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NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

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BY WALTER SULZBACH

INTRODUCTION BY HANS KOHN



American Council on Public Affairs

WASHINGTON, D. C.

American Council on Public Affairs

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INTRODUCTION

Prof. Sulzbach has written a helpful and hopeful book. In the age of nationalism which embraces the history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries for the peoples of European descent and that of the twentieth century for all the peoples of the earth, the sound understanding of nationalism, its nature, and its function, is of fundamental importance. Ever since the end of the eighteenth century, nationalism has been the most important single factor molding the public mind and determining history. It has filled peoples with the passionate belief that the organization of mankind into separate and sovereign nation-states is the ideal and "natural" form of political organization, that man's supreme loyalty is due the nation-state and that his existence is dependent upon cultural values nationally rooted and different from all other "national" values. From Western Europe this belief has gradually spread all over the globe. Today, in spite of all its fundamental qualities of division, nationalism is the most universal religion of all times. Under these circumstances it is easily understandable that many nationalists believe that nationalism is innate in man, instinctive and natural and therefore eternal. However, as I pointed out twenty years ago in my book *Nationalismus* (Vienna, 1922), nationalism is a late product of historical development, subject to disappearance through changing circumstances and the rise of new ideas. Further research and thought has only deepened my convictions as to this.

Prof. Sulzbach is in my opinion entirely right when he states that "education and agitation rather than instinct and faith are the terms explaining this greatest modern mass movement." He supports his thesis with a felicitous wealth of arguments and examples. In disproving the often heard "economic interpretation" of the rise and the development of nationalism, he greatly enhances the value of his book. Though economic interests and motivations are of course interwoven with many human actions and desires and have there

fore affected nationalist movements and aspirations, nevertheless nationalism has time and again acted in contradiction to all rational economic considerations. It may well be argued that the breakdown or weakness of capitalism is due to nationalist interference with economics. As Prof. Sulzbach puts it, "National wars are connected more with the concept of honor than with the idea of wealth. The nation is not an economic group."

Prof. Sulzbach's book is so hopeful because his conclusions point in the direction that nationalism and national consciousness need not exist forever. The de-politization of nationalism can happen in the future as the de-politization of religion has happened in the past. When interminable and ferocious religious wars threatened to destroy human happiness and civilization, the movement of enlightenment arose as a counteracting force. As a result, religion lost the element of coercion which had been so "natural" to it for many centuries; and its connection with the power of the state was severed. Gradually, religion retreated into the intimacy and spontaneity of the individual conscience. A similar de-politization of nationalism may arise out of the present war. For in this war there is a profound struggle between two different interpretations of nationalism. One of these attitudes is fundamentally opposed to any common human values, and therefore to any possible peaceful world order on the basis of equality. On the other hand, there is a viewpoint which recognizes the essential oneness of mankind and the desirability of a rational world order. These two different forms of nationalism are at death grip in this war.

A deepened study of the nature of nationalism is indispensable at the present time. Through our understanding of its origin, its development, and its characteristics, we will be better equipped to shape the future.

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PREFACE

In 1929 I wrote a book in German entitled *National Consciousness and Economic Interest*.¹ In it I tried to demonstrate the impossibility of explaining national consciousness and imperialism in economic terms.

The problem of national consciousness has become increasingly important in the years that have passed since that time. The basic problem of the peace conference after this war will be the adjustment of national consciousness to post-war conditions. New boundaries are already forming; old boundaries will either have ceased to exist or they will need revision because more than one nation will lay claim to disputed territories. Questions involving "what is right" will be raised, but more important will be the problem of limiting armaments. Rampant nationalism will have to be adapted to the demands of world security through the creation of some supernational organization.

Whatever the merit of the theories concerning nationalism set forth in the second part of this volume, the prevalent descriptions and explanations of national consciousness (discussed in the first section) are certainly most unsatisfactory.

The literature on nationalism is enormous, and some of it is excellent; nevertheless scholarship has left much to be desired in this field. So little original thought is to be found in books on nationalism that one is reminded of John Stuart Mill's remark about preconceived impressions: "The information which an ordinary traveller brings back from a foreign country, as the result of the evidence of his senses, is almost always such as exactly confirms the opinions with which he set out. He has had eyes and ears for such things only as he expected to see."²

¹*Nationales Gemeinschaftsgefühl und wirtschaftliches Interesse* (Leipzig, 1929).

²*A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive*, Book V, Chapter IV, paragraph 3.

It is with a profound feeling of obligation that I acknowledge certain debts. I owe more than formal thanks to the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars and to Claremont Colleges for the opportunity to work and teach in this country; and I owe more than mere words can convey to the late Dr. Russell M. Story, President of Claremont Colleges. Without his generous encouragement and advice this book would not have been written. To Mr. Willis Kerr, Librarian of Claremont Colleges, Mr. Luther J. Lee, of the faculty of Pomona College, and William Jay Gold, former managing editor of the *Virginia Quarterly Review* and consultant of the American Council on Public Affairs, I am obligated for invaluable editorial assistance.

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MODERN TRENDS

National consciousness is by far the most important force in modern times. Religion does not influence men so profoundly; and in times of stress even class solidarity has yielded to nationalism.

In the past men went to war against the followers of other religions. Today religious tolerance is symptomatic of a widespread indifference to religious controversies. Though there are points of friction between the Catholics and Protestants of almost every Occidental country, they are of little significance. It is more likely that the German and Czech nations will fight each other than that German and Czech Protestants should combine to make war against the Catholics of both countries. The Pope's influence is so unimportant in international affairs that modern history can almost ignore it. Nor has religion been able to maintain unimpaired its power over the followers of Islam. The attempt of the last Turkish Sultan to unite all Mohammedans against the British and the Russians in 1914 was a dismal failure; instead, the Mohammedan Arabs revolted against the Mohammedan Turks and allied themselves with the Christian British. No less significant is the fact that revolts of "pagan" colored races against white peoples invariably assume the form of national rather than religious movements.

The "class" consciousness so ardently fostered by the Communists has not been able to compete against the feeling of nationhood. Until August 1914 many people believed in the Marxist doctrine of the unity of the proletarians of all countries in spirit and interests, but with the outbreak of the First World War it immediately became clear that international solidarity was nothing more than a fiction which disappeared when the manhood of each nation, rich and poor alike, answered the call to arms with equal enthusiasm. When that war was over, Soviet Russia initiated a tremendous propaganda campaign in-

tended to unleash an international proletarian revolution. The attempt was futile. The Communist parties failed to win even a majority of the industrial laborers, let alone the whole population, in any country. Instead, Soviet Russia itself developed nationalistic tendencies; Peter the Great was reinstated as a national hero and admired together with Lenin and Stalin.

National consciousness has shown steady growth from the beginning of the nineteenth century. The wars for the unification of Italy, Germany, and Yugoslavia were fought for national aims. The movements and revolutions that brought about the downfall of the old Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires were national in character. It was chiefly national ambition which aroused enmity between France and Germany, each of which claimed Alsace-Lorraine as its rightful "possession." The First World War, too, was waged for national purposes. Some nations claimed "unredeemed" territory; others asserted that they could not feed their surplus populations unless they had colonies; still others were moved by the pressure of an alleged national "mission" which bade them fight for glory and more land. The peace treaties that followed the cessation of hostilities were designed to establish a better international order—a world "safe for democracy"—by drawing the boundaries of European states in conformity with the principle of nationality. Millions of people were freed from "foreign rule" in this way.

Still there was no lasting peace. New movements in Italy and Germany made a religion of nationalism. The slogan with which Hitler seized control in Germany and which led to the Second World War was "One Reich for all Germans and *Lebensraum* for the Reich." For the second time in one generation nationalism and national imperialism threatened to destroy the foundations of Western culture.

In the United States, a single bond of patriotism has been able to overcome the competing group feelings of the states of the Union. The history of the United States is primarily the history of melting-pot amalgamation and economic progress rather than a story of boundary disputes. The Latin American countries, on the other hand, have constantly bickered over boundaries. Asia and, to a lesser extent, Africa have been torn by "national awakenings" since the "peace" of 1919.

If we turn from a consideration of the outward manifestations of national feeling to its psychological aspects, the first fact to be ob-

served is that men apparently regard their affection for their compatriots as "instinctive." They do not, however, believe in "instinctive" attitudes in religion, social ideals, or economic institutions. What we know about religion we learn from our parents and teachers or from books. Christians are not Christians because of some special somatic or psychological endowment which the followers of other religions lack; they are Christians because Jesus Christ preached a doctrine that has been transmitted from generation to generation. There would be no Mohammedans if the Prophet had not existed. In the same way it is generally taken for granted that the solidarity, if any, of the proletarians or of the middle class or of the landowners is built up through learning, thinking, choosing. There is nothing "instinctive" in the origin of trade unions or trusts, nor does a man instinctively join one political party today and another tomorrow. But every patriot asserts that his "nation" holds first claim on his loyalty; he believes himself to be controlled by "instinct"—sometimes described as the "voice of the blood." If he is an American, he has affection for the American people; if he is a German, he prefers the Germans; if he is a Brazilian he must feel Brazilian national consciousness. Furthermore, all nationally conscious people tend to take for granted their own indifference to, or their own dislike of, members of other nations and foreign nations as a whole.

The truth is of course different. It should be evident that no one would have national consciousness if he had never been instructed in the differences that exist in the languages and histories of various nations. But the patriot feels that in learning these things he merely becomes aware of ideas already existing in his unconscious mind. He believes that his parents or teachers assisted him in exploring his own mind, but contributed nothing beyond that.

The conviction that national consciousness is in some way "instinctive" is so generally accepted that it is at times almost inimical to the interests of democratic governments. Hitler was able to fulfill purely imperialistic aims by shattering the French and the British will to resist through the effective manipulation of the slogan of "national self-determination." It was certainly not in the interests of the Western democracies to permit Germany to grab Austria and the Sudetenland on the pretext of bringing Germans back to the Reich. The majority of the French and the English felt that the demand for "one Reich" was not artificial, but "natural" and "in-

stinctive"; indeed Europe might have remained at peace indefinitely if such national "instincts" had not been allowed to have their way. Had England and France been ruled by absolute monarchs in 1938, they might have regarded Germany's encroachments upon her neighbors as a menace to the balance of power, and they would have been unmoved by the theory that the boundaries of states should depend on the popular sentiments of their subjects. In that case Hitler could not have scored all his initial successes in the international field simply by using the democratic principle of "national self-determination."

It is not necessary here to discuss at length the definition and meaning of "instinct," for an extensive substantial literature on this subject has been developed. It is enough to point out that the impulses a mother feels toward her children differ from those of a person joining a commercial partnership or a social club. The nationally conscious patriot believes that his relationship to his nation is primarily that of the family pattern and not that of the commercial type. This does not mean that he is, as a rule, unaware of the related economic interests involved. Since the general meaning of "instinct" is disputed and even its application to the parent-child relationship is questioned, the term "impulse" more accurately describes the natural force which allegedly draws co-nationals together.¹

The existence and dynamic power of modern national consciousness cannot be explained by the theory of the "voice of the blood," by a belief in the congeniality of people with the same "national character," a common language, common traditions or economic interests. Belief in these factors is in itself a secondary phenomenon of national consciousness. Where an intense national consciousness actually has arisen from other causes, various illusions have developed as a consequence. Although many impulses underly national solidarity, they differ from those whose existence is generally assumed.

Even more perplexing than the self-delusions of nations as to their *raison d'être* is the paradox of the private and the national lives of modern patriots. The national wars of the last hundred years have cost more lives than all the dynastic wars of past centuries. Future wars, the armaments race, and worldwide unrest now threaten to impoverish entire populations and destroy our civilization. Yet everywhere millions of people willingly sacrifice their lives and fortunes in

¹For definitions of "instinct" see Pierre Bovet, *The Fighting Instinct* (London, 1923), p 41

order that their nations may live and thrive. Although their emotions reach a peak only when stimulated by conflict and war, or by situations involving national honor, they earnestly believe that their individual lives are worthless outside of the frame of their nation.

But the same people, as individuals, act as if such a thing as a nation did not exist. The majority of the inhabitants of Danzig certainly desired reunion with the Reich, at least during the period of the German Republic. But because Danzig prospered economically as a Free City under the control of the League of Nations, there was no migration from Danzig to Germany; the reverse was true. To the Germans of the Sudetenland their national grievances were important enough to lead them toward a European war but not strong enough to cause them to leave the Czechoslovak Republic in any appreciable numbers. The politically minded Germans, no matter what their party loyalties were, had one all-important objective after 1919—the destruction of the Versailles Treaty. But an analysis of the suicides in Germany during the post-war period reveals that, practically speaking, no individual thought his life was worthless because Germany was forbidden to have an army based on conscription, or because the Rhineland was garrisoned by foreign troops, or because the Polish Corridor was cut through German territory. Suicides were motivated, as usual, by poverty, unemployment, illness, and frustrated love. During the same period, as members of a nation, Germans were faced with national grievances constantly presaging new wars with a fresh toll of millions of lives. To individual Germans, however, these national grievances were of little significance. In European boundary regions—that is, where Poles and Lithuanians, Italians and Yugoslavs, Germans and Danes live in close contact—national strife and rivalry affect the daily life of the people. People living in such regions are convinced that an unchangeable law of nature determines differences between neighboring peoples. Thus a few square miles of territory along a boundary assume overwhelming importance. If the same people emigrate to America or Australia, the whole matter is forgotten—if not by the, certainly by their children. In their new environment they can be congenial with a former enemy.

Obviously any account of modern national consciousness must take into consideration this contradiction between a man's attitude as private individual and his attitude as a member of a nation. Certain emotions, not usually present, may move men to entertain such confused

views of themselves and of the society in which they live that they become blind to the forces behind their own ideologies. Only logic and experience can uncover them. Our starting point, then, is the fact that contemporary man regards as "natural," and more or less fated, a pattern of group solidarity that is fictional. Unless study or experience has convinced him to the contrary, he believes that national feeling has existed throughout all history; actually it is of very recent origin. He imagines that under the stress of certain emotions he would be willing to live and die for his nation although in his daily life he follows a course of action that practically ignores the existence of a "nation."

An investigation of the phenomenon of national consciousness must approach the subject from two points of view: that of the individuals who compose a nation, and that of the nation as an entity.

Where does the individual's knowledge of his country and its history, his political opinions and concept of patriotic duties come from? Chiefly from parents, teachers, newspapers, books, and propaganda. Some men add their own ideas to what they have learned from others, making selections from a mass of conflicting views; but the majority follows the beaten track. Otherwise there might be as many opinions as there are human beings, and there would not be enough political parties or nations to express so many different aims.

But men have been taught different ideas at different periods; and where there is liberty of opinion, they are free to choose any doctrine. The mediæval church was anti-patriotic and internationally minded; so is modern Marxism, although for different reasons. Man is to a great extent the product of his environment, so that education as well as agitation can achieve much. The dictatorships of today have proven anew how comparatively easy it is to make the younger generation believe whatever it is told. The dictators adapted educational systems to their own purposes and thus molded the youth of their countries as they liked.

It is only a small step from these premises to the conclusion that national consciousness is not inevitable. If it is man-made and man-communicated, man can destroy and replace it. Education and agitation rather than instinct and fate are the terms explaining this greatest modern mass movement.

But when the investigator considers not individuals as such, but a nation as an entity, he may reach a different conclusion. Now he no

longer notices the single wave, but the ocean. The thoughts and acts of millions of individuals straighten out into a common level, and the result is a general view of history that has form and pattern. Certain great changes seem to overtake all peoples at some stage in their history. They have all gone through the stage of totems and taboos. All were at one time hunters and had to invent or copy the skills of agriculture. Slavery has been almost universal. Where a high degree of culture has developed, skepticism has undermined religion, and has itself often been followed by a religious revival. The industrial revolution has swept over every continent. National feeling has arisen or has appeared to arise wherever there are human beings.

Therefore, as soon as the investigator chooses a method of approach more or less similar to that of a philosophy of history, the emphasis on the influence of teachers and agitators on individuals seems misleading. There is evidently something fundamental in mass attitudes such as national consciousness that is more than coincidental. It is very doubtful whether in the long run the convictions of men can be molded arbitrarily. The task of the investigator requires him not merely to show, in the words of Leopold Ranke, "how it has really been," but also to explain why it was bound to happen in this way, and this way alone.

No answer to the question "What is a nation, what is national consciousness?" will be satisfactory that does not attempt to give the proper place to both necessity and coincidence.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The following pages do not by any means offer a history of national consciousness. A satisfactory survey of the historical development of national feeling could not be made at the present time because, extraordinarily enough, considering the importance of the subject, the preliminary studies necessary for such a survey are lacking. Ever since national consciousness has developed into a world force, most historians seem to have more or less unconsciously felt that, as René Johannet has put it, "*la méditation des origines*" may have consequences fatal to a nation.¹

✓ In a study of nationalism, historical facts must be recognized and interpreted within the frame of the general problem. The ancestors of modern nationally-conscious man were as a rule quite indifferent toward state boundaries as related to language boundaries; none the less, the modern nations which struggled for a century and a half to form and limit themselves as well as to expand were determined by the states of the past. ✓

Greek patriotism came very close to the modern version insofar as intensive attachment to the state is concerned. However, at certain points it differed from modern patriotism. A large part of the inhabitants of the Greek city-state was neither expected nor allowed to take an interest in public affairs. This was reflected in the use the Greeks

¹"The only thing pertaining to nationalism about which I should be willing at present to commit myself in definite language is that it is the most fertile field for doctoral dissertations in modern history with which I am acquainted. . . . It offers the richest possibilities of immediate return of any species of historical undertakings now in sight. I do not think I exaggerate when I say that hundreds of monographs must be written before it will be possible to say with authority what nationalism was in the past, what it is now, or what it is likely to become." William T. Laprade, "Nationalism," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1915*, p. 228.

A very useful *Bibliographical Introduction to Nationalism*, by Koppel S. Pinson, has been published by the Columbia University Press (New York, 1935).

made of military conscription. In the Greek cities, every citizen was compelled to perform military service; but the citizen was also a proprietor who lived by the work of his slaves in the fields or in the workshops. He had a direct interest in defending the sacred soil of his forefathers, for it actually belonged to him. The slaves, the freedmen, and foreign residents were never called to arms. Even poor citizens who could not afford military equipment were left behind. "Nobody would ever have dreamt of imposing the burdens of military service and the terrible risks of war upon men who, having nothing, had nothing to defend."²

The Greek city-states had an inter-relationship in which the "barbarians"—the stammerers who spoke in incomprehensible tongues—found no place. A number of institutions like the Olympic Games and the Oracle of Delphi were common to all the Greek-speaking peoples, but the barbarians were excluded. Nevertheless, wars of the Greek cities against each other occurred frequently; they were not felt to be "unnatural" or criminal as civil wars are thought of at present. There were no attempts of any importance to bring all the Greek-speaking peoples together into one community—the goal of modern national consciousness. The traditional Greek religion was so strongly associated with the city and its gods that every voluntary amalgamation of several cities would have involved a difficult religious adjustment. The Greek conception that the State is the City, that "he who goes out of the City goes out of the State," was reflected in the colonial system. To quote Sir J. R. Seeley: "Though it seems not to have occurred to Corinth that it could possibly carry on government at the distance of Sicily, on the other hand it seems just as little to have occurred to the Spanish or Portuguese or Dutch or French or English governments that their emigrants could pretend to independence on the ground that they were hidden away in the Pampas of South America or in the Archipelagos of the Pacific Ocean."³

The patriotism of the Romans at the beginning of their history meant pride in the city, its gods and legends. In this Rome followed the Greek pattern. But it never came about through the expansion of Roman rule that all inhabitants of Italy or all who spoke Latin became Roman patriots, although toward the close of the Empire

²Francis Delaisi, *Political Myths and Economic Realities* (London, 1925), p. 209.

³Sir J. R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England* (London, 1895), pp. 46-47.

Roman citizenship was made universal. Between the earliest and the latest periods, selected individuals from all parts of the Empire, freed slaves, and sometimes entire tribes, were honored with the gift of citizenship. Roman patriotism was reserved for the citizens of Rome, but gratitude for the *Pax Romana* was shared by many of the conquered. There was no doctrine or demand that certain people, possibly defined by their language, ought to have a sovereign government of their own. If there had been, the Roman Empire might have been destroyed earlier. As it was, external forces contributed more to its downfall than did internal unrest.

The Christian Middle Ages, as well as the succeeding centuries up to the end of the eighteenth, were characterized by an almost complete indifference on the part of the people to state boundaries and the nationality of their rulers.⁴ To be sure, people of the Middle Ages made a distinction between just and unjust, lenient and cruel rulers; they were aware that they were "Germans," "Frenchmen," "Englishmen," or "Scotchmen"; there were "national" conflicts during the Crusades; and the students in universities were often housed according to their respective "nations." But it did not occur to the people that language, state, and government should form the basis of a certain relationship. There were no slogans comparable to "France for the French" or "Germany for the Germans."

The discussion among various historians as to whether modern national consciousness in Europe began with the French Revolution or had its origin much earlier is a dispute over words. The answer depends on how "national consciousness" is defined. Everyone agrees upon two points: people speaking different languages were aware of their differences and often proud of the accomplishments of other members of their own language groups; on the other hand Germans, Spaniards, Frenchmen, etc., had no conception of or desire for a national state. As late as the eighteenth century Voltaire could write: "That the princes are all the time maintaining so many soldiers, is really a deplorable disaster. But . . . this disaster produces something desirable: the people take no interest in the wars of their masters. The inhabitants of beleaguered cities pass often from one sovereignty to the other without a single one of them having lost his life. They are only the prize of him who has the most cannons and money."⁴

⁴"*Essai sur les Moeurs*," quoted by Julien Benda, *La Trahison des Clercs* (Paris, 1927), p. 253.

Until fairly recent times it was possible for the king of England to be at the same time king of Hanover in Germany; for the king of Prussia to rule in Neuchâtel, Switzerland; and for the Hapsburg dynasty to have provinces in Germany, Hungary, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, and Alsace.

When the Germans first came in contact with the Roman world they felt various tribal solidarities, but no national consciousness whatever. Even in the tenth century we find Widukind mentioning the *regnum* of the Saxons but not of the German nation. In the battle of the Catalonian plains, 451 A.D., the Eastern Goths fought on the side of the Huns, the Western Goths on the side of the Romans. The Goth, Jordanis, declared that it was the mission of the Goths to sacrifice themselves for the Roman people. During the war of the Byzantines against the Goths, a part of the latter sided with Byzantium.

After the realm of Charlemagne had been divided, the Franks in the East and in the West continued to feel that they were all Franks. The same can be said of the Saxons and Anglo-Saxons after they had separated. The Bavarians felt a relationship with the Langobards, although the latter had been strongly Romanized. But no sentiment knitted all Germans together.

Some great battles of the Middle Ages, considered today as national events, were in reality nothing of the kind. The battle of Legnano in 1176, in which the Lombard League defeated Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, was a local affair, and Italians fought on both sides. At Bouvines, where the king of France gained a victory over the king of England in 1214, there were Frenchmen in both armies.⁵ Mediæval man regarded himself as a knight or a peasant, according to his "estate." He was a Christian, and as such, was opposed to Mohammedans and pagans. But it is very doubtful if the Frank of the ninth century thought of himself as a German when he came in contact with Slavs and Arabs. Voluntary loyalty was valued more highly than attachment to one's people and one's country. On this voluntary loyalty the feudal system was built. The dominant factors motivating the loyalties of the Middle Ages were, first, the universal tie of religion, and second, the bond of regional relations. In between these two ties there was nothing.

In 1240 Vincent de Beauvais said: "He is yet weak who is capti-

⁵Robert Michels, "Zur Historischen Analyse des Patriotismus," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik*. Band 36.

vated (chained) by his native land. He is strong to whom any country is his native land, he is perfect to whom the whole world becomes a place of exile." If there was no feeling of relationship between all the Germanic and between all the Romanic peoples, a strong tendency existed in the West to regard the Eastern, Byzantine Christians, the "Greeks," as altogether different from the "true" Christians, and not very different from the Mohammedan Saracens.⁶

A German scholar, Clara Redlich, has made an interesting study of the question of national consciousness in relation to the mediæval colonization of the Slavic East by the Germans.⁷ She shows that the Germans regarded themselves as Christians fighting pagans. That their pagan enemies were also Slavs was of no importance. Had they been Germans, the attitude of hostility would have been the same. The moment the Slavs were converted to Christianity, they were regarded as friends. The Slavic nobles were fully accepted by the German nobles. In Pomerania the German princes concealed from their warriors the fact that the natives had already been converted to Christianity as they were afraid that their men would decline to fight. The Wends, a Slavic tribe east of the Elbe, put up no resistance whatever against absorption by the Germans. The upper classes were even eager to be accepted by their German peers. There remained only Wends of low social standing who were despised because of their social inferiority, not because they were Wends.

Beginning with the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, expressions bringing language and state into some relationship began to be more frequent. It may be said that these statements are "national" in the modern sense. The Czech reformer, Jan Hus (1370-1415), proclaimed: "The Bohemians must be the first in the kingdom of Bohemia, as are the French in the kingdom of France. The laws, the divine will, the natural instinct, command that they shall occupy the first place."⁸ This is similar in thought to the words of King Henri IV of France (1553-1610), when he received the deputies of the newly acquired provinces of La Bresse and Pays de Gers: "As you speak the French language by nature, it is reasonable that you should be the subjects of a king of France. I quite agree that the Spanish language should

⁶Richard Wallach, *Das abendländische Gemeinschaftsbewusstsein im Mittelalter* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1928).

⁷*Nationale Frage und Ostkolonisation im Mittelalter* (Berlin, 1934).

belong to the Spaniard and the German to the German. But the whole region of the French language must be mine."⁹

In the beginning of the sixteenth century Machiavelli advocated the unity of Italy, and Ulrich von Hutten sought the same for Germany. The latter proclaimed that the Germans ought not to be dominated by the Italians; actually he referred to the Catholic clergy and the Italian Pope in Rome rather than to the government. Hutten, it should be remembered, was a Protestant. Protestantism made it possible for the people to read the Bible in their own language, and dealt a strong blow to Latin, which was gradually replaced by the national idiom as the language used in literature and by educated people. In the break-up of mediæval internationalism, Protestantism played an important part.

Utterances like those of Hus and Henri IV are significant in that they closely approach the definition of nationality in our times. Are we to infer, in spite of indications to the contrary, that this principle has been acknowledged for several centuries? Hardly. The kings and aristocrats who ruled the various countries and cities were eager either to keep and protect the territories under their sovereignty or to enlarge them; where expansion was their aim they paid no attention whatever to the languages and the traditions of the conquered people. The intellectuals of the era were mainly clerics, governmental advisers, or teachers whose livelihood was dependent on the good will of the church, the government, or both. They produced few ideas which would have brought them into conflict with the aims of the existing authorities.

As to the masses, we hear a great deal about occasional revolts against hard and cruel rulers and about religious struggles, but nothing about popular movements aimed at uniting "nations" under "national" governments. The statements of Hus and Henri IV were not typical for their centuries. Even in modern times, when we find some intellectuals clamoring for national states, the extent of their influence upon the masses should not be overrated. Carlton J. H. Hayes, in *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, speaks of Rousseau, Herder, the Jacobins, Bentham, Mazzini, Maurras, and others. Friedrich Meinecke, in *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat*, writes about Humboldt, Schlegel, Fichte, Hegel, Ranke, Bismarck, etc. These were

⁸J. Novicow, *Conscience et Volonté Sociales* (Paris, 1897), p. 313.

⁹*Ibid.*

all intellectuals or political leaders. A history of national consciousness should not, like a history of philosophy, simply describe the thought of a limited number of eminent men without regard to the extent of their following. As in the histories of religions, we need to know what response the masses have given to different doctrines. Before the nineteenth century it appears that the people at large were indifferent to what we call the "principle of nationality." Everything happened as if they had experienced no national consciousness.

The Reformation did not have the effect of secularizing politics immediately, although it contributed to this process in the long run. The interest of the reformers was, of course, primarily theological, and under their influence men continued to regard as justified only those wars in which the belligerents represented different theological concepts. "One mass," exclaimed Knox, "is more fearful to me than if 10,000 armed enemies were landed in any part of the realm."

"Dogmatic agreement still formed the principle of alliance and all co-operation with heretics was deemed a sin . . . Italy, Spain, Germany and the Netherlands swarmed with writings denouncing the alliance of the French with the Swedes as little short of apostasy from Christianity."¹⁰ As late as the early eighteenth century when Northern France was invaded during the war of the Spanish Succession, it was possible for Fénelon to tell the suffering population that this was a just chastisement for their sins. A modern French author who relates this adds: "One may imagine what would have been the reception given to a preacher who might have spoken in the same way to the French in August, 1914."¹¹

At the time of the French civil wars the Leaguists appealed for help to the Spaniards, while the Huguenots appealed to the English and the Dutch. In the German religious wars the German Protestants appealed to the Danes and the Swedes, and later even to the Catholic French. The German Catholics asked the Spaniards and Italians for help. National loyalty counted for so little that the Protestant League of Schmalkalden sought an alliance with France against the Emperor. The Grand Elector of Brandenburg, in the seventeenth century, was willing to help the Emperor against the Turks only on condition that the latter should recognize the occupation of Strasbourg by Louis

¹⁰William E. H. Lecky, *History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe* (London, 1913), Vol. II, pp. 42 and 108.

¹¹Julien Benda, *La Trahison des Clercs* (Paris, 1927), p. 205.

XIV. In the Thirty Years' War a soldier fought for whoever paid him. During the wars of the Fronde the Prince de Condé and Marshal Turenne went over to the Spaniards and besieged French fortresses. Condé remained in the Spanish service for nine years. He was treated by France, not as a traitor, but as a belligerent party, and was graciously re-accepted after he had written an excuse. A few years later he again commanded a French army against Spain. And at that time the idea that one's native land had some claim to loyalty found more approval in France than in any other country.¹²

The German people in general believe today that the French are their "hereditary enemy" (*Erbfeind*), and the French believe the same of the Germans. But history tells a very different story. Every German prince who ever had trouble with the Emperor, looked to the king of France for help. German Protestantism could resist the Hapsburgs only with French support. It was Richelieu who suggested and financed the entry of the Swedish king, Gustavus Adolphus, into the Thirty years War. The Grand Elector of Brandenburg, one of the great Hohenzollerns, favored the annexation of Alsace by France because it was detrimental to the Emperor. Frederick the Great of Prussia held that France should have the Rhine as her frontier in the East. In short the numerous German sovereigns were concerned solely with their own positions and possessions. For them there was no German "nation."

In 1930 a nationally-minded modern German historian, Johannes Haller, wrote a book, *Tausend Jahre Deutsch-Französischer Beziehungen*. This book contains 230 pages, but the author arrives at the French Revolution on page 63, and on page 94 he begins to discuss events after 1815. The reason for this apparent lack of proportion is that until the French Revolution, dynastic rather than national considerations determined the foreign policies of states; and there were really no relations between a "Germany" and a "France." Haller emphasizes that national factors played no role in determining the sections into which Charlemagne's Empire was divided at Verdun in 843. "It was not the contrast and antagonism between the Germans and the French which brought about the states of Germany and France; on the contrary, it was the separation of the kingdoms which made possible and favored the formation of the nations. It was not

¹²Michels, *op. cit.*

so, as we are prone to think, that the states grew out of the nations; it was the nations which owe their origin to the states."

Many Germans have fought under French kings. In the old French army, regiments were called Royal-Allemands, Royal-Bavière, Royal-Deux-Ponts, and so on. And even in 1813, when Napoleon had been defeated at Leipzig, the victorious Allies—including the Austrian emperor and the king of Prussia—offered Napoleon the "natural frontiers" of France—which meant the Rhine in the East. They did not find it objectionable to hand over to France millions of Germans on the left bank of the Rhine. That Napoleon was short-sighted enough to refuse their offer is another matter.

Frederick II of Prussia (1740-86), who plays such an important role in the German national myth and is claimed by Hitler as the "first National Socialist"—his portrait is said to adorn Hitler's private office—is remembered chiefly because he was a successful army leader. But there was nothing German in his inclinations. His friends, Voltaire and La Mettrie for example, were French; he wrote his books in French; and, when he was forty-six years of age, he confessed to speaking German "like a coachman," but thought that he was then too old to learn it properly. Though he fought and defeated French armies, strange as it appears, his patriotism was French. "Frederick regarded his subjects as strangers and the French *hommes d'esprit* as his compatriots."¹³ In 1785 he made an attempt to bring all the German princes into a defensive alliance against the (German!) Emperor. His minister, Hertzberg, drafted a memorandum which was written in French and intended for the European governments. It was inspired by Frederick. This document by the "first National Socialist" should be of interest to those who believe that national feeling is "natural" and has always existed. It states that all the powers of the Continent are as much interested in the constitution of the German Empire as its own members. "Germany is situated in the middle of Europe, it is densely inhabited, and its people are warlike. A great number of distinguished princes under a powerful chief rule the country. Germany need not fear an attack from outside; at the same time she is unable to conquer other countries. But should it ever happen that Germany would be ruled by a sole shrewd, and ambitious monarch, he would find it easy to subdue

¹³Mme. de Staël, *De L'Allemagne* (Paris, 1813), Vol. I, p. 151.

one neighbor after the other, even the most powerful one, and open the way to the Universal Monarchy (*Universalmonarchie*) of Europe." The document cites Charlemagne and Otto the Great, and their subjection of Germany, Italy, Denmark, Poland, and Hungary. "For this reason the neighboring powers have always come to the help of the German princes, when these were in danger of being overcome by the Emperor." Such assistance was given by the kings of France and Sweden. Eventually, the constitution worked out at the end of the Thirty Years War put Germany under the protection of France and Sweden.¹⁴

"Even Bodin and Montesquieu, though they recognize the influence of climate and soil on the character of peoples and the nature of their constitutions, have nothing to say of the spirit which makes a nation or the significance of nationality."¹⁵ Rousseau held the opinion that the area of a state should be determined by the ideal of autarchy for its population. "Voltaire and his friends have their infatuations but they are for peoples and countries other than their own; England first, then China and America."¹⁶ Frenchmen of 1770 were completely Europeans; they were probably the most mature Europeans that Europe has produced.

The classical German poets and philosophers were also radically cosmopolitan and anti-patriotic. Johann Gottfried Herder said: "Among all those who are conceited the one who glories in his nation and the one who glories in his birth and nobility are in my opinion the greatest fools." Lessing once called patriotism "a heroic weakness." Schiller declared in 1784: "I write as a citizen of the world (Weltbürger). I have lost my native country at the right time and exchanged it for the wide world. Germans, don't attempt to be a nation; be content to be human beings." In 1789 he wrote in a letter: "The patriotic interest is important only for immature nations, for the youth of the world. . . . It is a miserable, narrow-minded ideal to write for a single nation. A philosophic mind finds these bounds quite unbearable." Kant was interested in the suppression of war and in a league of nations. Goethe's cosmopolitanism is well known;

¹⁴Karl Klüpfel, *Die Deutschen Einheitsbestrebungen in ihrem geschichtlichen Zusammenhang* (Leipzig, 1853), pp. 270ff.

¹⁵Ernest Barker, *National Character and the Factors in its Formation* (London, 1927), p. 123.

¹⁶H. F. Steward and Paul Desjardins, *French Patriotism in the Nineteenth Century (1814-1833)* (Cambridge, 1923), p. XXVI.

¹⁷Klüpfel, *op. cit.*, p. XXXII.

he was an admirer of Napoleon, and when his son wished to volunteer for the War of Liberation of 1813, Goethe deterred him.¹⁸

UNITING AND DIVIDING FORCES AT WORK

Instinct seems to have played no part in the formation of groups that later experienced national consciousness. History supports the premise that such groups are man-made.

One of the few really important books on national consciousness and nationality is René Johannet's *Le Principe des Nationalités*.¹⁹ Johannet, a French nationalist and royalist himself, sheds light on the part played by dynasties. "The cause of the statue is not the marble but the artist. In case of nationality, it is primarily the dynasty."²⁰ Kings invariably know their aims, and are able to organize their people. This fact was first noticed by a Frenchman, Ernest Renan: "If there is one nation which was created by a family, then it was the French nation, which owes its existence to the Capetians."²¹

In England it was dynastic forces which first linked Scotland with England, and later incorporated it into Great Britain. The decay of Ireland can be attributed to the lack of a dynasty. The case of Spain is more pertinent. Spain's emergence as a power in the fifteenth century was the result of a marriage. In the Iberian peninsula the destinies of Catalonia were bound up with those of Castile. Portugal remained by itself because of the existence of the house of Braganza at Lisbon. There was no equivalent strength at Barcelona or Valencia, for their Arab dynasty had been expelled in the thirteenth century.²²

The unity of France is the result of the imperialism of the Capetian dynasty, just as the unity of Italy is the result of Roman imperialism. At the time of the Punic Wars numberless interpreters were needed to travel from Milan to Tarentum. The people still spoke Gallic in the valley of the Po, Etruscan near Lake Trasimene, Greek and Messapian in Southern Italy, and in addition, there were Italian idioms much alive right at the very doors of Rome. More recently, the name of France brought maledictions in Brittany and in Provence. . . . What Proudhon calls *la politique unitaire*, a phenomenon of which an immense part coincides with what the nineteenth century has known under the name of the principle of nationalities, is a collection of territories which the imperialistic idea could explain better than the national idea.²³

¹⁸Paul Barth, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie* (Leipzig, 1915), p. 772.

¹⁹(Paris, 1923).

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 400.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 400.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 400.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 308.

This implies that certain individuals and groups of individuals have united people, and likewise have separated them. Those who have been molded in this way, later feel that they belong together because of a national consciousness, which they assume is an inviolable part of their very nature.

A view of history convinces us that the nation of the theorists—the pure, closed, independent nation—has never existed. But the Empire has had a very real existence; and the flourishing condition of the contemporary nations is only one aspect of the new methods introduced in the sixteenth century by the eternal imperialism. The modern fact of nationality exists only as a consequence of the fact of imperialism. . . . The empire explains the nation better than the nation the empire.²⁴

Karl Marx, despite his preference for great nations and his indifference toward small ones (he expected the proletarian revolution to take place first in large industrialized countries), gives the following account of the unification of the French nation:

During the Middle Ages, the nation of Southern France was not more related to the nation of Northern France than the Poles are today to the Russians. . . . Nevertheless it suffered the fate of Poland, and was first divided between Northern France and England and later subjugated by Northern France alone. . . . The people of Southern France fought for centuries against their oppressors. But history had no mercy. After three centuries of struggles their beautiful language had degenerated to a patois, and they themselves had become Frenchmen.

Their end came during the Great Revolution. The Constituent Assembly deprived them of the last remnants of their autonomy by destroying the historical provinces, but “as a compensation for their nationality” the Southerners received democracy.²⁵

The brutal methods of the old dynasties have sometimes been repeated in contemporary times. The Bulgars and the Greeks made use in Macedonia of what might be called *massacres plebiscitaires*. The Turks exterminated at least 150,000 Lebanese between 1914 and 1918, not to mention the deportation of the Armenians.²⁶

In many cases governments have erected boundaries based upon language differences and, as a consequence separated groups otherwise cohesive. In this way the boundaries were drawn between Germany and Holland, and between Spain and Portugal. Originally there were numerous dialects in Germany and in the Iberian Peninsula. Through

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 306.

²⁵Article written 1848; quoted by Heinrich Cunow, *Die Marxsche Geschichts-, Gesellschafts- und Staatstheorie* (Berlin, 1921), Vol. II, p. 12.

²⁶Johannet, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

causes having no relation to the language situation, Portugal and Holland became separate sovereign states; Portuguese and Dutch in time ceased to be dialects and evolved into separate languages. Eventually language differences added to the boundary lines between the states, resulted in the creation of separate nationalities.

Dynastic marriages have been responsible for the establishment of several nations. The union between England and Scotland came about in that way. Henry VIII's secession from the church of Rome originated in his desire for a divorce and a new marriage. Its consequences were tremendous. Luther kept himself and Protestantism in good favor with his Saxon prince by accepting the latter's right to two legitimate wives at the same time. By helping German Protestantism at a critical time, he thus became an important factor in German national history. That wars have produced or molded nations is not quite as paradoxical as the fact that marriages have had the same effect. But this involved no paradox to predemocratic minds; both war and love are quoted together in the famous verse addressed to the House of Hapsburg:

Bella gerant alii,
Tu, felix Austria, nube,
Nam quae Mars aliis
Dat tibi diva Venus.²⁷

One must beware of the word, "impossible," in matters of national molding and remolding. The Germans and Russians were by no means sentimental toward the Poles; yet they acknowledged the command "Thou shalt not kill" and recoiled from extreme brutality. Had they treated the Poles as the Turks treated the Greeks after the victory of Kemal Pasha, or in the way Hitler has treated the Jews, there would have been fewer Poles left, and these might have been more willing to give up their language and forget their nationality. Persecution is ineffective when done half-heartedly; but, when it is done so that even the lives of the persecuted count for nothing, it can be very successful. The several modern dictatorships have proved that if one kills, deports or imprisons all who disobey, the results are far-

²⁷May others fight wars,
You, happy Austria, marry!
For what Mars gives to the others,
Divine Venus gives you.

reaching. The age of intentional and unintentional nation-making has not yet come to an end.²⁸

The so-called aristocratic groups have also played the role of nation-makers. These groups are made up of the elite to whom the people at large look for leadership, and whom they are inclined to believe and imitate. The elite may be an aristocracy of birth or an aristocracy of culture and knowledge. In the latter case it coincides with the intellectuals.

The aristocracy was sometimes the first group to give up the native language and customs, and to associate with conquerors, in the event of defeat. This was true of most of the Slavic nobles at the time of the German conquest of the territory east of the Elbe. They acknowledged the superior culture of the Germans, and the latter's Christian religion impressed them. Having lost their own aristocracy, the Slavic masses were ready to be Germanized without further resistance. Other cases could be cited where the aristocracy of the victors took over the land of the conquered, identifying themselves with the vanquished people and becoming *their* aristocracy. Part of the German higher strata thus influenced the Czechs after the early seventeenth century. English aristocrats who settled in Ireland made themselves to some extent leaders of the Irish people. In both cases a strong new force was added and the consequences became evident in the course of time.

Aristocracy of birth has played an important part in strengthening national consciousness and in leading national resistance and aggression in countries where the people continued to hold the nobility in particular respect; this is true in spite of the rise of democratic tendencies which have everywhere coincided with the development of modern nationalism. Such was the case with the Hungarians and the Poles. But in most countries the intellectual leaders, rather than the aristocrats by birth, have been regarded as the pace-makers.

The part played by the intellectuals has been and continues to be extremely important. "Patriotic enthusiasm and patriotic activity are represented in the history of the people, first and foremost, by the aristocracy of education and culture."²⁹ It was not the people of

²⁸"A fatherland (*patrie*) is a group of men who live under the same laws, because they themselves or their forefathers have been induced to obey the same sovereign, the same government, either voluntarily or because they were forced; as a rule they were forced." Gustave Hervé, *Leur Patrie* (Paris, 1907), p. 11.

²⁹Robert Michels, *Italien von heute* (Zürich und Leipzig, 1930), p. 20.

Prussia who rose against the French in 1813, but principally the intellectuals. The same holds true of the Italian Risorgimento. "Among the ninety-five patriots who were executed in Naples in 1799 because they had been the ringleaders of a movement against the Bourbons, there were twenty lawyers, twenty officers and non-commissioned officers, seventeen professors and authors, twelve owners of houses and land, ten physicians, five merchants, three fencing masters, two officials, one banker, two peasants and only three workmen."³⁰ In November, 1939, the German authorities had twelve Czech nationalist ringleaders shot at Prague. Nine of them were students.

Speaking of the various types of elite, Johannet points out that the bourgeoisie of Alsace put up the strongest resistance to Germanization and that Gaul's Romanization was undoubtedly brought about by the alliance of her aristocrats with the Roman democracy. "There is hardly a nationality without aristocracy."³¹ The French Canadians have continued as such and have multiplied, thanks to their clergy. They have even assimilated many Anglo-Saxons. "The same thing can be said of the Bulgars, the Serbs, the Greeks under the domination of the Turks, and the Parsis in India. The nationalities without aristocracy, intellectuals, and clergy are more easily assimilable."³²

It goes without saying that every philosophical, sociological, and political attitude is represented by some intellectuals—"a social class which lives from the trade in ideas."³³ Our task here is to show that the idea of nationality, like other ideas, originated with and was propagated by intellectuals. Their weapon has been persuasion, not force. Though many of them have argued in favor of national consciousness as a "natural" affection felt by compatriots for each other, it would be difficult to find a class of human beings more removed from nature and natural instincts, and professionally more rationalistic, than the intellectuals. A certain amount of suspicion is warranted when, of all people, the intellectuals discover a "natural" pattern of social affection.

The intellectuals, who include poets and artists, have stimulated cultural relationships and an awareness of common interests among people speaking the same language, without always suggesting political

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 21.

³¹Johannet, *op. cit.*, pp. 405-406.

³²*Ibid.*, pp. 395-396.

³³*Ibid.*, p. 236.

aims. Pan-Hellenic feeling in antiquity had its roots, in a great measure, in the common knowledge and appreciation of the Homeric epics narrating the conquest of Troy by an expedition in which every Greek tribe participated. Through all the centuries of Roman and Turkish rule the Greeks never entirely lost the pride in their past. In regard to modern Italy, we are told by G. A. Borgese: "Italy was not the creation of kings and warriors; she was the creature of a poet, Dante."³⁴ Yet Dante himself had no national consciousness whatever. After having composed his earlier writings in Latin, he chose the Florentine vernacular for his *Divine Comedy*, possibly for the sole reason that he shrank from writing in the same language which Virgil, the greatest of Latin poets, had used.

The *Divine Comedy* created a nation. Dante never had such a purpose in mind. His life had moved between a negative and a positive pole: hatred for the walled city of Florence, love for the boundless universal empire of all mankind. Whatever stood between kingdoms like France and England, nations or principalities, he either cursed or ignored. But having set his aim at the absolute, the arrow of his desire hit somewhere half-way. . . . Thus Italy was born: a compromise between the infinite and a city, between eternity and the daily news.³⁵

In the eighteenth century a Bulgarian monk named Payssius was distressed because the Bulgars were regarded as having no history of their own and were, therefore, despised by the Greeks and Serbs. In order to remedy this situation, he set out in 1762 to write the history of his people. He exaggerated and idealized, asserting that the Bulgars had been the most famous of all the Slav people. The effect of Paysius' work, printed only in 1844, but evidently circulated somewhat before that time, was considerable. Pan-Slavism had its origin in the writings of the German authors, Schlözer and Herder. The Rumanians were brought to their first "awakening" by young priests who learned to admire the old Romans in Rome and felt that they were their descendants.³⁶

"In most cases . . . the national revival began as a purely cultural movement. Almost the only exception was that of the Serbs, who, characteristically, fought before they thought. Elsewhere, nearly always the first symptom of the new age was an eager delving into national history and philology, the collection of legends and folk-lore, the compilation of grammars and text-books."³⁷ Such trends seemed

³⁴Colliath, *The March of Fascism* (New York, 1938), p. 7.

³⁵Borgese, *op. cit.*, pp. 19 ff.

³⁶Georges Weill, *L'Europe du XIX^e Siècle et L'Idée de Nationalité* (Paris, 1938), p. 36.

³⁷C. A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities* (London, 1934), p. 94.

harmless to the Austrian Chancellor, Metternich, who feared only political conspiracies and failed to see that the latter were the result of interests originally purely intellectual. Indeed, he encouraged the Czechs and Southern Slavs in their literary studies, and was glad that they had something to keep them busy. A historical falsification, the Koeniginhofer manuscript, first exposed as spurious by the late President Masaryk when he was a young professor, has done much to build up the national consciousness of the Czechs. In such matters, truth is of less importance than popular appeal.

A people lacking intellectual leadership sometimes gets its first impetus in the direction of national consciousness through foreign influence. Even today the national pride of the Lithuanians is strengthened by the opinions of non-Lithuanian scholars regarding their language, remarkable for its preservation of early forms and regarded as a Sanskrit of the West.

It might seem that the purely scientific interest of a small band of scholars could have no influence on the fate of a language or people. But in this case, and it is not the only one, it certainly did, by reason of the reaction on native sentiment. If the Lithuanians are reminded, as they often are by the Poles, that their language can boast no great literature, they retort that it is one of the most highly prized by scholars, and is studied in the greatest universities in Europe.³⁸

Indian national consciousness was first fostered by intellectuals who had studied in England. Chinese national consciousness was stimulated by men who studied in the universities of Europe and the United States. According to George Antonius, the Arab national movement began in Syria in 1847 as a result of the foundation in Beirut of a modest literary society under American patronage.

Carlton J. H. Hayes has aptly observed:

If we were to review the actual course of nationalism in any European country in the nineteenth century, we would be struck by the early prominence of professors, lawyers, physicians, merchants, and bankers. The most conspicuous nationalists in France during the Restoration and the Second Empire were of those callings and so were the bulk of the deputies in the German National Assembly at Frankfort in 1848 and in the Slav National Assembly at Prague in the same year. Alike in the national states which were developing nationalism and in nationalisms which eventually produced national states, members of the upper middle class were active. In France, Spain, and England, and also among Germans, Italians, Greeks, Poles, Czechoslovaks, and Jugoslavs, it was the same story.³⁹

³⁸Carl Darling Buck, "Language and the Sentiment of Nationality" *American Political Science Review* (1916), Vol. X.

Etienne Fournel states: "A language, a history: these are the two first needs of a people. . . . There is not a new nation in Europe which has not been preceded by from fifty to eighty years of philosophy and archaeological studies." *Les Nations Romantiques* (Paris, 1931), p. 206.

³⁹*Essays on Nationalism* (New York, 1926), pp. 70, 71.

Once the doctrine of nationality has been accepted, the governments make certain that it is assiduously spread and consolidated by the schools and universities. However, education alone can never explain national consciousness, for the latter must first have been propounded and accepted before it can be transmitted to the younger generation. But, with this reservation, its influence is strong. The influence of education on national consciousness in Europe is analyzed in detail in the University of Chicago series entitled "Studies in the Making of Citizens." One of the series is Carlton J. H. Hayes' *France, A Nation of Patriots*.⁴⁰ Hayes finds: "The current supreme loyalty of Frenchmen to their country—French nationalism, if we may so style it—is an artificial, not a natural, creation. It depends exclusively neither on physical heredity nor on geographical environment; it does not conform to canons of biology or botany."⁴¹ The masses in France, as elsewhere, "receive on faith what they are taught about the past, and the past of France has been rendered by publicists and popularizers highly conventional, highly artificial."⁴² Hayes reports that the work of French intellectuals, during a half century after Napoleon, established the ideal that all Frenchmen should be supremely loyal to France.⁴³ History text-books have had a tremendous influence on the way in which each generation sees itself and the outside world. Significantly, the League of Nations has endeavored to encourage the elimination of nationalistic stories from the school texts. But the cooperation promised by governments and educational boards has not been given.

People have in some instances learned to be loyal to their former enemies and to dislike their compatriots. The city of Strasbourg enjoyed a vigorous autonomy within the framework of the old German Reich when it was annexed by Louis XIV of France without any justification whatever and against the wishes of its German-speaking citizens. A hundred years later the inhabitants of Strasbourg had developed a deep affection for France and the French.

Unlike the people of Strasbourg, who identified themselves with the French, the people of the Rhineland in 1918 were loyal to Germany. After the Rhineland was conquered by the armies of the

⁴⁰New York, 1930.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 13.

French Revolution, it took only fifteen years of French rule to develop sympathies toward the French. Then the Rhineland was taken over by Prussia. Again its inhabitants hesitated in their sympathies. Even in 1866 Bismarck was not sure whether the Rhenish regiments would fight against the Austrians, and he was surprised and pleased that they did so without reluctance. When the French occupied the Rhineland in 1918, they hoped for an enthusiastic welcome as representatives of the Great Revolution. But nothing of the kind happened. The Rhineland had become German in its sympathies, and attempts of the French to found an autonomous Rhenish republic were supported there only by second-rate and venal elements.

Danzig was a Free City up to 1793, when Prussia forcibly annexed the town against the wishes of its citizens. In 1807 the people of Danzig greeted Napoleon as liberator, and at the Congress of Vienna they moved to become once more a Free City although connected in some way with a new Poland. As a matter of fact, Poland was not restored and Danzig remained Prussian. In 1919 autonomy was forced upon the people of Danzig at the will of Poland; they themselves did not want it.

This historical survey is perforce not all inclusive; many nations have not been mentioned and only some facts have been emphasized in connection with those nations considered. However, the facts given here will show that nations are to a large extent man-made social groups and have become what they are by more than a natural impulse of the people concerned. Dynasties have molded their subjects. Coincidence has brought some human beings together and has separated others. When democracy took the place of the dynasties, the loyalties toward former sovereigns were transferred to "nations," and the intellectuals elaborated doctrines to aid the cause of nationality. Yet the national patriot assumes that nations developed according to some law of nature. Without this illusion, national consciousness would possibly be a less virulent and explosive force. The truth is that nations have been man-made although they themselves believe they have always existed and hold that the unconscious impulses toward nationalism were destined to become conscious, purposeful aims. They are resolved that what has actually happened in the past shall not under any circumstances happen in the future. And millions are determined to sacrifice even their lives in order to carry through this resolve.

RACE

A nation consists of individuals who share sentiments and who sometimes act in unity. There are certain external characteristic circumstances which, if taken separately or in a combination, are said to produce a social pattern called a "nation." These are generally asserted to be identity of descent, similar customs and opinions (sometimes described as "national character"), the same language, a community of habitation, tradition, and interests. John Stuart Mill contends that a "feeling of nationality" may generate from various causes.

Sometimes it is the effect of identity of race and descent. Community of language and community of religion greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes. But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past. None of these circumstances, however, are either indispensable or necessarily sufficient by themselves.¹

When and where does a nation begin? It sometimes happens that the members of a group are of identical descent, but speak different languages; or they have the same tradition, but different customs. Not all of the causal situations referred to are present simultaneously. Actually, the circumstances that are thought to contribute to the formation of a nation are not as decisive as they appear. Concerning the question of identity of descent, Sir Henry S. Maine says: "Of this we may at least be certain—that all ancient societies regarded themselves as having proceeded from one original stock, and even labored under an incapacity for comprehending any reason except this for their holding together in political union." He emphasizes that "the history of political ideas begins, in fact, with the assumption that kinship in

¹*Representative Government*, Ch. XVI.

blood is the sole possible ground of community in political functions.'²

The solidarity felt by national compatriots toward each other but not toward foreigners is a psychological fact. Granted that men who come from the same stock share certain somatic attributes—their cephalic index, the color of their skin, their stature, etc.—these factors do not provide the explanation for mutual sympathies. Unless biological characteristics actually affect sentiments and thoughts, they cannot be said to explain behavior. Either the members of a nation feel an instinctive affection for each other because blood ties promote such impulses, or their common heritage has made them similar in character and tastes. The significance of the second explanation will emerge when we investigate national character. The first explanation, based on an assumption of instinctive liking and dislike because of descent from a common stock, will be examined first.

People who are related to each other by blood ties do not necessarily belong to the same race. The offspring of a man and wife of different origin will represent two racial strains. Individuals of the same racial origin are not inevitably identified with the same nation or tribe, even when the latter is based on descent from a common stock. However we may define race, it will always include a great number of individuals who may belong to the same race but to different families, tribes, or nations. Unfortunately, the assertion that national solidarity is founded at least partly on blood relationship is often expressed by the claim that the members of one nation belong to one race, and those of another nation belong to another race. This is a confusion of terms. Many anthropologists have given up attempting to define "race." Any such attempt involves the same insuperable difficulties as does a definition seeking to make a distinction between language and dialect. What the anthropologists have in mind when they speak of a race is an extensive group of individuals who have in common a number of physical attributes that are transmitted by heredity to their offspring.³ Modern research has shown that a large number of characteristics formerly believed to be constant actually vary with the environment.

²*Ancient Law* (London, 1874), pp. 128-129.

³"A race . . . must be conceived as a biological unit, as a population derived from a common ancestry and by virtue of its descent endowed with definite biological characteristics." Franz Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man* (New York, 1938), p. 37.

There are two general types of "race theories": those of the historians, philosophers and politicians, and those of the anthropologists. The various doctrines of some of the former—*e.g.*, particularly Arthure de Gobineau and Houston Stewart Chamberlain—have been quite popular. Chamberlain's *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* is one of the few books that Hitler seems to have read. The theories of the anthropologists, among whom Franz Boas is outstanding in the United States, are known chiefly to scholars. They have not exerted an influence on politics and certainly have not inspired any mass movements, but from the point of view of science they are, of course, far more important.

When the anthropologists speak of races, they mention (though they no longer over-estimate) cephalic indices, types of hair, stature, etc. The races are designated under various headings—for example, the Mediterranean, the Alpine, the Nordic. When the layman speaks of races, and the same can be said of some historians, the categories are usually determined by language groups, such as the English, the Germans, and the Arabs. Sometimes the color of the skin is taken as the mark of differentiation, *e.g.*, the white, the black, and the yellow races. Though men have occasionally been classified according to the food they prefer, the popular conception of the divisions of mankind is based on distinctions of color and language. Historians emphasize that the inhabitants of the British Isles have sprung from several "races"—the Celts, Romans, Saxons, and Danes—which lived in different countries and spoke distinct languages. As to hereditary physical qualities, it is very unlikely that any existed which were not common to all. The migrating and struggling groups were not "races" even in the most lenient sense of that word. On the other hand, the dolichocephalics and brachycephalics, or the several blood-groups into which modern medicine divides men, are not the concern of historians.

The following statements are now generally accepted: (1) Germans, Englishmen, Russians, Brazilians are not "races," for they lack hereditary physical qualities which distinguish them from other groups; (2) the "races" of the anthropologists, based not on a study of history but on investigation of the human body, do not coincide with the groups traditionally regarded as "nations." If the race-concept of the anthropologists, as applied for example to Europe,

should be taken seriously by politicians, civil wars would immediately destroy all the existing "nations," because *Homo Europaeus*, *Homo Mediterraneus* and *Homo Alpinus* are all to be found in almost every country of Europe. If sympathies coincided with what the anthropologists call "races," a great part of the inhabitants of Northern Germany would feel closer affiliation with the people of Northern France than with those of Southern Germany; and many Northern Italians would feel more intimately identified with the Swiss than with the natives of Naples or Palermo.

As Ernest Barker so aptly remarks, "A race is a physical classification and a nation a spiritual fact."⁴ Though German National Socialism has from the first pretended to base patriotism on race consciousness, Hitler and Rosenberg by no means know what they are talking about. It is not a coincidence that Gobineau, of all men, called patriotism "a Canaanite monstrosity." German nationalists are in the habit of saying: *Blut will zu Blut* (men of the same blood long for each other). It is very doubtful whether this applies even to close relatives, who are often quarrelsome; it is certainly far more unlikely in the case of several million different persons. Whatever "races" may be, they are not identical with nations.

If men could feel with any degree of assurance that some persons belong to their own race and others do not, it would be much less difficult to divide mankind into races. One would merely catalogue the sentiments of every individual. If the Germans could actually define races by listening to the "voice of their blood," as Hitler asserts, it would not be necessary to require every inhabitant of Germany to prove whether his descent is "Aryan." "partly Aryan," or Jewish. Every German Aryan would be aware of his ancestry and of the Jewish blood in others by instinct.

Most people do not even know who their great-grandparents were, to say nothing of their ancestors ten or more generations back. No instinct makes relationships recognizable. The tracing of correct genealogies is difficult in most cases. Furthermore, the concept of blood relationship is elastic. Brothers and sisters are closely related, cousins less so, second cousins even less so. Somewhat related to one another are groups of a dozen people or less, of a few hundred, of a

⁴Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

few thousands, of many thousands, or of several millions. If we go back far enough into the past, probably all human beings are "brothers." Where, then, are the boundaries which would define the "nation" if nationhood were based upon blood-ties? No one has ever contended that blood relations feel an antipathy to other individuals in proportion to the distance of relationship.

We may therefore conclude that whatever may be the underlying cause of national consciousness, it is not common descent. Julian S. Huxley and A. C. Haddon knew whereof they spoke when they said, "A nation has been cynically but not inaptly defined as 'a society united by a common error as to its origin and a common aversion to its neighbors.'"⁵

The Semites believed in their descent from Sem, while the Teutons believed in a mythological ancestor, Teut. In 1484, an English author claimed for knighthood "an antiquity not less than that of Adam and Eve, asserting that it was the earliest divine device for the recovery of the human race from the ruin of the fall, and identifying the archangel Michael as the first knight."⁶ At the time of the slavery controversy in the United States, a southern author asserted that the Negroes were not descendants of Noah and therefore were not related to the white people. When the Bavarians were allied with the French at the time of Napoleon, a Bavarian author set out to prove that the French and the Bavarians, but not the other Germans, were of the same Celtic descent.

Where there is solidarity, a common ancestry is assumed to be the underlying cause. Preachers, politicians, and scholars have long promoted this pattern. In the fifteenth century French monks "proved" that the two peoples who together made up the French, namely the Gauls and the Franks, were both descendants, through different lines, of the Trojan king Priam.⁷ Such legends cannot stand against the criticism of more skeptical ages. But the appeal of the idea of common ancestry is so strong that some nationalists would rather give up scientific history than relinquish this illusion. Maurice Barrès, one of the leaders of modern French nationalism,

⁵*We Europeans* (London, 1935), p. 16.

⁶F. C. Hearnshaw, "Chivalry," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*.

⁷Johannet, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

actually declares that it is a patriotic duty to wrap in mystery the origins of the French nation.⁸

It is clear that national consciousness is not rooted in common descent. History and anthropology disprove it. Psychological analysis leads to the same conclusion. It might appear, therefore, that after the assumption of race instincts has been refuted, it would be superfluous to investigate whether national feeling, rooted in common descent, leads to "national character" and common customs and attitudes. But national character must be investigated despite the fallacy of the race doctrine. It is not bound up with the latter. Insofar as "national character" stands as a reality, it may be the consequence of environment or it may have other causes.

⁸E. R. Curtius, *Maurice Barrès und die geistigen Grundlagen des französischen Nationalismus* (Bonn, 1921), p. 146.

NATIONAL CHARACTER

The character of an individual is his way of reacting, doing, behaving, his "*modus reagendi*" condensed into a formula. It is the sum of acquired tendencies built upon native bases; it reflects "an identity which is constant, and expresses itself in what we may call 'expectable' action."¹ One may describe the behavior of people in detail or say that their general "character" makes them act in a given manner. In either case character is the hypothetical cause behind human behavior. It is not an actual organ like the heart or the liver. It is a fiction invented to simplify a description of human behavior, a formula through which to determine what to expect from human beings.

That there is such a person as a typical American, Englishman, Russian, or German is generally accepted as true. "There is," according to Prof. Edward Alsworth Ross, "an imposing stock of facts which seem to prove that the Negro has a fiercer sex appetite than other men, that the South Italian has a bent for murder, that the Irishman has an uncommon taste for fighting, the Jew for money-making, the gypsy for wandering, the Levantine for lying, the Slav for anarchy, the Frenchman for gesticulation, the Yankee for asking personal questions."² The English, it is said, are known for the predominance of will in their character, the French, for their clarity of thought; the Germans, for their inclination toward discipline and metaphysics. As Charles E. Merriam has pointed out, although much

¹Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

²Edward Alsworth Ross, *The Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1920), p. 60.

has been written about national character, its scientific value should not be overrated.³

When we say that the American is an individualist, an optimist, and a shrewd businessman, we do not mean that this applies to every American. It is obvious that some Americans are fond of discipline, others are pessimists, and not all are money-makers. It is the *typical* American or Irishman we have in mind when we speak of national characteristics. The notion of "typical" behavior involves a score of problems which cannot, of course, be investigated here.

The concept of a type develops in our minds from general impressions. If the majority of a people are tall, long headed, of light complexion, with narrow faces and straight noses, we construct this combination of features as a type. We may perhaps consider as typical that half of the population whose traits are the most frequent and that lie near the most frequent value. Supposing that the features under consideration are mutually independent, one half of the population will have one of the typical traits; one half of these, that is one quarter, will have two combined traits; one half of these, that is one eighth, will have three of the typical traits combined, so that when ten such traits are counted only one in 1024 individuals will combine all the typical traits. . . . The type is not an individual but an abstraction.⁴

Assuming that national character is a pattern of behavior of typical representatives of a nation, it must be emphasized that not only the importance of such characteristics in general but also their constancy throughout history have often been exaggerated. Roman authors described the old Gauls as war-minded and sociable and the Germans as morally pure and divided among themselves; travelers to Spain and Great Britain centuries ago wrote about people whose traits might apply to our contemporaries. But while some traits of certain peoples have persisted, others have changed substantially with the altering circumstances of history. When these characteristics are believed to be eternal and unchangeable, they begin to assume a quasi-metaphysical aspect. Israel Zangwill states the other side of the story graphically:

³"Volumes have been written in alleged analysis of national characteristics, but most of them possess little value, either from the comparative point or view or of that of an analytical student of civic education. They are so deeply colored with national prejudices, either native or alien, and so little allied to the modern methods of analysis, that they possess value chiefly as examples of the national methods of celebration and glorification." Charles E. Merriam, *The Making of Citizens* (Chicago, 1931), p. 338.

⁴Boas, *op. cit.*, p. 47

The Mongols turned from agriculture to militarism and back again. The Magyars were Oriental shepherds before they came prancing westward as mounted archers. The Germans were once meek and musical: a native editor of Schiller's *Robbers* opined that "even the Germans" could produce great passions and characters. Now Germany's future is under the water. The people of Magna Charta clamor daily for more bureaucracy. The heirs of Mazzini demand court-martialling of free spoken Deputies. The oldest monarchy in the world has just turned into a Republic, and Bushido bound Japan has acquired a National Debt.⁵

Two conditions must exist in order that it may justly be said that national consciousness and international antipathies have their origin in similarities between members of a certain group and in their differences from other groups. The similarity of people belonging to the same nation must be stronger than that of members of economic, age, or religious groups on an international scale—otherwise the strength of national feeling cannot be accounted for. Moreover, individuals of the same nation must *know* that they share certain similarities and have the same national character. If they do not know it from experience but take it on faith, then their belief, rather than the existence of characteristics, must be assumed to be the underlying cause of national consciousness and solidarity.

With respect to the first condition, we take for granted that although many Americans bear more resemblance to Englishmen or Frenchmen than they do to fellow Americans, yet a "typical" national behavior is apparent on the basis of empirical research. But it is not only through belonging to the same nation that individuals share certain characteristics with others. Society is, after all, divided into numerous classes; members of the same class have similar tendencies. Moreover, sex determines certain attributes.

The prevalent opinion among rough old farmers when they are by themselves and talking freely is that women generally are touchy, unstable, flighty, vain, irresponsible and sly. But their women folk gathered around a quilting frame agree that for the most part men are coarse, sensual, self-willed, violent, egoistic and unreasonable. Each opinion has something in the way of solid fact to go on. . . .⁶

Communities in which there is a large number of young voters are less swayed in their political choices by partisanship and prejudice, more critical of party management, less governed by feelings from the past and more hospitable to progressive ideas. A community dominated commercially by men from twenty to forty five years of age will reflect the money making spirit and will sympathize

⁵*The Principle of Nationalities* (New York, 1917), p. 43.

⁶Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

with every form of legitimate enterprise and individual initiative. If, on the other hand, men above forty-five constitute the tone giving element, the money-keeping or business-keeping spirit will get the upper hand of the money making spirit.⁷

Environment exerts its influence upon men, modifying their characteristics. Large cities produce characteristics dissimilar from those developed in a rural environment.⁷ People who have grown up and continue to live in large cities appear quicker, more intelligent, and more ambitious than the agricultural population. The inhabitants of plains, on the one hand, and mountaineers on the other, share certain characteristics. People who live close to the ocean—fishermen and sailors, for example—have attitudes transcending national boundaries. The professions and trades also have special characteristics. If it is possible to distinguish an American from an Englishman or an Italian, it is equally possible to tell a professor from a salesman and an actor from a soldier. It is interesting to note that in medieval farces the cobbler is usually a philosophically-minded, solid person; the tailor is lighthearted and fond of quizzing; the master baker is plump and comfortable; the butcher is brutal and violent. Müller-Freienfels has commented :

Certain qualities are demanded from the soldier wherever he fights, whether at Marathon, at Pavia, or on the battlefields of the Great War. In the same way, there exist marks of distinction of the nobility which shine through in spite of all national and temporal differences. The type of the peasant is fundamentally the same when the Athenian, the medieval, or the modern comedy puts him on the stage. If we set aside the language and culture, as far as it is bound up with a specific language, the similarities between a German and a French physician, a German and an English naval captain, and a German and a French factory workman are much greater than the community between a German physician, a German naval captain, and a German factory worker.⁸

Educated and cultured persons of different nations find no difficulty in carrying on an interesting conversation, provided they have a common language. But the same thing does not hold true for individuals of the same nation when their cultural backgrounds are dissimilar. Members of a ruling class show traits different from those of the class over which they rule. Religion influences and is

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁸Richard Müller-Freienfels, *Persönlichkeit und Weltanschauung* (Leipzig, 1919), p. 41.

influenced by national character. Certain peoples are inclined toward Catholicism, others toward Calvinism or Lutheranism, and still others toward Buddhism or Islamism. These religions, in turn, influence national characteristics. It has sometimes been said that Protestantism makes its followers better fitted for capitalistic thinking and competition than does Catholicism. In India, Mohammedanism has molded its followers, who were formerly Hindus, into a quite different type. The Hindu is adaptable; he is a merchant and ambitious. The Mohammedan is a warrior, a believer in force.

Not only do entire national populations have distinct characteristics; smaller geographic divisions also determine traits. A French sociologist, Demolins, has described the various regions of France in terms of the typical behavior of the inhabitants of each. Anyone who reads his monographic surveys might easily believe that various nations, rather than French provinces, are their subject.⁹ Actually, society falls into many categories, in addition to national groups, and the members of each of these categories invariably show identical tendencies.

Individuals of one nation are undoubtedly aware that they possess certain characteristics that differentiate them from people belonging to other nations. Specifically, what does the American, the Englishman, or the German know about his own countrymen? And what does he know about foreigners?

It is true, of course, that everyone knows a certain number of his co-nationals personally, perhaps a few hundred or a thousand, but in any case the number of his acquaintances is insignificant compared to the number of those he has never even seen. In the city-state of antiquity, as in the small Swiss cantons, something approaching acquaintance with all fellow-citizens was possible. But in the populous states of our time, a person's opinion of his countrymen cannot possibly be based on his own experience and conclusions. What does an American really know of other Americans, except that they are of many different origins and live on different economic levels? He assumes that they all speak English and are appreciative of American democracy. But in business matters, he does not rely on sociological descriptions of "the American" as a means of

⁹For an abstract of Demolins' work, see Edward Alsworth Ross, *Foundations of Sociology* (New York, 1920), pp. 312 ff.

judging a customer desirous of obtaining credit, a prospective partner, or any contracting party. He asks a bank or a credit bureau for the information he needs. What Americans think of "the American," the Germans of "the German," the English of "the Englishman" cannot very well be the result of inevitably limited personal experiences.

Relatively few people ever see a foreign country, and of those who do, only a minority is able to form its own opinion of foreign citizenry. For one thing, there are language barriers. Moreover, a visitor to another country is necessarily limited in the number of persons he is able to meet. Little is gained by attempting to supplement such contact by meeting foreigners in one's own country, for no real knowledge is gained in this way. By and large, a person's opinions of other nationalities are even less a result of his own experience and conclusions than are his opinions of his fellow countrymen.

It is often said that a man cannot feel an affection for humanity in general because he cannot know the whole of mankind. Love of humanity is an unattainable ideal because it is so vague. Yet it is assumed that a man loves the people of his own nation because he knows them. But if the conception of "knowledge" is not used in an inadmissably broad sense, we cannot "know" the millions of people who constitute a nation.

How do we picture our compatriots or other nationalities? One thing is certain. The picture cannot be adequate, for the powers of imagination are limited. We cannot clearly conceive of millions of human beings at the same time. When we think of the Germans or the Russians, it is impossible to unify the endlessly different characteristics of innumerable individuals. When we are asked to think of the American landscape, we think, perforce, not of one composite scene but of a plain, a mountain, a city, or a beach. In the same way, we cannot think of the Germans or the French as a whole, but are bound to concentrate on a German or a Frenchman. In so doing we choose an ideal which we consider typical. The reduction of many individuals to the picture of a single person is not a scientific procedure comparable to the reduction of the area of a continent to the limits of a map. Unavoidable though it may be, the reduction is bound to falsify reality. Note, for example, the success of the Ger-

man slogan that Germany had been "encircled" by enemies, first in 1914, then again in 1939. When an individual is "encircled," he thinks of himself as standing alone against a majority. But a large country can be "encircled" by a number of small countries with a combined population smaller than the state against which they combine. In time of war, it may be advantageous to be encircled; to possess the inner lines of communication may be a strategic advantage. The translation of a concept affecting millions of people into terms involving only a few individuals has a strong emotional impact upon the unthinking and uncritical masses.

The way in which we arrive at the concept of *the* German, or *the* Frenchman resembles the method used in drawing cartoons. The cartoonist is indifferent to general characteristics and exaggerates the variation from the norm. A tall person is drawn as a giant, a small man as a dwarf, baldness is shown as a glittering mirror, and so on. The same process takes place when the popular imagination envisages the various nations. The result, as described by Francis Delaisi, appears thus:

The Frenchman is of average height, his hair is brown, auburn or fair . . . he generally drinks wine; he is lively, witty, nimble minded, an individualist, an idealist and a rationalist. The Englishman is tall, fair, empirical, practical, a meat-eater, and a sportsman. The German is fat, fair, sentimental, methodical, disciplined, slow minded, a Kantian and a drinker of beer. The Italian is small, brown skinned and eats macaroni; he is sober, artistic, subtle and inclined to perfidy. The Spaniard is brown skinned, proud, indolent, and so on.¹⁰

These concepts are not constant but undergo changes, incidental to the widening or narrowing of experience. To quote Graham Wallas:

An American working man associates . . . the Far Eastern physical type with that lowering of the standard wage which overshadows as a dreadful possibility every trade in the industrial world. Fifty years ago the middle class readers to whom *Punch* appealed associated the same type with stories of tortured missionaries and envoys. After the battle of the Sea of Japan they associated it with that kind of heroism which, owing to our geographical position, we most admire; and drawings of the unmistakably Asiatic features of Admiral Togo, which would have excited genuine and apparently instinctive disgust in 1859, produced a thrill of affection in 1906.¹¹

When we become interested in foreign countries and their peo-

¹⁰Delaisi, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-97.

¹¹Graham Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics* (New York, 1921), pp. 79-80.

ples, we wish to learn how they differ from our own people and conditions. Several factors contribute toward simplification of reality—over and above the tendency to exaggerate the differences between the nations. Our propensity for simplification is strengthened by the fact that, though individual Germans may be honest or dishonest, clever or stupid, industrious or lazy, the Germans—organized in one state and represented by one government with a foreign policy—act as a unit. A nation's foreign policy matters more to other nations than its individual characteristics. Germany, Britain, and the United States are at the moment thought of as either enemies or allies by the rest of the world. In consequence of such circumstances, each nation tends to overrate the unity existing in other nations and to believe that internal conflicts of interest and party, though dangerous to one's own national welfare, do not seriously affect the others. This belief intensifies the assumption that beyond one's own border the individuals composing other nations have identical characteristics.

The desire to find a meaning in the struggles between nations contributes to assumptions of national characteristics. Nations sometimes fight each other, and it is understandable that thinking people should seek to interpret this clash, just as they try to understand individual experiences and psychology. In simplifying more than cautious research permits, they identify nations with notions, and declare them to be strongholds of liberty or despotism, materialism, or idealism, etc. In time of war, this may make sense. But it should be remembered that in the process of simplification and identification, individuals are conceived to be representative of whole nations.

We have suggested two conditions under which national consciousness and international antipathies may be based on differences. The characteristics of the nation as a whole must outweigh the characteristics of certain of its groups, between whom a similar antagonism is lacking; and the nations must realize and not simply have faith in the existing differences. A third point, not quite so important, might be added. It would seem that similarities should produce sympathy, and diversities should create antipathy. But this, too, is far from self-evident. There are two German proverbs on the essentials of friendship between man and man. One of them says that equals associate easily, and the other says that contrasts attract

each other. It is an often-repeated experience that friendship, as well as sexual love, flourishes where there is contrast. Where there is nothing but similarity, boredom may stifle affection. If antagonism inevitably resulted from contrasts, this would be reflected within each separate nation. For example, aversion would constantly arise between the various character-groups, and also between the nationally typical and the nationally non-typical individuals.¹²

Every great nation produces idiots and geniuses, criminals and saints. It is impossible to find a common denominator for Goethe and Goebbels, Kant and Hitler, except that they are all Germans. A prominent Nazi, answering English Protestants who had condemned the treatment of the Christian churches in Hitler's Germany, emphasized that the homeland of Martin Luther was not in need of enlightenment from foreigners on the meaning of Christianity. But the assumption that all Germans must be good Christians because Luther was one is absurd. In reality, the attitude of various Germans toward the Christian religion, as toward everything else, proves that to be a German is not the same thing as to hold a certain opinion.

The problem of character-groups is analogous to the relationship between races and nations. Psychologists divide men into optimists and pessimists, the confident and the timid, the introverts and the extroverts, those with an aggressive and those with a sympathetic social viewpoint. These categories have no relation to nationality and language.

The differences between man and man are far outweighed by what is common to them. To emphasize differences only is like thinking, for example, of automobiles in terms of their variations, forgetting that all makes are the same general type of machine and perform the same services. No explorer was ever in doubt whether the beings he found in a newly discovered region were men or not. Columbus may have had a wrong conception of the origin of the natives on the Caribbean islands, but neither he nor anyone else ever questioned that the Indians were human beings. The similarity between members of even remote races is, in any case, strong enough

¹²This was noted by Aristotle. "Not a few things about friendship are matters of debate. Some define it as a kind of likeness and say that we love those who are like ourselves, whence come the sayings 'Like to Like,' 'birds of a feather flock together,' and so on; others on the contrary say 'two of a trade never agree.'" *Nicomachean Ethics*, VIII, 1.

to make the breeding of offspring between them possible. Even to-day it is an open question whether the differences between the mental endowment of the "highest" and the "lowest" races are due to environmental or hereditary factors, with the balance swinging decidedly away from the assumption of invariable inherited characteristics.

The highest accomplishments in science and art are most certainly international. A scientific theory is true or false, a work of art is beautiful or ugly, regardless of whether they have originated in Germany, France, or China. The index of any textbook in any science records the names of scholars of all nations. But an attempt to find all scholars united in one school of thought, on the basis of their nationalities, would be entirely futile. Only nationalists who have a very crude knowledge of what science means use science for political propaganda. Differences along national lines mean only that the members of any group share qualities which are reflected in their respective attitudes toward scientific problems and methods. National science is nonsense. Insofar as it is science, it is not national, and insofar as it is national, it is not science. Whether a statement is true and important or false and unimportant cannot possibly be decided by investigating the national origin of its author.

It is the same with art. True, there are certain national traits in Italian painting, German music, and French novels. But Michelangelo, Beethoven, Homer, and Shakespeare appeal to all mankind. To quote Goethe: "The world remains ever the same, the same situations recur, one nation lives, loves, and feels like the other, why then should not one poet write poetry like the other?"¹³ And again, "There is no patriotic art and no patriotic science. Both, like everything good and great, belong to the whole world." (*Sprüche in Prosa.*)¹⁴

¹³Eckermann, *Gespräche mit Goethe*.

¹⁴"In Romeo and Juliet, we are interested not in the feud of Montague and Capulet which rages in an Italian city of the fifteenth century, but in the eternal drama of two young creatures loving one another in defiance of the social conventions by which they are separated . . . It comes to this, then, that a work is a masterpiece, not for those qualities that are specifically national, but precisely for the qualities that pertain to humanity and are therefore universal.

"Literary and artistic productions will assume a local character in proportion to their mediocrity, and this may explain why modern historians whose primary concern is to emphasize differences in periods and nations have applied themselves to rescuing so much second-rate work from well merited oblivion." Delaisi, *op. cit.*, pp. 179, 181.

It has often been asserted that men instinctively dislike what they do not know because they fear it. This may be true of an animal or a small child. But with grown men, reflection and abstractions determine to a great extent the known and the unknown. Most co-nationals are personally unknown; so are the individuals of other nations. We do not know but rather are told about the differences between individuals and nations. People neither fear nor feel aversion toward individuals who belong to other nations and speak foreign languages. It is characteristic of the Germans, who certainly are nationalistically-minded enough in our day, to disparage something by saying, "it does not come from far" (*es ist nicht weit her damit*).

Some hold that antagonisms between nations would be lessened by closer acquaintance. A hundred years ago great hopes were placed on the railway and the steamship as means of communication likely to bring the nations together. In the twentieth century the invention of the airplane evoked similar hopes.¹⁸ But during the same period in which travel has expanded nationalism has increased. Therefore one may conclude that national consciousness is not greatly influenced by either ignorance of or familiarity with foreign nations.¹⁹

National consciousness is weaker in older people or in those who have traveled and formed their own opinions. It is, as a rule, most intense in young people whose opinions are influenced more by emotions and suggestion than by experience. If the difference between certain types of human beings normally inspires antipathy, there should be even more between young and old, farmers and city-dwellers, the cautious and the daring, than one finds between Germans and Frenchmen, Spaniards and Russians. The national groups, it could be argued, know less of each other, are less aware of each other's differences, and hence feel less antipathy. In reality, the contrary is true.

When people meet, either as individuals or as groups, they may

¹⁸Curious to relate, nobody ever seems to have suggested the telephone in this connection.

¹⁹The Germans are a good example. On the one hand, when Germans become citizens of the United States or of a British Dominion, they are often eager to forget their old country as fast as possible and are very successful in adjusting themselves to their new environment. On the other hand, the most chauvinistic German patriots have in many cases been the *Auslanddeutsche*, the Germans in foreign countries.

like or dislike each other. When the Olympic games were revived, sponsors of the event expected it to contribute to international goodwill. The French nationalist, Charles Maurras, at first anticipated a similar result and he condemned the plan for this very reason. But later he was reassured "for he was convinced that when several distinct 'races' meet and are constrained to associate with each other, they are mutually repelled and withdraw at the very moment they think themselves joined."¹⁷

If personal contact meant anything in politics, we would find that neighbors separated only by a man-made frontier would sympathize more strongly with each other than with people living on the other side of the globe. But neighboring nations see each other primarily as potential enemies on the battlefield. Therefore the old saying of Manu still holds true: "We must conceive of all the States on our own frontier and their allies as being hostile, and for the same reason we must consider all of their neighbors as being friendly to us."¹⁸ The same point is emphasized by Ernest Barker:

The temper and character of Germany before the war, more particularly in her relations to France, were affected to no small extent by the fact that her population exceeded 60,000,000 and was still increasing; while the population of France was under 40,000,000 and was stationary at that amount. In the same way the suggestion of Home Rule for Ireland raised one set of feelings about 1841, when the population of Ireland was over 8,000,000 and that of England and Wales was under 16,000,000; it raised other feelings about 1921 when the population of Ireland (apart from the six northern counties) was something over 3,000,000 and that of England and Wales was nearly 38,000,000.¹⁹

National characteristics or their equivalent have existed at all times. National consciousness is relatively recent. It is inadmissible to explain a change through a factor which has not changed. Similarities and differences of opinions, customs, and attitudes are not responsible for feelings of unity or aversion. These feelings must first arise from other causes.

¹⁷William Curt Butman, *The Rise of Integral Nationalism in France* (New York, 1939), p. 244.

¹⁸Quoted by Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, Vol. II, p. 183; *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche* (London, 1924), Vol. XV.

¹⁹Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

UNITY AND ANTIPATHY

Feelings of unity within a national group and of antipathy between groups are commonly supposed to arise from four main sources. It should be noted, however, that these factors have not had as great an effect on national character as commonly supposed.

LANGUAGE

Language differences separate the various groups more obviously than any other cause except color of the skin. When we say that we "understand" our compatriots better than other folk, we may be referring to spiritual harmony, but it is more likely that we simply mean that we speak the same language. There are many languages, and it is not surprising that political groups often coincide with language groups. But this mutual inclusiveness has not always existed and is not, obviously, the case everywhere today. There is, however, a distinct tendency at present toward making language groups coincide with state boundaries.

In a few instances, people speaking different languages share the same government and are quite satisfied with their conditions. The majority of the Swiss people speak German, and a minority speak French or Italian, without losing an intense Swiss national consciousness. The several cantons have no wish to secede from the federation and join Germany, France, and Italy respectively. Belgium, too, has two language groups—one speaking French and the other Flemish; yet they have managed fairly well together, as have the English-speaking and the French-speaking Canadians. But most nations that comprise several language groups are in danger of being undermined through the quarrels of their language groups. Conversely, people who speak the same language but are divided into several nations generally wish to remain separate.

The French-speaking Canadians quite clearly have some group consciousness, but they are not eager to join France. The Irish have hated the English for centuries in spite of a common use of the English language. English is the language of the educated classes in Ireland, notwithstanding the artificial revival of the old Gaelic. The Jews speak the languages of the countries they live in, but this has not prevented anti-Semitism. Negroes in the United States, though they speak the language of their country, are not regarded by all white Americans as equals. The Brazilians speak Portuguese, but they have a strong Brazilian national consciousness. The Spanish-speaking people of South and Central America do not wish to come again under Spanish domination, and they are themselves divided into national groups despite their common language. England and the United States though bound together by language ties do not, of course, have the same national consciousness.

An example of the elasticity possible in the relationship between language and national sympathies was the outcome of some of the plebiscites held in contested territory after the First World War. According to German statistics, more than 50 per cent of the population and two-thirds of the school children in Allenstein, East Prussia, used Polish as their mother tongue. Nevertheless, 97.86 per cent of the voters cast their votes for Germany. The reasons were probably that they were Protestants, while the Poles were Catholics; they looked down on Polish as compared with German culture; moreover, they feared that the Russians might conquer Poland. In Klagenfurt, claimed by both Austria and Yugoslavia, many more votes went to Austria than had been indicated by earlier Austrian language statistics. Here too the reason was presumably the belief in the superiority of the German over the Slav, both as governor and as business man.¹

There have been cases in which a language-conscious or a color-conscious group wanted to separate from another group, but formulated its demands in the language of the group against which it protested. India has so many idioms that English is the medium of communication for educated Indians from different provinces and is

¹C. R. M. F. Cruttwell, *A History of Peaceful Change in the Modern World* (London, 1937), pp. 173ff.

used in Indian congresses.² The Czechs had to revive their language artificially when all of them, except the lowest class, spoke German and wrote in German. The first volumes of Frantisek Palacky's Czech history, which contributed much to the formation of Czech national consciousness in the nineteenth century, were published in German. At the time of the Hapsburg monarchy, a nationalistic Czech paper called *Union* was written in German.

All this might point to the conclusion that language, after all, is not so closely interwoven with the identity of certain social groups as the recent universal "awakening of the nations" might suggest. There is, of course, another side to the matter. Languages differ from each other so greatly that many words cannot even be properly translated into another language without losing a part of their meaning. But it is surprising how fast people learn a second language and forget their native tongue while living in a new country. Their children begin to talk in the new language and master it so well that it is quite impossible to tell from their vocabulary or pronunciation from what stock they have sprung. They have no feeling whatever that there is anything unnatural in the fact that they speak a different language from their forefathers.

Incidentally, it has happened sometimes, though not often, that whole peoples have changed their languages. The Bulgars originally spoke a language which was related to Finnish. When they had subjugated certain Balkan Slavic tribes, they took over the language of the conquered. The Danes who settled in Normandy early in the tenth century adopted French, but when their descendants settled in conquered England, they again became, from the linguistic point of view, Germanic.³

We tend to accept expressions of national consciousness and imperialism as a matter of course today; therefore, linguistic intolerance appears to be natural and is accepted as if it had always

²"It is important to remember that the members of the Indian national movement do not use any single language in common except that of the alien rulers whom the movement seeks to expel." "Nationalism," *A Report by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* (London, 1939), p. 156.

See also A. P. Newton, *A Hundred Years of the British Empire* (London, 1940), pp. 228 ff.

³Alfred Kirchhoff, *Zur Verständigung über die Begriffe Nation und Nationalität* (Halle, 1905), pp. 23-24.

existed. But history tells a different story. The widespread use of the Roman language was a result of Roman conquests. But the Romans did not interfere with the people of Naples insofar as they preferred to continue speaking Greek. Greek inscriptions from as late as the seventh century A. D. have been found around Naples. At present, each nation is eager to get as many people as possible to speak its language for reasons of prestige and power. But for identical reasons, the opposite policy was pursued in the past ". . . the Caliph Motewakkel ordered the Jews and Christians in 853 to teach their children only Hebrew and Syrian, and forbade them to speak Arabic. Today he would do just the contrary."⁴ The Turks made no attempt whatever to suppress the languages of their subject nations. Had they been less tolerant during the centuries when they dominated the Balkans there would possibly be no Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian languages left, and Turkish would be the only idiom of that part of Europe.

At no time before the end of the eighteenth century did the governments regard the language of the people as a matter which concerned them. They did not attempt to destroy a language when they acquired new subjects through conquest or peaceful annexation. In spite of the wars against Italy and Spain, Italian and Spanish were spoken at the court of France, and French at the court of Elizabeth. When the Jagellons, princes of Lithuania, had conquered White Russia, they gave preference to the Russian language over their own. Slovene was accepted at the court of Vienna. The first to cry out against the "jargons" were Barrère and Grégoire, at the time of the French Revolution.⁵

But though linguistic intolerance is a recent phenomenon, it is untenable to assume that the areas occupied today by different language groups have been shaped without purposeful interference, particularly by governments. Such action was not taken because a certain language was spoken by certain people. Considerations of expedience were at the root of the matter, and no attention was paid to the language used by the lower classes. But a decisive change has taken place since the French Revolution.

⁴Johannet, *op. cit.*, p. 364.

⁵Arnold van Gennep, *Traité Comparatif des Nationalités* (Paris, 1922), I, pp. 69-72.

The speech of the government . . . may become the speech of the governed; the use of the court and the chancery may become the use of society and of men of letters; and the State may give to the nation the unity of a common and uniform language. It was in this way that the East Midland dialect became the general standard of English; that the *langue d'oïl* became the language of France; and that the High German used by the Hohenstaufen chancery became the German of Luther and the whole of Germany.⁶

As Delaisi points out, the kings of France extended their influence over the law courts. From that moment it became customary to address royal officials in the language of the king. Gradually the dialect of Ile de France assumed a preponderance over the other dialects of France. Then French became the language of culture and to speak it was the mark of social superiority. Books were printed in French and no longer in Latin. The stage was another effective instrument for diffusing the language.

But the greatest change came when, in the nineteenth century, citizen armies replaced mercenary armies, and illiterate peasants and unskilled laborers were called up for military service. The recruits had to know the language of their leaders, otherwise they could not obey orders. In this way the knowledge of French was forced on those who had previously spoken only their own regional patois. In Germany, too, military considerations brought about governmental decrees which affected the French-, Polish-, and Danish-speaking parts of the population.

It is clear, therefore, from the experience of a century, that a national army implies a national language. Hence, the strenuous efforts made by every European government to make linguistic boundaries, so far as was possible, coincide with territorial frontiers. One soil, one language, became the modern slogan unknown to the old monarchies with their armies of mercenaries . . . In every country the diffusion of the *national* language was essentially a military necessity; it was imposed from above by means of compulsory education and, in many regions, it was nothing but an artificial creation. Dialects, far from having made the nation, were themselves compulsorily unified by the nation.⁷

The same conclusion is reached by Arnold van Gennep: "It is with language as with the other elements of civilization—houses, costumes, every kind of technique: Language does not depend on nature, because it is itself a means of forcing nature to obey man."⁸ Whether an idiom finally becomes a "dialect" or a "language" depends to a large extent

⁶Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

⁷Delaisi, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-165.

⁸*Op. cit.*, p. 185.

on the question, "Who rules over Whom?" Not the philologists but political history will decide whether Slovak is a distinct language or only a dialect of Bohemian, and will determine the relationship of Little Russian to Russian.

The German "dialects" of Westphalia and Bavaria differ from each other much more than do the Danish and Swedish "languages" or Servian and Bulgarian. The High German of Luther's Bible translation was finally adopted by the Low German-speaking population of North Germany, but never in the Netherlands, though, from the purely linguistic point of view, its use there would not have been materially more difficult or artificial. [In France] an ordinance of 1539 requiring the use of French in all the courts brought a formal protest from the Provinces against being forced to use a language which must be learned like Latin. Had the absorption by Castile of the other kingdoms constituting Spain extended to that of Portugal, its standard language would be the same Spanish, based on the dialect of Castile. There would be Portuguese dialects coordinate with Spanish dialects, but no Portuguese language in the conventional sense.⁹

It is clear that the language map does not reflect the pattern laid out by nature. Why modern governments are eager to enforce a single language within the boundaries of their states is understandable. But why is there a strong mass feeling that the language map should coincide with the political map, even when this means, as it often does, a conflict with the existing government? Why are there irredentas? The answer to this question will be considered in detail later in this book. The following summary of the situation must suffice here. Men generally prefer to belong to a group distinct from other groups, and possibly opposed to the others; they want to know with whom they are allied, not artificially, but by "nature." It seems "natural" that if there are many states, their boundaries should generally follow language lines. Governments of the past contributed decisively to the spread of some dialects and to the suppression of others. There followed a period during which the nations considered language a matter of the very highest political importance. Then came the creations of linguistic "haves" (e.g., the English and the French) and linguistic "have-nots" (e.g., the former Germans and Italians, and the present-day Hungarians and Bulgarians). The claims of the "have-nots" make headlines in modern political history.¹⁰

⁹Buck, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

¹⁰"One might say that mother Europe has produced her nations in two broods: one goes back about five hundred years and the other dates from the nineteenth century. Some nations began their growth at the time of the absolute monarchy; others have been shaken up in the midst of the revolutions. The former are the children of facts, the latter of ideas." Fournol, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-218.

GEOGRAPHY

Possession of a certain territory is often considered essential for the formation of a certain nation. This ordinarily implies one or both of two different attitudes. Seemingly, national consciousness grows out of affection for the native soil. Seemingly, too, mountains, rivers, and seas provide "natural frontiers" which bind together in one nation the people living in a certain territory—thereby separating them from other nations.

A glance at the map of Europe shows that the large plain which characterizes the eastern part of Germany (in which Berlin is situated) is also the Polish plain, the Lithuanian plain, and the Russian plain. If it were not for the towns, the roads, the various languages, and certain marks of culture, a traveler on a journey from the Elbe to the Urals would fail to notice that he had left one country and entered another. A man's affection for the small local area in which he lives from day to day hardly conditions his national consciousness, for in that case, it would be much smaller than the territory actually occupied by his nation. If plains, mountain ranges, coast lines, and the entire length of certain streams determine unity, then the natural boundaries of Eastern Europe would far out-distance those of each nation. A mountain dweller in Switzerland may love his particular valley, but this will hardly make him feel affection for his canton. Or if he loves only the Alps, he will ignore the frontiers of Switzerland and include the French, German, and Italian Alps within his sphere of affection. Terrain and attachment to their native soil would not give the Swiss their conception of "Switzerland." If geography were the decisive factor, a German in eastern Germany should feel more affection for Poland and Russia than for the hilly Rhineland and the Austrian mountains, and coast dwellers all over the world would associate together rather than with the people living inland.

That peasants, who have ordinarily a stronger attachment to the soil than city dwellers, may feel relatively indifferent toward the question of a national government is attested by C. A. Macartney. Speaking of the right to choose one country or another, sometimes conceded to the inhabitants of regions annexed by the victor after a war, he states: "The right is seldom exercised by peasants, who almost invariably prefer to remain on their land, even at the price of being placed under an alien and often aggressive régime. And the popula-

tion of frontier districts is almost always a peasant population."¹¹ As the land remains unchanged when frontiers are shifted, this attitude is comprehensible.

The surface of the earth is a unified whole. Nature begins and ends everywhere and nowhere. On the other hand, nations, like property rights, begin and end at certain points. It is, therefore, difficult to understand exactly what those historians, sociologists, and poets mean who think that the "territory" in which men live is and should be a political entity. Bossuet, as quoted by Lord Acton, declared: "Human society demands that we should love the earth where we live together or should regard her as a common mother or nurse . . . Truly men feel themselves bound together by something strong, when they think that the same earth that supported and nourished them as long as they lived will receive them in its bosom when they will be dead."¹² This reasoning can lead to cosmopolitan, continental, or simply regional emotions, just as well as to national feeling.

The foregoing criticism of the viewpoint that attachment to the land produces national feeling applies also to the second attitude—that the geographical configuration of the earth shows distinct divisions which account for the national solidarity and aversions to foreign nations.

The influence upon the development of the various peoples of such factors as soil, climate, ease of communication, and natural harbors admits of no argument. But despite this influence the globe cannot be divided into areas that harmonize with those occupied by the several nations. Germany, it is true, is colder than Italy; but Milan is colder than Naples, just as Königsberg is colder than Munich. The weather maps drawn by meteorologists overlap national frontiers everywhere. Storms and earthquakes, as well as the conditions favorable or unfavorable to a good harvest, take no account of man-made frontiers.

Ernest Renan declares: "There is not the mouth of a river from Biarritz to Tornea which has, more than one of the other rivers, the character of a boundary. Had history willed it, the Loire, the Seine, the Meuse, the Oder as well as the Rhine would have taken the char-

¹¹*National States and National Minorities* (London, 1934), p. 431.

¹²Lord Acton, "Nationality," *The History of Freedom and Other Essays* (London, 1922), p. 294. Maurice Barrès' often repeated remark runs: *La terre et les morts*.

acter of natural frontiers. . . .'¹³ And Carlton J. H. Hayes holds the same opinion:

The physical geography of the land which admittedly is and has long been French includes mountains, sea-coasts, river valleys, fertile plains and relatively barren plateaus; and if physical geography were the main determinant of national character, then there would be not one French nation but at least five.¹⁴ . . . When we consider that some four nationalities—Portuguese, Castilian, Catalan and Basque—coexist in the geographic unit known as the Iberian Peninsula, that the Polish and Magyar nationalities occupy parts (and only parts) of great plains, that the Greek nationality inhabits rocky coasts and islands, that Norwegian geography is similar in many significant aspects to Swedish, Yugoslav to Bulgarian, and even German to French, we must conclude that the idea of natural frontiers between nationalities is a myth.¹⁵

Even if there were more truth in the geographical argument than it actually contains, it should be kept in mind that new inventions and technical improvements—such as railways, tunnels, and roads—are making frontiers less “natural” than they were originally.

In Germany, a whole school of political thought has been eager to prove that politics has its roots in geography. It has named its doctrine *geopolitik*, and it sponsors a periodical, the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, edited by Karl Haushofer, a retired general.¹⁶ The prophets of *Geopolitics* would deserve more confidence if they sometimes advocated having the areas of their respective fatherlands (mostly Germany) reduced rather than enlarged. That they are always in favor of expansion is suspicious. Geographical arguments were used by conquerors and imperialists long before German scholars tried to put them into a clear-cut system. Napoleon contended that Holland ought to belong to France because it was a deposit of French rivers. And in 1852, when Lombardy and Venetia were still Austrian, the Austrian Count Ficquelmont postulated, in a volume entitled *Lord Palmerston, England und der Kontinent*, that the plains of Northern Italy must always be part of a German realm, because all the rivers which watered them originated on German Alpine soil.

We may conclude that wherever national consciousness or imperialistic aims exist, a belief in “natural” divisions of the earth’s surface will arise, comparable to that in common racial descent.

¹³*Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation* (Paris, 1882), p. 304.

¹⁴*France, A Nation of Patriots* (New York, 1930), pp. 15-16.

¹⁵*Essays on Nationalism*, p. 7.

¹⁶*Cf.* Richard Hennig, *Geopolitik* (Leipzig, 1928); Karl Haushofer, *Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans* (Berlin, 1938).

TRADITION

Every nation has traditions, and feels that they are an important bond between its members. John Stuart Mill states that of the causes which generate the feeling of nationality, "the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past."¹⁷ According to Renan, "To have common glories in the past, a common will at present, to have achieved great things together, to intend to achieve more of them in the future" is essential for a nation.¹⁸ "What is the national spirit (*l'esprit national*)?" asks E. Fournol. And he answers: "It is tradition and nothing else. Every generation may well add a trait to the national character and may even subtract another, but it will know the nation only as a product of the past."¹⁹

When the members of a nation believe in their common descent, the tradition of "race" arises. But tradition may also arise without a common ancestry. Armies, regiments, and universities have traditions; so have ecclesiastical orders such as the Franciscans and the Jesuits, and institutions such as the Roman Senate and the Supreme Court of the United States. The national traditions of the American or Argentine people are similar to those of England and France in their general characteristics, but the belief in common descent plays no important part, as these nations are composed of immigrants from various countries and their descendants.

A tradition may exist for an institution or social group. Individuals may enter and leave the institution or group through birth, death, or a voluntary act, and may partake of the respective tradition, either for life or temporarily.

Traditions may be of many kinds. The outstanding national ones cluster, as a rule, around wars and victories. Says Israel Zangwill: "Death was the seal of Nationality that stamped it as sacred. If men would henceforth die for it, it was because men had died to give it birth. More binding than common blood in the veins is the blood that is shed in common."²⁰ The same thought occurs to Henri Hauser:

¹⁷*Representative Government*, Ch. XVI.

¹⁸Renan, *op. cit.*

¹⁹*Op. cit.*, p. 121.

²⁰Zangwill, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

"It is the struggle, the armed conflict between the human groups which has created the nations. To force the invader out of the territory is the elementary form of patriotism, the instinctive reaction of the invaded. It is enough to recall the rôle of Jeanne d'Arc in the formation of the French national consciousness."²¹

War is of immense importance in the formation of national consciousness. But in order that groups of human beings may fight each other (and thereby allegedly become nations), they must first exist; and it is not true in all cases that blood shed for a common cause brings about national consciousness. Many groups, large and small—tribes, towns, classes, brigands, and others—have fought each other in the course of history; but nations have emerged only in relatively few cases and, during the greater part of human history, not at all. The Germans and Italians did not achieve national unity under single government until the latter half of the nineteenth century. Before that time, Italians fought Italians and Germans fought Germans in many wars involving the various Italian and German states. The German and Italian national movements were launched partly to give the people in each country a common national history which had not actually existed in the past. When Bismarck made up his mind to risk a war against France in 1870, the idea uppermost in his mind was that he might unite the separate German states in a struggle for a common victory and that this would pave the way for the formation of the German empire. The will for national unity was first; blood shed in common and a common glorious tradition were consequences.

When several nations are antagonistic to each other, wars fought together may do nothing to amalgamate them. The various nations of the old Hapsburg monarchy remained aloof in spite of their common army and numerous wars fought under the Hapsburg dynasty. The Irish have not become nationally-conscious Britishers. The Jews, since they have been emancipated, nourish the illusion that if they show their patriotism on the battlefield they will be fully accepted by the countries for which they fought. But this never happens. In other words, the struggle between groups has had consequences of the greatest historical importance, but it has resulted in national traditions and perhaps national consciousness only under certain conditions.

In considering the more general thesis that common historical rec-

²¹*Le Principe des Nationalités* (Paris, 1916), pp. 12-13.

ollections are at the root of national consciousness, it should be noted that history is not confined to a record of the Greeks, the Italians, the French, etc. After all, almost all groups and movements have histories.

A group may have a common tradition, and the stories handed down to its members may be true or fictitious. But it can have no "remembrance" of a past beyond the memory of men still living. To "remember" an event is a psychological phenomenon restricted to individuals. A person who has lived through the First World War remembers it; a person who was born after 1918 or who was an infant at the time has merely heard of it. Events which lie remote in the past have all been handed down by the written or spoken word; they are known but not remembered.

Frenchmen think of Jeanne d'Arc and Americans think of the Pilgrim Fathers and the Revolution of the thirteen colonies against England as belonging to "their" national history. Yet comparatively few Americans claim that their forefathers came over on the *Mayflower* or fought in the Revolution. They have learned their national history from teachers and books. A contemporary German no more remembers the battle of Leipzig of 1813 A. D. than he does the battle of Salamis of 480 B. C. But in thinking of them, his feeling toward one is different from his feeling toward the other. The battle of Leipzig is his "own" history, whereas the battle of Salamis concerns the Greeks. But if Europeans had a European instead of a national consciousness, the history of Europe would be as stirring as the history of their several nations. Many Europeans hope that some day the history of a battle fought by the Greeks and one fought by the Germans may convey the same sentimental associations and have the same significance. But group consciousness must precede group tradition.

The victory of Clovis at Tolbiac is presented as a personal success to the children of Toulouse, whose ancestors at that period were still under the heel of the Goths. The Battle of Bouvines is welcomed as a happy event by the small child of Provence, who is not told that his ancestors at that time were subjects, not of France, but of the Holy Roman Empire of the Teuton. For the small Breton children of today Crecy, Poitiers and Agincourt are national disasters, whereas actually their ancestors were often allied to the English during the Hundred Years' War. . . . Apart from a handful of scholars, people are interested in the past only in so far as it is a justification of the present.²²

²²Delaisi, *op. cit.*, pp. 167, 168, 170.

Barrès, as has been said above, thinks that it is better to suppress the truth than to undermine national consciousness. In this opinion he was preceded by Renan:

Oblivion, and, I shall say, even historical error, are an essential factor in the creation of a nation, and that is why the progress of the historical studies is often a danger for the nation. . . . It is the essence of a nation that all the individuals should have many things in common and also that all of them should have forgotten many things. . . . Every Frenchman must have forgotten St. Bartholomew and the massacres in the South during the thirteenth century.²³

Nations are not created by, but are themselves the creators of, national traditions. Since national traditions are transmitted from one individual to another by oral and written means, the belief that national consciousness is a matter of tradition is tantamount to holding that it is something that is taught and learned.

COMMUNITY OF INTERESTS

It is often taken for granted that the members of a nation share the same "interests." Sometimes this idea is stated explicitly, though rarely with as much emphasis as by John Oakesmith:

Everywhere we find a specific mark of nationality in the recognition of a common interest. Where the sentiment or conviction of nationality is weak, we find that the nationalizing process has not succeeded in establishing perfect community of interest, as in the case of Ireland in regard to Great Britain; in Finland as regards Russia; in Alsace as regards Germany. . . . The history of every people represents a separate stream of continuity of national life; and the national adjective, English, French, and so on, which signifies separateness from other peoples, signifies also continuity and identity of interest for the people it includes.²⁴

Most explanations of national foreign policies are based on the assumption that the "interests" of nations differ and perhaps even clash. Because the British have certain interests and the Germans have other interests, they must allegedly come into conflict. They may agree to talk it over peacefully and split the differences, but they cannot eliminate the basic fact that their interests are not the same. It is pertinent to ask: What are interests? What does the word connote, and what do harmony and conflict of interests mean?

The word "interest" has several meanings, of which two are im-

²³*Op. cit.*, pp. 284-286.

²⁴*Race and Nationality* (London, 1919), p. 86.

portant in the sphere of the social sciences. The first is equivalent to concern, curiosity, aim. In this sense we speak of artistic interests and of religious interests. The second meaning of "interest" is equivalent to "advantage," and in this sense we speak of a common interest when people collaborate because they believe that something is mutually advantageous. Thus, for example, the Allied Powers pursued different aims in the war of 1914-18: the British wanted to eliminate the German Navy, the French wished to recover Alsace-Lorraine, and the Russians wanted to carve several Slavic states out of Austria-Hungary. But their common interest was to destroy Germany's military power, because if this were accomplished, the aim of each participant in the alliance might be fulfilled. The manufacturers of an article have a common interest in a tariff, as they can all secure higher prices when foreign competition is minimized. On the other hand, all consumers are bound together by a common interest in free trade (even if they are not aware of it) because low prices make the money of each consumer go farther.

When we speak of the common interest of people belonging to the same nation, we may mean nothing tangible and thus we move in a vicious circle. To say that national interest is common to all members of a nation is the same as saying that what is common to all Smiths is their Smith-interest, and that what is common to all Joneses is their Jones-interest. Actually, those who assert that the members of a nation have common interests are thinking of *economic* ends. They mean that some things help the economic well-being of all Germans, others those of all Englishmen, and so on, and that this factor, together with others if not by itself alone, lies at the base of national consciousness. This assumption can best be analyzed by considering the various associations into which men enter when they wish to advance the economic well-being of every participant.²⁵

First there are innumerable associations for making money by contributing some work or thought to production and exchange in our economic society. Under primitive conditions the family is the producing group, and the product is distributed among its members. Under more complicated conditions, partnerships of every kind, and

²⁵The subject of economic interest and economic groups receives treatment also in the author's article "Class and Class Struggle," *Journal of Social Philosophy*, Vol. VI, 1940-41.

joint-stock companies represent the collaboration of any number of persons who may contribute capital or labor or both to achieve a common economic purpose—dividends to the participants. There are many associations of various kinds in every branch of economic life in every country, competing against each other and thus proving that their interests are not identical. Each one of them expects to gain at the expense of others, whether they belong to the same nation or not. The investment of capital in foreign countries, where it gives work to foreign labor, is a common occurrence. Nationalists all over the world constantly deplore the "capitalistic" system because it sets fellow-countrymen against each other, and they praise some socialistic system which supposedly would utilize all the economic forces of the nation for a common end. But when people are left to themselves, they are not conscious, either in word or deed of any community of economic interest among fellow-nationals.

A particular type of economic association is the kind formed by persons who collaborate with others, similarly situated, in order to eliminate competition and secure a larger income by influencing prices and wages through a monopoly. This is accomplished by trusts, cartels, associations of employers, and trade-unions. All these attempt to obtain a greater share of the national income through limiting commodities or labor thereby raising prices or wages. The clash between these economic associations leads to the so-called "class-struggle," and this may become a menace to national unity. It is said that the trade unions in the United States are only slightly sympathetic with foreign workmen, and do their best to keep them out of the country. But this does not happen because all American workmen share common interests against all foreign workmen, but simply because they wish to limit the supply of labor in general, and of cheap labor in particular.

Producers of every kind often combine in order to put pressure on their government to grant subsidies or protective tariffs. Where the state and the nation coincide and do not overlap, it appears that the manufacturers, and the agrarians or workmen associated with them, stand for the "protection of national labor." This is the usual slogan, but it proves nothing. Everyone tries to secure economic aid in the form of a tariff, subsidy or dole at the expense of other people. The national government is the agency to which one may apply with

the greatest chance of success, and it is approached for this reason alone—not because it is “national.” At the same time, Americans are very happy, if they are New Yorkers, to be protected against the competition of Massachusetts or California. That is true in every country. France has been conspicuous for the obligation imposed by its voters upon almost every deputy of the French Chamber to secure something for the district which has elected him.

If it were technically possible, not only every county but every city, every village, every street, and every individual would attempt to secure a subsidy from all the others and, in addition, some restriction upon the competitive power of rivals. It is expediency rather than national consciousness that erects tariffs along national instead of other frontier lines. Where there are no tariffs, trade ignores frontiers. Where tariffs exist, frontiers are created artificially. If people followed their economic interests, the consequences might just as well be international free-trade as intra-national obstacles to the free interchange of goods and services.

It has often been claimed that the several national movements resulting in the unification of Germany, Italy, and other countries have in reality been only the ideological concomitants of economic necessities; in order to work out its benefits for the rising bourgeoisie, the industrial revolution needed reasonably large national areas. But this is a very superficial thesis. First, from the purely economic point of view, there is no reason why Italian-speaking Lombardy, for example, should prefer to be joined to Italian-speaking Rome or Sicily rather than to German-speaking Austria; or why German-speaking Hanover should prefer an economic merger with Prussia to one with Dutch-speaking Holland. Secondly, if nothing mattered to the nationally conscious people but the size of their free-trade area, the national states ought to have been eager long ago to relinquish their economic sovereignty in favor of larger states or the League of Nations. But this is the one thing that they have so far declined even to consider. Instead, they fortify their frontiers, build up tariff walls and possibly aim at autarchy. The frontiers of the states—themselves factors in the formation of national consciousness—are the outcome of conquests, dynastic marriages, revolutions, and national ambitions. They have not been mapped by the economists.

There are many types of economic relations between men. They

can be competitors, buyers and sellers, landlords and tenants, creditors and debtors, entrepreneurs and workmen. All these relationships cut across the nations.

The groups we have considered so far are bent upon securing an income for their members by doing something more or less useful and getting the highest price for it. They are exchange-groups. But there is another way of securing wealth. One can just seize it from other people, or else force them into a position where they must pay tribute. Within the sphere of a state this may be done by gangsters and racketeers. On an international scale it can be accomplished by a group strong enough to defeat armed opposition. Do war, conquest, annexation, and colonies—in one word, imperialism—constitute good business? This point will be discussed later. Here it suffices to ask: Which has the better chance of success—a nation or an association of a different structure—when it attacks another group, disregarding the risks and thinking only of the gains? It cannot be held that nations stand a better chance than other groups. Men who share any common denominator—or even those who do not—may decide to unite against another group and try to secure the latter's property and income. The larger the attacking group, the smaller will be the risk, but at the same time the probable dividend for each participant in the attack will also be smaller. On the other hand, the smaller the group the greater will be both the risk and the possible gain.

The Germans can attack the Poles, or the Japanese the Chinese. But Prussia can also invade Bavaria or Austria; California can, theoretically at least, declare war on Oregon; Western Europe can stand against Eastern Europe; the Americas can attack Asia. The same position might be taken by the poor against the rich, or by Catholics against Protestants, or by non-Jews against Jews. Leaving aside the details of each actual case, every conceivable human group can (in theory) pin its hope on violence and imperialism. Experience shows that a few people have a greater chance of success than many millions. An Al Capone is more likely to become rich by threats and violence than an imperialistic nation.

It need hardly be mentioned that if the members of a nation had the same economic interest (which they have not) and if the way of achieving wealth indicated that they must take it from other nations, the normal economic project of every nation would be war.

Actually, warfare has a great deal to do with national consciousness, as we shall see later. But national wars are connected more with the concept of honor than with the idea of wealth. The nation is not an economic group.

This leads us to the conclusion that the belief in common economic interests of all the members of one nation is an illusion and a very dangerous one. Renan knew better: "Community of interests brings forth commercial treaties. . . A *Zollverein* (customs-union) is no fatherland."²⁶ Chateaubriand once wrote: "Men don't allow themselves to be killed for their interests; they allow themselves to be killed for their passions."

Logical reasoning does not indicate that the races of the anthropologists, the character groups of the psychologists, the conceptions of the geographers, the traditions of the historians, or the interest groups of the economists, lead us to the concept of a nation. National consciousness may serve to explain these doctrines, but it must itself be explained in a different way.

²⁶*Op. cit.*, p. 303.

WHAT IS A NATION?

The question "What is a nation?" is usually answered by using a number of words of rather indefinite meaning—nation, peoples, patriotism, nationalism, imperialism. The attempt is made here to define the various concepts in words which will most clearly describe their real nature.

The historical evolution of particular words and their meanings is a task for the philologist. The sociologist, on the other hand, is primarily interested in human attitudes. It is, therefore, not of primary importance to know that the word "nation" is of Latin origin and originally had the connotation of "descent," for in modern nations belief in common descent is only one factor. Nor is it altogether necessary to trace the development of the word "nation."

When we think of nations, national consciousness, national aspiration, and unredeemed nationalities, what impresses us most strongly is that certain groups of people are concerned with the area and the frontiers of the state to which they belong or wish to belong. This concern has had, and continues to have, tremendous influence on modern political history, hence it must be taken into consideration in attempting to define the word "nation."

There are three general concepts of a nation. The first defines it as the people belonging to the same state, regardless of their language, descent, etc. Thus Abbé Sieyès, famous for his participation in the French Revolution and conditioned by experiences of the eighteenth century, writes: "What is a nation? A body of associates living under one common law and represented by the same legislature."¹ This use of the word, excluding national movements against the political *status quo*, is at present rather universally disregarded. The sec-

¹Quoted by Macartney, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

and concept is objective. According to Pascal Mancini, "A nation is a natural society of men bound together by the unity of territory, origin, custom, and language, in harmony with their community of life and social conscience."² Maximilian Littré defines a nation as "A group of people inhabiting the same territory, subject or not subject to the same government, and having had for a long time sufficient interests in common to be regarded as belonging to the same race."³ The third concept, by contrast, stresses the subjective aspect and makes the existence of a nation dependent upon the thoughts and feelings of the individuals who compose it

The significance of a common language and traditions has been discussed above. One point, however, should be emphasized. No essentially new national pattern has been set up since the French Revolution on the basis of descent, language, and customs. Mankind has always been divided into a great number of groups according to these factors. What is new is that people build political demands upon these factors, and find it important to know with whom they share their state and with whom they do not; and that language and tradition are believed to have a connection with such questions as frontiers and government. The word "nation" applies to these contemporary dynamic groups, rather than to the traditional subdivisions which existed in some form or other long before there was a written history.

A satisfactory definition must, therefore, be sought along the lines of the third concept, the subjective one. By far the best known definition is that of Ernest Renan, who stated that a nation is "*un plébiscite de tous les jours*" (an uninterrupted plebiscite).⁴ According to John Stuart Mill, "A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others—which makes them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively."⁵

These and many similar definitions point in the right direction. Their chief weakness is that they are not sufficiently clear and leave

²Quoted by Johannet, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

³*Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁴*Op. cit.*, p. 307.

⁵*Op. cit.*, Chapter XVI.

a number of questions unanswered; their principal merit is their emphasis on the connection between national feeling and the state. But which of the various activities of the state have a direct bearing on national feeling? Self-government is usually the aim of groups which believe they would be better off ruling themselves than being ruled. Renan's *plébiscite de tous les jours* has a wider meaning than he intended because the question remains as to the nature of the subject on which the plebiscite is taken. It has sometimes been held that a group is a nation insofar as it wishes to be one. Sir Alfred E. Zimmern states: "Broadly speaking, one can only say that if a people feels itself to be a nation, it is a nation."⁶ But an equation using the same unknown on both sides is anything but helpful. A bridge club, strictly speaking, is a collection of people who play a definite game—bridge. It is not a group of people who feel that they form an association called a "bridge club."

✓ National consciousness became an historic force of paramount influence, not because races or languages or cultures had changed, but because certain human groups had adopted a new attitude toward matters previously regarded with indifference. Therefore, a nation must be defined by the subjective attitude of the people concerned. ✓

The question arises: "What are those social groups, which we call "nations" demanding? What is their object? It is evident that they desire separate and independent states for themselves, and that in each state the right to legislate and govern is to be reserved to members of the group. But people may desire a state of their own either because of the nature of the objectives which they wish to achieve internally or because of the position which their state may hold among other states. Hence a national entity implies that the *international* aspect of the state is of basic importance.

There are certain laws, facilities, and institutions that men desire and others which they dislike. It sometimes happens that people can achieve certain objectives only if they are willing to acquiesce in the policies of a foreign government. A nation is a group of people which, when put to this test, prefers its own government to any foreign government.

After the First World War the French were eager to have the inhabitants of the German Rhineland secede from the Reich and join

⁶*Nationality and Government* (London, 1919), p. 55.

France. The French had much to offer: an orderly government instead of the chaotic conditions prevailing at that time in Germany; the satisfaction of being on the side which won the war instead of on the losing side; the tested democratic institutions of France; lighter taxes than Germany weighed down by reparation debts could promise. Yet the people of the Rhineland almost unanimously retained their loyalty to Germany. Certainly not because Germany was better able to fulfil their everyday wishes, but rather because they felt that it was their duty as Germans to belong to a state which represented the German people in foreign politics.

In 1935, the Saar declined to stay under the humanitarian rule of the League of Nations and joined Hitler's Germany from no other than purely "national" motives. Further examples are the Irish people, who are willing to sacrifice their trade with England for the sake of a sovereignty of hardly more than symbolic significance, and the Palestine Arabs, who light-heartedly reject the tremendous economic advantages of a preponderantly Jewish Palestine for Arabic autonomy and poverty.

A nation may be defined as a *group of people which wishes to be sovereign among other peoples and therefore desires a state of its own.*

When men revolt against their government in order to found a new state or join another state already in existence, they may do so because they have their own national consciousness. But this is not the case when their aim is simply to have certain grievances removed, and when the proposed change of government is only a means to this end.

Bismarck, in his later years the founder of the German Empire of the Hohenzollerns, had one of his first parliamentary controversies over a question of national consciousness. A deputy of the Prussian Chamber declared that when the German people revolted against Napoleon in 1813 one of their chief motives had been the wish for self-government and an elected House of Representatives. Bismarck's rejection of this view was a typically national attitude. He was amazed that anyone could imagine that considerations of internal policy should have played a part in the decisions leading to the War of Liberation; the true motives had been the "feeling of shame that strangers commanded in our country, of ill-treatment and humiliation, of hatred against the strangers."

Germany, with little national feeling as late as the eighteenth

century, further illustrates how national consciousness focuses upon the relation of the nation to foreigners beyond its borders. "When the German Bund was formed after the defeat of Napoleon, a proposal was made to have this loose federation of all German states guaranteed by the big European Powers. The greatest German statesman of that time, Baron vom Stein, while having certain misgivings, did not turn down the proposal altogether but thought that only England and Russia should be allowed to participate. The modern German historian, Friedrich Meinecke, who relates the story in connection with the evolution of national consciousness in general, emphasizes that Stein stopped halfway but that modern national consciousness will proceed to the end and will "reject every, absolutely every, constitutional possibility to have the free movement of one's own power policy disturbed by foreign countries."

National movements aim at unity or liberty or both, and in every case the international position of the state is of paramount importance. The German national movement of the nineteenth century was a movement for unity. The Italian *risorgimento* aimed at unity and, in addition, at liberation of Northern Italy from Austrian rule. The Czechs were a united but not a free people before 1918. The Yugoslavs were not united and only partly free. Colonial nationalism aims, as a rule, at liberty. This applies to the Americas in the past and to British India at present.

National consciousness does not arise because people find that some co-nationals are suffering from poverty, or loneliness, but when the people as a whole are suffering (actually or allegedly) from foreign domination. National, as distinguished from human, sympathy is always associated with citizenship and the state. Hence, national feeling presupposes other nations. One nation alone on the surface of the earth is a psychological impossibility in the same way that there cannot be one partner or one party. (What the totalitarians call a single party is in reality a monopolistic organization). In this plurality of states every nation claims certain territories and people that are supposed to form a sovereign state. Other nations may not interfere with one's own nation, but the latter may wish to interfere with them.

The foregoing answer to the question "What is a nation?" contains implications which must be analyzed. So long as we speak

¹Meinecke, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

about the psychological attitude of an individual, we are on relatively firm ground. But with the numerous individuals that form a group, there is the probability, amounting almost to certainty, that they may differ in their opinions. If, for instance, some Slovaks want a sovereign Slovakian state while others do not, are the Slovaks then a nation or not? Who decides, and how is a decision reached?

The answer nearest at hand is, of course, that the majority of the people concerned must decide. This would solve the problem were it not for the preliminary question: Who determines the people, the majority of whom are to make the decision? The "self-determination of the nations" is not so simple a matter as it appears at first sight. The Irish, for example, say that all people living in Ireland belong to the Irish nation. The people of Ulster, though a minority, deny it. If they are eventually annexed to the Irish Free State, one way of describing what has happened would be to say that within the legitimate boundaries of a single nation the minority has had to conform to the will of the majority. (This is what Dublin would contend). But the same event might also be described by asserting that people who feel British, and therefore are British, have been forcibly subjected to an alien rule. (This would be the stand of Belfast). The group whose size may be the decisive factor cannot decide who shall vote on the question of national allegiance. If a vote were taken throughout Germany on the question whether a German province named Austria should exist by itself, the majority would certainly vote "No;" but if only Austrians were asked the same question, the outcome might be doubtful. The Republic of Panama had a safe majority in favor of autonomous existence, but Columbia, of which it once formed a part, was opposed to the independence and autonomy of its province.

When plebiscites are held in order to determine the nationality of people living in a certain region difficulty is bound to arise. For example, the size and the boundaries of the electoral district chosen determine whether the Macedonians will be considered Macedonians or Serbs or Bulgars. In 1921 Upper Silesia, taken as a whole, gave a majority to Germany; but certain portions of the area returned a Polish majority. It would seem that an outsider must define the electoral body, and his definition may carry with it an implication of the result of the plebiscite.

As a consequence, a group may call itself a nation by right of the majority, while at the same time the status of a part of it remains doubtful. A distinction must be made between two cases. A minority may feel that it is a part of the nation, while the majority rejects its claim. Take, for example, the Jews in many countries, including some where they enjoy full legal rights and where they have not been made pariahs as in Nazi Germany. Even before the Nazis came to power, a number of Germans took the position that the Jews were at best tolerated aliens but not Germans. Many Hungarians and the majority of the Poles and Rumanians feel the same way toward the Jews.

In the second case, the majority claims the minority as a part of the nation, while the minority feels a different loyalty. Though this is by far the more important of the two situations, it does not represent all typical "national minority" problems. For example, the Italians do not claim that the German speaking population of the Southern Tyrol is Italian, and the Rumanians do not claim that their Hungarian-speaking subjects are Rumanians. But the Germans held in 1871 that the Alsatians were Germans, although the Alsatians denied it. The Serbs claim the Croatians for the "Yugoslav" nation, although the Croatians do not concur. Democratic opinion will naturally favor the smaller group and deny the larger group the right to coerce. This is a noble sentiment, but its consequences are not altogether pleasant. If one million people has the right to secede from a country, why not one thousand or one hundred, and why not every individual? And if considerations of nationality give a group the right to sever allegiance to a government, why may not questions of economic policy, taxes, education, and religion confer the same right? Assuming that they do, how then can an orderly administration be maintained anywhere at any time?

This book is concerned with the scientific analysis of national feeling and not with politics or ethics. We are investigating what was and is, not what ought to be. Nevertheless, one observation may be made here on the international consequences of the right of national self-determination if this right is pushed to an extreme. Granted that there would be no white or Negro people in the Americas and no European colonies in Africa and Asia today had the original inhabitants decided the question, what of those areas to which access

is all-important for the economic life of other nations? It is not a matter of "exploitation" that the inhabitants of the regions around Suez and Panama allow ships of all nations to pass through these two artificial waterways. It is to their advantage. Yet the Egyptians living next to the Suez Canal, or the people of Panama, *might* declare that they wish to be let alone and might close their territory, including the waterways, to further traffic. Though this would be in accord with their right to self-determination, few democrats in other countries would acquiesce. They would probably contend that the right of national self-determination must give way in certain cases to other broader principles.

The difficulties discussed do not nullify the existence of national feeling as such. The definition of national consciousness as the wish of certain people to have a sovereign state among other states, still holds, even though it is impossible in many cases to tell which groups come under the definition.

National consciousness does not see the social world as a whole, but rather as separate groups, each standing for itself—partly with and partly against all others. In nature transitions and changes are gradual. *Natura non facit saltum*. The sun moves slowly over the surface of the earth from Russia, over Poland and Germany, to France and England. Nowhere is there a variation from this uniformity. Geographically, Berlin and Paris are much nearer to each other than New York and Los Angeles, but from the viewpoint of national feeling the former cities are much further apart than the latter. The time may be 8 a.m. in two places somewhat remote from each other on the same degree of latitude, while it is 7 a.m. at another place slightly further to the west. This is a man-made law. In nature there is continuity and gradual change.⁸

A plain may stretch for numberless miles without any natural division. But property laws, being human institutions, make divisions; where the property of one man begins, another man's ends. The human races shade one into another. But when taboos, customs, or laws intervene, certain groups remain apart. It is man who

⁸"International boundaries are thus sharply defined lines, fixed by nations like fences between their respective properties. In nature, however, there are no sharply marked boundaries of any sort, only zones of transition." S. Whittemore Boggs, *International Boundaries* (New York, 1940), p. 6.

brings discontinuity into nature. It is man who divides the social world into nations, each watching jealously over its sovereignty.

In speaking of definitions, Spinoza states: "*Omnis determinatio negatio.*" It is the same with nations. The German, insofar as he is nationally conscious, is non-French, non-Polish, non-English; the Spaniard is non-French, non-Italian. "The two tendencies, the cohesion and the repulsion, are strictly correlative; each involves the other."⁹

The method which the modern dictators have used to stir up the national sentiments of their subjects has consisted almost entirely in making them hate certain "enemies," such as the "plutocratic democracies," the French, the Bolsheviks, or the Jews. To judge from Hermann Rauschning's conversations with Hitler, even the latter's persecution of the Jews is in part nothing but a coldly calculated policy for uniting all Germans by giving them a common enemy.¹⁰ After the downfall of France in 1940, the government of Marshal Pétain immediately looked for ways and means to build up anew a basis of French unity and national consciousness. An attempt was made to concentrate on a new common enemy, and as the victorious Germans were for the time being too dangerous for the purpose, the British, the Jews, and the recently naturalized foreigners were put forward as objects of common national hatred.

For the sake of clear and concise terminology, some words related to "nation" and "national consciousness" should be defined at this point. "People," as distinct from "nation," means a large number of individuals who rightly or wrongly believe that they share a common descent. Nations, too, believe this. It seems expedient to call a group "people" as long as the group sees no political implications in such a belief. In this sense the Germans were a people throughout the Middle Ages. They believed in a familylike relationship but did not argue that, therefore, all Germans must live together in one state. The moment the greater part of them took to this view, the German people became a nation.

"Patriotism" is the loyalty of individuals toward the state to

⁹John M. Robertson, *Patriotism and Empire* (London, 1900), p. 5.

¹⁰"I asked whether . . . the Jew must be destroyed.

"'No,' he replied. 'We should have then to invent him. It is essential to have a tangible enemy, not merely an abstract one.'

"Hitler instanced the Catholic Church: 'It did not content itself,' he said, 'with the Devil; it had to have visible enemies in order not to relax in the struggle.' " Herman Rauschning, *The Voice of Destruction* (New York, 1940), p. 237.

which they belong, regardless of whether it is a state in which their own nation is dominant. When an Italian who was under Austrian rule before 1859, 1866, or 1919 felt allegiance to the Hapsburg empire, he was patriotic; so is his descendant who has transferred his loyalty to the Italian national state. Men were patriotic before they felt that their allegiance ought to belong solely to their nation.

"Nationalities," as distinct from "nations," are national-feeling groups who are spoken of as "nationalities" by other groups. This occurs when their national consciousness has not achieved a national state, or when they exist as minority groups within sovereign nations. Thus the Germans and the Hungarians are "nationalities" in Rumania, but not in Germany and Hungary. Old Austria was composed of a substantial number of nationalities, none of which, at least legally, had fewer rights than the others. Imperial Russia had, and Soviet Russia now has, scores of nationalities within its boundaries.

"Nationalism" is a certain condition of mind. It is the essence of modern nationalism, according to Carlton J. H. Hayes, that "all other loyalties must be subordinate to loyalty to the national state, that is, to national patriotism."¹¹ This condition is not necessarily implied in national consciousness. A national patriot may well subordinate his national sentiment to the teachings of the Catholic Church when the two come into conflict. He is nationalistic when he feels toward his nation as those citizens of Florence felt toward their city, who, according to Machiavelli, valued its greatness more than the salvation of their souls. A spirit of aggression often goes hand in hand with such an evaluation of the true or alleged interests of one's nation. When national consciousness embraces the idea of imperialism, nationalism emerges as a national tendency toward conquest.¹²

National consciousness can be very strong or very weak or something between strength and weakness. The individuals who together form a nation belong also to other groups (economic, religious, social), and their minds are not at all times and exclusively possessed by the longing for a sovereign state. The definition of the concept "nation" given above does not coincide with the actual state of affairs wherever there is national feeling; rather it reflects the "ideal type" of the nation in the sense in which this expression was created by Max Weber.

¹¹*Op. cit.*, p. 26.

¹²For the problem of terminology see also "Nationalism," *op. cit.*, pp. XVI-XX.

[The ideal type is] an ideal construction of a typical course of action, or form of relationship which is applicable to the analysis of an indefinite plurality of concrete cases, and which formulates in pure, logical consistent form certain elements that are relevant to the understanding of the several concrete situations.

... [It is] a construction of elements abstracted from the concrete, and put together to form a unified conceptual pattern. This involves a one-sided exaggeration of certain aspects of the concrete reality, but is not to be found in it, that is, concretely existing, except in a few very special cases, such as purely rational action. It is Utopia.¹³

The ideal nation, if we may use the term, has perhaps not materialized anywhere. There are cases where the staunchest national patriot may prefer a foreign regime to some greater catastrophe. Such was the attitude of the Russian "Whites" when they welcomed Allied and Polish intervention against the Bolsheviks. Such will almost certainly be the attitude of German nationalists if and when they are confronted with a real, not with an alleged, danger of communism. But reality can come very near to the ideal type. National consciousness, like family attachment and religious sentiment, is a matter of degree.

The importance which is assigned to the national ideal may vary in proportion to the place reserved for other ideals—personal, cultural, religious, and humanitarian. The Germans of 1930 were more preoccupied with the German nation than those of 1830. The modern Greeks are more a nation than the Chinese have been during the greater part of the latter's history.

In some countries local allegiances compete with national feeling. In Germany, loyalty to the *Länder*—Bavaria, Saxony, Mecklenburg, and so on—was at one time stronger than German national feeling and may become so again. Some of the people in the United States concentrate on the political interests of a particular state and regard national affairs of minor importance. The percentage of people taking an interest in national aims varies. It is greater in the United States than in India, and greater in France than in Rumania. Also variable are the lengths to which the several nations will go in sacrificing for the achievement or preservation of their sovereignty as states.

¹³Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (New York, 1937), pp. 603, 606.

HOME AND HOMELAND

Inevitably, a psychological and sociological analysis, such as this study is, treads upon controversial ground for the subject of national feeling is broad and is open to unavoidable dispute at many points. Controversial issues can, however, be reduced to a minimum by somewhat limiting the scope of the inquiry. In this and subsequent chapters the attempt is made to show that men enjoy belonging to groups which stand against other groups; that they wish to be considered courageous, and that under certain circumstances they enjoy fighting.

The existence of a pattern of in-group and out-group attitudes is supported by psychoanalytical theories. According to I. D. MacCrone, an investigator of race problems who has been influenced by psychoanalysis:

The internal conflict which is inseparable from the life of the individual as a member of a group becomes externalized as a conflict between groups, and so is made more tolerable. The psychological distinction, therefore, between in- and out-groups corresponds to a real division within the individual himself. As a form of insurance, the existence of the out group covers the in group against the risks of internal conflict and aggressiveness. If we could imagine a state of affairs in which such a group did not exist, it would become necessary to invent one, if only to enable members of the in-group to deal with conflicts, internal and external, without wrecking their own group.¹

This may be true or false, but in any event the thesis of the writer does not depend on the acceptability of either the psychoanalytical or other psychological doctrines.

The present study does not claim to be a history of national consciousness. Historical data are used as illustrations only. The author does not assert anything affirmatively or negatively regarding the

¹*Race Attitudes in South Africa* (London, 1937), p. 252.

existence and meaning of human "instincts" in the sense in which this conception is controversial among biologists and psychologists. And least of all does he take sides in the ultimate philosophical interpretations which can be attached to social and historical phenomena. Theories which consider national attitudes as forming a part of the universal struggle for existence; those which interpret them as events within an ever recurring alternation of rational and irrational historical epochs; those which classify them as falling within the categories of progress or regress or recurrence—these and many others are of great interest and value. But the method of the present study is intentionally nearer to the surfaces of the phenomena.

An obvious factor in national consciousness is man's love for a certain country and a certain group of people. Patriotism in general, and national feeling in particular, are generally taken to mean attachment to one's native place and soil, and to the people among whom one has grown up. This is illustrated by the following examples.²

Alfred William Howitt tells of an Australian native who, on leaving his camp for a trip of about a week, burst into tears, saying to himself repeatedly: "My country, my people, I shall not see them." It was with the utmost difficulty that the Veddahs of Ceylon could be induced to leave their accustomed solitude even for a short time. The Stiêns of Cambodia are so strongly attached to their forests and mountains that to leave them seems almost fatal. Not infrequently Solomon Islanders die from homesickness on their way to the Fiji or Queensland plantations. The Hovas of Madagascar, when setting out on a journey, often take with them a small portion of their native earth, on which they gaze during their absence, invoking their god that they may be permitted to return to restore it to the place from which it was taken.

Odysseus, even in the arms of a friendly goddess, longed for his native island.³ Napoleon on St. Helena thought with emotion, not of Paris where he had lived as emperor, but of Corsica, his poor native island, and he asserted that nowhere else was the air as healthy and life more pleasant. The Swiss are particularly susceptible to homesickness. Swiss mercenaries were known to desert when homesick-

²Cf. Edward Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas* (London, 1926), II, pp. 169 ff.

³Cf. Robert Michels, *Der Patriotismus* (Munich, 1929), pp. 54 ff.

ness overcame them. In order to keep them with the colors, the French kings forbade them temporarily, on pain of death, to sing their national song, *Le ranz des vaches*. Chateaubriand thinks that Providence has, so to speak, attached the feet of every man to his native soil; therefore, even Iceland with its glaciers and the flaming sands of Africa do not lack population. Robert Owen, who had tried to build up a new social order in America through communities organized on the basis of his ideas, returned to his native Newtown, in England, when he felt death approaching.

One object of homesickness for males is often the type of women they have known at home, while another is their native food. Michels quotes G. A. Borgese as saying: "For nine-tenths of the people their fatherland is the square kilometre where their kitchen smokes and their salad grows." It is said that during the American Civil War, Danes fought on both sides without any extraordinary feelings in the matter. But when some Union Danes conquered a camp of Confederate Danes and found their native dishes, they were moved to the core and began to sing Danish national songs.

French writers have often claimed that there can be no patriotic sentiment except for the small corner of a country where one has been born and has grown up. As has been noted above, peasants who have to decide between their native soil, which is to be transferred to an alien state and government, and their national state, to which they have belonged hitherto, usually choose the former. "The sympathy with one's group carries with it its own limitation. Face-to-face contact being limited, the size of the group that one can be spontaneously interested in is also limited. The phenomenon known as *campanilismo* among the Italians, the devotion to one's village *campanile*, village interests, and village members, indicates more nearly the extent of original patriotism."⁴

What would national consciousness be like if it depended only on love of home and homeland? There would be no definite frontiers between "our" land and the rest of the world, for in the conception of home, there is only continuity. There would be no determination of one's own group by the single fact that it excludes all aliens (*omnis determinatio negatio*). The affection felt for one's own people

⁴Max Sylvius Handman, "The Sentiment of Nationalism," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 36 (1921).

would be strongest for those nearest to oneself gradually becoming weaker the further one moved from the center to the circumference of one's immediate environment. There would be neither a definite breach anywhere between self and the whole of mankind nor a place for the national "One for all and all for one." No particular interest would be felt in the affairs of people one has never seen, even though they spoke the same language. There would be no national imperialism; and a tradition of war and heroism, if it existed at all, would attach itself merely to one's own small group and the little piece of land the group defended in the past.

The situation is of course different. In the first place, people may experience a very serious conflict between love for their home and allegiance to their nation. Obviously, then, the two cannot be identical. Severe threats and discriminatory laws were needed to force the Germans in the Baltic states to leave the region where their forefathers had lived for centuries and to move to Germany. Pursuant to an agreement between Hitler and Mussolini, the German-speaking people of the Southern Tyrol were asked to choose between Italy and Germany in January, 1940. Under very strong Nazi pressure two-thirds of them decided to go to Germany; one-third preferred to remain in their homeland. A number of Turks live in Rumania, and the Rumanians have tried hard to induce them to return to Turkey, but they refuse.

There is one situation, however, where a conflict between nationality and homeland is unlikely to arise—when the state which asks for the loyalty of its citizens is very small. In this case, home and state usually coincide. This is the reason why Plato and Aristotle, as well as numerous political scientists of a later period, have been so strongly opposed to great empire states. Plato and Aristotle "recognized that collective deliberation and volition are essential to the true state. . . . The limits of the political organism capable of a collective mental life were rightly held to be set by the number of citizens who could live so close together as to meet in one place to discuss all public affairs by word of mouth."⁵ Aristotle maintained that a city should have a moderately sized population, for, "who could command it in war, if the population were excessive, or what herald short of a Stentor could speak to them?" Antiquity, says Henri Hauser, knew

⁵William McDougall, *The Group Mind* (Cambridge, 1920), p. 131.

la patrie but not *la nation*. The territory of the former can be seen with the eyes, that of the latter only with the mind (*avec l'esprit*).⁶ Between the one and the other, there is the same gap as between the concrete and the abstract, experience and fancy. Voltaire thought it might be difficult to feel affection for a great nation. Rousseau was convinced that if democracy had a chance anywhere, it would be in a small city like his native Geneva. He advised the Poles to draw in their frontiers. Auguste Comte favored small states because of the more intense patriotism of their citizens.

The feeling which the members of a nation have toward each other is by no means identical with the sentiments which grow out of childhood attachment to a community or neighborhood. Man knows his home, homeland, family, neighbors, and local acquaintances. He has a definite picture of his home community and the persons who live in it, based on his own experiences. But in an altogether different way he arrives at a picture of foreign nations and of his own nation when its size transcends his experience. In this case consciousness of the duty of patriotism gives rise to a certain kind of affection; this, in turn, produces a more or less arbitrary picture of the country and its inhabitants. The same thing happens, to a certain extent, in the realm of family relations. The individuals belonging to our family are not always the persons we might love best should we meet them as strangers. But having felt from early childhood allegiance and affection for our family, we are inclined to picture its members (regardless of their individual qualities) in a special way, apart from other persons. Hence the pains taken by nationally-conscious people the world over to prove that the members of one nation are racially related.

The American learns that it is his duty to love America; the German, to love Germany. This is the first conscious contact the individual makes with his nation. It is a matter of morale, not experience. The patriot endows his nation with superior qualities, and clothes it with his ideals. But various people have various ideals, with the result that the images they hold differ substantially. For example, two Germans, one a democrat and humanitarian and the other a National Socialist, both feel that they love Germany. Both may possibly find numerous short-comings in many Germans around them. But that will not detract from their patriotism, for they will

⁶*Le Principé des Nationalités* (Paris, 1916), p. 14.

insist that the Germany to which their affection is due, is not the transitory Germany of the day, but the "real," the "true," the "eternal" Germany. The humanitarian's concept of Germany means Goethe, Beethoven, Kant, the Rhine, Heidelberg, wine, music, *lieder*, lyric poetry, and philosophy. But the National Socialist's concept is entirely different; to him Germany connotes Hitler's discipline, the Germans as a master-race, soldiers and armaments, great battles, and the latest Nazi victories in Europe. There are more and wider differences between these two pictures of Germany than between the picture a humanitarian German patriot holds of Germany and that which a humanitarian Frenchman holds of France. This is easily understandable, for their differing patriotic images have not been gained by personal experiences and induction, but have been created, unconsciously to be sure, for the purpose of moral edification. A patriot may possibly love "America" or "France" and at the same time dislike practically every individual American or Frenchman whom he knows. In the same way, some anti-Semites hate the Jews but make an exception of every individual Jew with whom they happen to be personally acquainted.

The associations with certain symbols also play an important part. According to Graham Wallas, "When a man dies for his country, what does he die for? . . . If he is an Italian it may be the name, the musical syllables of Italia. If he is a Frenchman, it may be the marble figure of France with her broken sword, as he saw it in the market-square of his native town, or the maddening pulse of the 'Marseillaise.' Romans have died for a bronze eagle on the wreathed staff, Englishmen for a flag, Scotchmen for the sound of the pipes." The larger a country is and the more its inhabitants are unknown to one another, the greater is the significance of symbols such as the national flag and the national anthem.

Roger Soltan describes the way in which Maurice Barrès (who, incidentally, invented the word "nationalism") constructs his own "true" France.⁸

⁷*Human Nature in Politics* (New York, 1921), pp. 93-94.

⁸*French Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (New Haven, 1931), p. 381.

Barrès reveals in fact to a striking if not unique degree the extraordinary subjectivism of this would-be objective traditionalism. He begins by wiping out or ignoring over a century of French development, life, and thought, of French tradition in a word, because it does not fit in with his conception of the course French life should have taken. But having gone back to the *ancien régime* he then proceeds to eliminate all that does not square with what we would have liked the *ancien régime* to be, the France of Voltaire and Fontenelle, the France of disastrous wars and humiliating peace treaties, the France allied to Turk or Protestant against the most Christian Kings of Spain, the France of peasant revolts and bread riots; that France is non-existent, and M. Parodi does not exaggerate when he says that "his creating ego claims, God like, the right to create his own France, in the likeness of his own instinct, and of making her real to all other men by the very act of this conceiving and willing her." Believing as he does in his intuitions, as a true individualist, his intuition is truth, so that "the natural instinct becomes one with the instinct of M. Barrès, and the soul of France is but the soul of M. Barrès exteriorized" . . . "My quarrel with Barrès," writes Emmanuel Berl in his provocative and amusing *Mort de la Pensée bourgeoise*, "is that while deriving his politics from a walk along the Moselle, he sees only the plum-trees and ignores the blast-furnaces. Who would ever realize, on reading this Lorrainer, that he describes a metallurgical country?"⁹

If the parallel is used with caution and not too greatly stressed, it may be said that the love of one's nation resembles the love of God. In both cases the feeling of *Thou shalt* precedes the more or less arbitrarily represented qualities of the object for which love is demanded. An analogy is also to be found in the attitude of extreme Marxists toward the proletariat. "In bolshevist Marxism," says Nicholas Berdyaev, "the proletariat ceased to be an empirical reality, for as an empirical reality the proletariat was a mere nothing; it was above all the idea of a proletariat that mattered, and those who became vehicles for the expression of this idea might be an insignificant minority."¹⁰

Love of one's nation is something entirely different from love of all one's co-nationals. The greatest patriots are often men and women who, without conscience, have killed or imprisoned or otherwise sacrificed the majority of their countrymen—for the good of the nation. The most hardened egoists who often have no friends and are tyrants in their homes may be fanatical nationalists, not only according to their own claims but also in the opinion of their contemporaries. The dictators of our time are outstanding examples. Psychologists agree that Mussolini and Hitler are absolutely egocentric. There is proba-

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 385.

¹⁰*The Origin of Russian Communism* (London, 1937), p. 125.

bly not a soul on earth whom Mussolini does not despise. Hitler has apparently never had a warm feeling toward anybody. It is said that during all the years of the First World War, he did not once receive a letter or a parcel, and that he has never felt affection for a woman. Mussolini has no real interest in Italian literature and art, and Hitler does not even know what German literature is. (His own German is deplorable.) Yet both men are national patriots. Can anybody doubt that the sentiments which they represent are different from those which grow out of childhood attachment to one's home and neighbors?

Members of large nations obviously do not view each other in the same way that neighbors do. Affectionate attachment to one's home and neighbors cannot lead to an in-group, out-group feeling. It is like family love, sexual love, and, in another sphere, the love demanded by the Christian religion, in that it is not based on antipathy. How, then, can discontinuity—*determinatio negatio*—be explained? There must be something besides love of home and country underlying national consciousness. But before investigating this second source, let us see how differently men react under conditions of war and peace.

National solidarity is strongest in wartime and when there is the possibility of a war; but it is very weak in peacetime. Co-nationals are amazed at the sudden feeling of unity and mutual confidence that inspires them when facing a common enemy. They call it a "national miracle" and boast that the enemy never thought such a thing possible. They believe that their *union sacrée*, their *Burgfrieden*, represents the expression of the national soul and will survive when the war is over. This optimism is invariably followed by strong disillusionment because, as soon as the fighting is over and there is no longer a common enemy, peace turns out to be what it has always been: a return to an unheroic, unromantic everyday life laden with competition, envies, and personal frictions. War lessens internal party strife.

Wilhelm II observed, with shrewdness, on August 4, 1914: "I do not know parties any longer, I know only Germans." But when the war was over and poverty gripped the nation, the remembrance of common years in the trenches was powerless to prevent party strife and even political murder from becoming much more bitter than they had ever been before. This has been well stated by John M. Robertson, in contrasting the psychology of peace and war.

He whose life's task has been to create burdensome tariffs in his own favor, to undersell and ruin his competitors, to keep down his workmen's wages, to enrich himself, is found offering to equip at his own expense a regiment of soldiers, as the expression of his new-found delight in the notion of fellowship. But it takes the old brute instinct of battle, of hate, to work the change, and they who think that, with that instinct asleep again, he will continue zealous to promote the common weal in normal life, are extravagantly astray

Twenty years of nominal national union in enmity to another nation [following British victory over Napoleon] had left the wealthy not more but less capable of beneficent fellow-feeling for their own "kind" who had fought the fight with them. The English aristocrat had no more learned to care for his luckless countrymen than had Coriolanus in republican Rome. The old psychological process had had the old result. A generation of indulgence for the principle of enmity, with the usual growth of militant fraternity *ad hoc*, had left society much less fraternal as regarded the works of peace and mercy and building up, than it had been a generation before.¹¹

The affection co-nationals feel for each other is somewhat peculiar. It differs, not in quantity, but in quality, from simple love of home, family, and land. National consciousness has been universally misunderstood because it has been confounded with the love of home and homeland. Actually, it is a manifestation of imperialism.

¹¹*Patriotism and Empire* (London, 1900), pp. 8, 19.

THE FIGHTING IMPULSE

Men have always lived in groups, small and large, but universally organized social life has never materialized. The inclination of all men is to belong to groups with more or less distinct aims.

Gustav Rümelin, a German author of the nineteenth century, expressed this very neatly: If men had the impulse to attach themselves to the biggest crowd, their dwelling-places would be near each other, not too remote from the common center, and we would find fewer human beings the nearer we approached the periphery. Probably all men would share the same language and culture, though both would be of a low rank. In reality, man has an impulse toward particular groups, not one of general gregariousness. "Our impulse does not aim to join others without limits but to belong to a group, to enter a definite circle which tends to assert itself as a distinct group against others. Joining goes inseparably with setting apart. The content and form of the human social impulse is to enlarge our self-consciousness to that of a group, to merge with it, to intertwine our interests with the interests of the group."¹ The innumerable associations of men with men, found wherever governments do not forbid them, testify to the truth of this statement. Edgar A. Mowrer remarks: "The Germans are a gregarious nation of organizers. As much as, or more than, Americans, they love to belong."² The same may be said for many other nations.

A group has a particularly strong feeling of solidarity when it competes or fights with other groups. Groups often consider themselves superior and are eager to have this superiority acknowledged in words and deeds. There are nations whose national consciousness

¹*Über den Begriff des Volkes, Reden und Aufsätze*, I (1875).

²*Germany Puts the Clock Back* (New York, 1932), p. 91.

and attitude toward other nations imply little beyond the gratification of belonging to a group that is distinct from other groups. The Dutch and the Swedes, for example, remembering with pride the battles and victories of their ancestors in earlier centuries, were content with their political status and had no reason to agitate for a change. They have always admired courage, but in recent times they have not had any aggressive ambitions. They are not moved by a conception of their distinction from other peoples, and consequently their foreign policy has not been dynamic.

People who have a particularly strong aptitude for enjoying membership in a group which segregates itself from other groups are fond of societies, clubs, and political parties having their own symbols and possibly secret rituals. This gives them the feeling of additional importance, needed by most human beings as a counterpoise to their insignificant social position in the everyday world. From such impulses spring the various lodges, such as the Freemasons, and organizations like the Ku Klux Klan. It is self-evident that men in general are proud of "belonging." Arthur Schopenhauer expressed the opinion that pride in one's nation is indicative of lack of personal individuality.

The cheapest sort of pride is national pride; for if a man is proud of his own nation, it argues that he has no qualities of his own of which he can be proud; otherwise he would not have recourse to those which he shares with so many millions of his fellow-men. The man who is endowed with important personal qualities will be only too ready to see clearly in what respects his own nation falls short, since its failings will be constantly before his eyes. But every miserable fool who has nothing at all of which he can be proud adopts as a last resource, pride in the nation to which he belongs; he is ready and glad to defend all its faults and follies tooth and nail; thus reimbursing himself for his own inferiority.³

This sounds very plausible, but man is not a logical animal. Many persons, outstanding in their own right, have felt more pride in their family tree than in their own achievements. Scores of eminent intellectuals and artists have in all ages gloried in their membership in a city or nation. An Austrian critic, Karl Kraus, once wittily remarked: "The Germans pride themselves on being the people of Schopenhauer; Schopenhauer was modest enough not to call himself the philosopher of

³*The Wisdom of Life*, London, 1897, p. 70.

the Germans." But Schopenhauer was an exception. Many intellectuals have felt as much national pride as have any other class.

Allied, as we shall show, with the desire for gregariousness is man's impulse to fight. This impulse is not equally strong in all men, yet it is strong enough to make some psychologists, such as William McDougall, assume that there exists an "instinct of pugnacity."⁴ In this connection Pierre Bovet has written an excellent treatise, *The Fighting Instinct*.⁵ The fact that this impulse has been called an "instinct," controversial though the definition of this word may be, is significant.

Nothing is more absurd than the assumption, popular not only with Marxists, that the sole motive behind human actions is man's search for economic well-being and that, when man fights, it is only for material gains. The behavior of children disproves this theory. "The great majority of children of nine to twelve years of age pick a quarrel for the pleasure it brings them; in other words, fighting is *play* to them. . . . We have to lay it down as a general rule that feelings of hostility are by no means the cause of quarrels. They are their effect. The quarrel does not arise from hatred, but gives rise to it."⁶

The "fighting instinct" takes two complementary forms: it creates fighters or spectators of fighting.⁷ Men may like to fight, to be watched and admired when they fight, or they may like to watch others fight.

Both patterns are important. Ernest Barker finds:

In a great population men diversify their lives by taking "sides." They may simply espouse an athletic side and become the fans of a team. In the circus of the great and populous Constantinople there were already Blues and Greens fourteen hundred years ago, and the Blues and Greens, from being circus factions, spilled over into politics and shook the throne of Justinian. There is no "side" more fascinating than the political, and nothing more calculated to diversify life, especially if it be organized with pomp and banners and uniforms.⁸

It is hardly conceivable that in the many wars of religion, whether between Christians and non-Christians or between Catholics and Protestants, the masses really grasped the meaning of what they were

⁴*An Introduction to Social Psychology*, Boston, 1923.

⁵English translation by J. Y. T. Greig, London, 1923.

⁶Bovet, *op. cit.*, pp. 39, 30.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 181.

⁸"The Social Background of Recent Political Changes," *The Sociological Review*, Vol. 28, 1936.

fighting for. But because they were willing to fight, one slogan was as good as another. Much blood has been spilled over the question of whether Christ has two natures or one. Probably the theologians themselves did not understand the controversy. Gibbon recounts that in Alexandria one religious faction chanted, "Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost," to which the other replied, "Glory be to the Father, in the Son, and by the Holy Ghost." Thereby street crowds were led to a fury that ended in head-cracking.⁹ According to Gaetano Mosca:

Buffon reports that if a certain number of stags are shut up in a park they will inevitably divide into two herds which will always be in conflict with each other. An instinct of very much the same sort seems to make its influence felt among men. Human beings have a natural inclination toward struggle, but it is only sporadically that the struggle assumes an individual character, that one man is at war with another. Even when he fights, man remains preeminently a social animal. Ordinarily, therefore, we see men forming into groups, each group made up of leaders and followers. The individuals who make up a group are conscious of a special brotherhood and oneness with each other and vent their pugnacious instincts on members of other groups.¹⁰

War is, of course, the greatest and bloodiest conflict and carries the most far reaching consequences for society as well as for the individuals involved. Terrible though war is, it gives a certain pleasure to the non-combatants. This was emphasized by the late Lord Northcliffe, editor of the London *Daily Mail* and London *Times*, who found that of all topics which fill the pages of newspapers, none appealed to the public as strongly as war; next in interest came sex. This view is corroborated by the strange paradox that the suicide rate in warring countries decreases, whereas one might expect it to increase. The overwhelmingly dramatic interest in the combat, coupled with the stimulus of group solidarity, adds zest to life. Wars appeal to the imagination. Far more people die every year in the United States from automobile accidents than were killed in the Spanish-American war; the great influenza pandemic of 1918-19 caused the death of some twenty million people, twice the number killed in the war of 1914-18. But wars hold first place in history, while automobile accidents are a matter of routine and the influenza pandemic is chiefly remembered by those who lived through it. Bertrand Russell wrote:

⁹William Albigh, *Public Opinion* (New York, 1939), p. 81.

¹⁰*The Ruling Class* (New York 1939), p. 163.

The instinct for romance, when it is denied an outlet in one's own life, seeks, as instincts will, a vicarious satisfaction in imagination. . . . At the outbreak of war, the delight of many of those who expect to be non-combatants has the same source; the gladiatorial show relieves the deadly monotony of the office or the factory even better than a football match or a horserace. And in spite of all knowledge to the contrary, non-combatants persist in imagining modern war on the Homeric pattern, as an affair of individual bravery and initiative; for the dreary mechanistic mass-action that constitutes the actual operations affords no outlet to the starved instinct for individual romance.¹¹

When to the joy of fighting is added the lust for killing, the result is either crime or war. But "what the police force of peace restrains as crime, war releases as heroism; what that force condemns as degradation, war glorifies as nobility."¹² It is idle to pretend that all men in general hate the idea of killing. Some do, but others do not. To quote Jerome K. Jerome: "This game of killing—of sticking a bayonet into a fellow human creature's entrails and there twisting it round and round—the common man, together with his betters, likes playing it. During the war it was the common people—the invalided soldiers—who broke up the peace meetings, stoned the peace-makers. The love of killing, the lust for war is a human instinct that has grown stronger rather than weaker with civilization."¹³ As Horace M. Kallen has expressed it: "Like Dionysiac religion, mass mysticism, evangelical revivals and their peers, war acts as a liberation; it seems to answer to some deep-lying need for a moral holiday, a need, perhaps primordially biological, to live with utter abandon in utter danger."¹⁴ Many motives converge in the lust for fighting and war. But although it is of great significance for the psychologist to discover whether it is idealism or sadism, personal insecurity or the longing for adventure which is the most important factor in bringing about the result, the present investigation is not concerned with these problems because it accepts the existence of the fighting impulse.

The conception we have of certain things often corresponds to a state of affairs that once existed but is now past; we retain our idea because we prefer romanticism to truth. As Bertrand Russell justly remarks, that is the way many men view war. There is practically

¹¹*The Prospects of Industrial Civilization* (New York 1923), pp. 32-33.

¹²Horace M. Kallen, "On War and Peace," *Social Research* (Vol. 6, 1939).

¹³"War and the Common People," *Foreign Affairs, A Journal of International Understanding* (February, 1921).

¹⁴*Op. cit.*

nothing in common between the duels under the walls of Troy and the (allegedly) chivalrous fights in the era of the Crusades, on the one hand, and the mechanized mass slaughters of modern war on the other hand, except the mutual killing. But we persist in believing that nothing essential has changed.

Dostoevski has said that the deepest reason for war is peace.

Those astringent thinkers who lay bare for us the economic causes of war rarely trouble to point out one important fact. It is that no war of any size has actually been fought on those issues. . . . In no recent campaign have the troops marched to battle with an economic slogan: For our Chairman and Debenture Holders or Death or Larger Dividends or Cheaper Raw Materials for the Motherland. . . . Obviously you could not raise a division of troops by talking about raw materials and dividends. Ordinary men always go to war for purely romantic reasons. . . . There has to be a romantic appeal. Men fight for the glory and honor of the fatherland, the motherland, for right against might, for the king and the flag, for the women and children. Not the most iron discipline, not the most urgent necessity for new markets and old coal-fields, can keep armies from crumbling away once the romantic appeal is discovered to be a trucky lie, once the last glimmer of chivalry has vanished. This may not be true of all races, but it is certainly true of the English, the Americans, the Germans, to name no others. The ordinary folk, who furnish the actual fighting forces, are all romantics.¹⁵

The Arabs of Palestine would have benefited tremendously by the influx of Jewish settlers and Jewish capital and they would have welcomed them wholeheartedly if they had thought in purely economic terms. Instead, they preferred to wreck the whole economic structure of the country, including their own interests, rather than share Palestine with the Jews. Their attitude was thus described by Lord Peel in the *Report of the Palestine Royal Commission*: "The schools are breeding-places of patriotism, and the young Arabs who emerge from them are then caught up by the Youth Movement. This movement is unaffected by economic arguments. 'British talk,' writes one who knows the Arabs well, 'of balanced budgets and higher standards of living is poor cold stuff when compared with the heroics of the nationalists. No gallant youth of any race would hesitate for a moment under which banner to enlist.'"¹⁶

Even the pacifists appeal to their followers to wage "war against

¹⁵J. B. Priestley, "The Public and the Idea of Peace," *Challenge to Death*, Philip Noel Baker and others (London, 1934).

¹⁶*The Times* (London, July 8, 1937).

war." It is a more rousing slogan than "peace for peace." The emotional impact of war terminologies has been stressed by Kallen:

Is it for nothing that the bird of peace is a dove and the bird of war an eagle? Is it for nothing that songs which most deeply move the heart are songs of war and not of peace; that the "Star Spangled Banner" and every other hymn of every other nation, that the "Marseillaise," the "Internationale," and every other hymn of every other libertarian movement is a hymn of war and not of peace; that the imagery of the western religion of love is prevailingly an imagery of battle? "Onward, Christian Soldiers," we are commanded, "marching as to war."¹⁷

At the time of Augustus, noble Romans had such an impulse to fight that they chose to take the place of their slaves in the arena. The early Christian church was radically pacifist and only very reluctantly allowed any Christian to become a soldier. But the church had to make concessions after it had established peace with Rome and later, when the Barbarians had been converted and their states were ruled by Christian governments. It declared that a Christian was allowed and even obliged to fight a "just" war, but tried in every possible way to keep the Christians at peace among themselves. But the combat instinct of the knights was so strong that during the Middle Ages, fighting and bloodshed never ceased for any length of time. Denial of a Christian funeral to those who had been killed in tournaments proved useless; and the *Treuga Dei* was more in the nature of a compromise than a solution.

So strongly does war appeal to man that the Christian churches, whose founder taught non-resistance to evil, have found it necessary and useful to address their followers in warlike language. They seem to have felt as Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, a German philosopher of the late eighteenth century, did when he asked: "Is it not strange that men so like to fight for their religion and so dislike to live according to its commands?" Adolf Harnack has shown the importance of terms in Christian speech borrowed from military vocabularies.¹⁸ Saint Paul describes the panoply of the faithful, and speaks of the campaign, the army, ransom, prisoners, baggage, companions in arms, the fight, and the crown that is to be the reward of the conqueror. In Clement of Alexandria are to be found the trumpet, the phalanx, the

¹⁷Kallen, *op cit.*

¹⁸*Militia Christi, Die Christliche Religion und der Soldatenstand in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten* (1905), Bovet, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

general. In Origen, and in Tertullian especially, such metaphors are still more abundant. Thereafter, they pass into the status of hackneyed phrases. Christians speak of themselves as *warriors* enrolled in an *army*, the *leader* of which is Christ. Those who are not of them are civilians, or *pagans*.

Ignatius Loyola was the most redoubtable fighter that ever stood for Catholicism and against the Reformation. He was a Christian soldier before his wounds, received at the siege of Pampeluna in 1521, combined with long meditations led him to sublimate his earlier ideals and become a soldier of Christ. In his famous "Exercises" he developed "a military method, which made the soul and its different faculties march under orders, act by act, modality by modality."¹⁹ He wished the soul to be trained in such a way that it obeyed the ego as the soldier obeys his commander. He called his society "The Company of Jesus," and it was led by a "general." The Jesuit sees the world as a place in which friend and foe, God and the devil, are ever battling with each other.

In more recent times another militaristic Christian organization, the Salvation Army, was founded by William Booth. It, too, is led by officers, headed by generals; its chief publication is named the *War Cry*, and its language abounds with warlike imagery. The Salvation Army marches, conquers, storms fortresses, holds positions, and carries attacks.

Though the apostles of the religion of love and forgiveness use military language and though Christians have fought many wars for their religion, patriotism appeals to the fighting impulse even more strongly than religion. Bovet mentions missionaries who in their Christian mission stations would no doubt have hesitated to revert to force, even if attacked by savages, but who nevertheless hurried from the ends of the earth in 1914 to take up arms in the defense of their country. They might have been willing to undergo religious martyrdom joyfully, but as citizens of a political state in which the warlike instinct had not been sublimated they were conscious of duties imposed by this relationship.²⁰

In purely secular struggles between political parties, successes such as the various fascist movements secured in certain countries

¹⁹Bovet, *op cit.*, p. 113.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 159.

were greatly aided by their superior use of militaristic language, symbols, and organization. Every political party speaks of offensives, treachery, resistance, battles, and victories. But the Fascists in Italy and National Socialists in Germany did more than that. They addressed people who had become accustomed to warlike concepts in the World War. Mussolini was somewhat influenced by Nietzsche and Georges Sorel, the spiritual father of syndicalism; his temperament made him sympathetic to the glorification of violence. Sorel teaches in a number of books, the best known of which is his *Réflexions sur la Violence* (first published in 1906), that the proletariat can achieve Socialism only if it knows how to fight and if it has a myth in which it believes. According to Sorel, no social movement in history ever achieved anything on the basis of rational calculation; those who won were possessed of a blind belief and conceived of themselves as warriors eager for battle. The enemy of the proletariat is the bourgeoisie, and the proletarian myth must be the general strike. The social-democratic parties only talk and bargain in assemblies and parliaments, which have no relation to fighting. Socialism will be victorious not through parliamentary procedure but through the *syndicats* (unions of the workmen). These must act, not talk; their weapons are hatred, sabotage, and the general strike.

Syndicalism does not shun bloodshed, but prefers civil wars to "imperialistic" wars. Writing in 1924 when the Russian Bolsheviks had disposed of their "white" enemies and had defeated Koltschak, Denikin, and Wrangel, a prominent syndicalist, Edouard Berth, predicted that the victories of the Red armies would form the nucleus of a new myth for the international proletariat. He describes a battle as "an event whose influence in the historic drama is marvelous. Nothing else in the world electrifies the heart as much as a victory which is worth more to a cause than tons of arguments and all the dialectics of our intellectuals."²¹

The influence of syndicalist ideas is apparent in Bolshevism and in Fascism, in Lenin and Mussolini. Nothing need be said about the myth of war in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, evidenced by the black shirts and brown shirts, the fasces and the swastika, *Giovinezza* and the *Horst Wessel Lied*, the terms Duce and Führer. The importance of militaristic conceptions for bringing about group enthusiasm

²¹*Guerre des Etats ou Guerre des Classes* (Paris, 1924), p. 81.

in Soviet Russia are not so generally recognized. Klaus Mehnert, who wrote a book on the youth of Soviet Russia, relates: In an often quoted sentence Stalin calls science a fortress to be "conquered" by youth. The daily papers look like war bulletins. Every economic and intellectual event becomes a "campaign" on a "front." "Armies" fight "battles," "brigades" take "narrow passes by storm," "iron battalions" put a fighting-zone under "machine-gun fire," "traitors" are "exposed," and "staffs mobilize."²²

Men are gregarious and like to combine in groups and they have, moreover, a fighting impulse that breaks through into the social life. Thus the groups arousing the strongest loyalties will be those whose aim is to be "in-groups" in opposition to "out-groups." The members of the former groups will view the world as an assemblage of unrelated sections. They will cherish traditions of war and glory. In peacetime individuals and groups will quarrel among themselves, but in war "nations" will stand together, believing that they differ radically in character, traditions, and ideals from their enemies.

²²*Die Jugend in Sowjetrussland* (Berlin, 1932), p. 76.

NATIONAL HONOR

The connection between the fighting impulse and national consciousness is so close that the latter would not exist without the former. Innumerable human groups have warred with other groups for thousands of years. The groups whose members were war-minded and courageous obviously had a better chance of survival than those whose members disliked war and looked upon courage with indifference. Natural selection inevitably worked in favor of groups holding warlike courage in high esteem. This evaluation still exists in our modern society. Men are despised when they fail to live up to the general standard of courage. Bravery is such an important ingredient of male-appeal that the female worshippers of warlike heroism are often more enamored of war than men are. If courage, or what is supposed to be courage, should one day lose its prestige with women, the lust for war would suffer a tremendous set-back, possibly a fatal blow.

Not even the most ardent nationalist advocates war merely for the sake of war, regardless of whom the war is to be fought against and the circumstances under which it begins. A war must be justified; otherwise a bad conscience may more than counterbalance the glory and joy of fighting. The lust for war has lately decreased almost universally. But even before this recent tendency became manifest, a ballot taken on the question "which is preferable, war or peace?" would certainly have found the majority of the votes cast for peace. However, if the question had been changed to read "which is preferable, war or peace, when the *honor of the nation* is at stake?" the result would have been quite different. The honor of the nation is a very vague conception. To a certain extent, people know what they mean when they say that they are defending their property and personal liberty, but they are quite unable to define national honor.

Yet the phrase brings about a warlike reaction. It produces the attitude: this we shall not suffer; war is preferable.

The Second Hague Conference assumed questions of national honor to be of such outstanding importance that it decided that it could not investigate or pass judgment on disputes of an international nature involving honor or vital national interests. Hitler, in whose speeches the word "honor" occurs countless times, wrote to the British Prime Minister on August 23, 1939: "I have already more than once declared before the German people and the world that there can be no doubt concerning the determination of the new German Reich rather to accept, for however long it may be, every sort of misery and tribulation than to sacrifice its national interest, let alone its honor." Leo Perla goes so far as to hold that "national honor has been the cause of almost every war of history."¹

The *Encyclopaedia Britannica*² calls honor "a term which may be defined as respect, esteem or deference paid to, or received by, a person in consideration of his character, worth or position; also the state or condition of the person exciting the feeling or expression of such esteem; particularly a high personal character coupled with conduct in accordance with a nice sense of what is right and true and due to the position so held." Arthur Schopenhauer defines it thus: "Honor is, on its objective side, other people's opinion of what we are worth; on its subjective side, it is the respect we pay to this opinion."³

The respect to which individuals are entitled varies according to their status in society. The honor of an unmarried woman, in Western society, is insulted when her chastity is questioned, but chastity does not enter into the honor of men. Veracity is more strongly associated with the honor of businessmen than with that of artists, for example. Courage, some feel, has little to do with women's honor; but with men it is extremely important, and with soldiers it overshadows every other quality.

The manifestations of individual honor are different in several major respects from those of national honor. When a man loses his honor, he knows it through the reactions of the persons around him. As social standing and the respect paid by others make strongly for

¹*What Is National Honor?* (New York, 1918), p. xxvii.

²14th Edition, Vol. XI.

³*Op. cit.*, p. 73.

happiness, his well-being is seriously affected. But a nation which loses its honor has as little capacity to feel this as anything else for a group cannot experience sensations. Only the individuals who compose a group perceive and feel. Therefore, the honor of the nation, which depends upon the attitude of people belonging to *other* nations, is revealed only to persons who live outside of the country or have the means of communication with sources of foreign opinion. These persons alone can tell by their own experience if and how far the reputation of a nation has suffered. The masses, however, rely upon whatever their governments disclose.

The same cannot be said of *all* groups within society. In many instances, certain groups strongly affect the respect in which their individual members are held. It is generally considered a decided asset to come from a "good" family. To be a high government official or an army officer provides considerable prestige in some quarters. In many countries, physicians are socially more respected than dentists. Jews have a lower social standing than Gentiles almost everywhere. Since the manual worker is generally ranked near the base of the social scale he often wants to climb into the white-collar class, even if this means less income. These valuations are, of course, set by fluctuating public opinion and reactions to them are of a personal rather than of a collective type. A group may protest against its position in society as a group or through some of its members, but the individual who earnestly wishes for more esteem tries simply to rise into a higher group. Workmen try to become clerks and send their children to college; Jews embrace Christianity and change their names.

When the honor of a nation is offended, the individual feels no direct consequences. The respect in which foreigners hold a particular Peruvian, has no more connection with the fate of Peru than the social standing of a clerk or workman has with the relative prosperity of the firm for which he works; his honor is not affected when the corporation becomes bankrupt. Even the military achievements of a nation, the essence of national honor, have no relation to the esteem in which its citizens are held beyond its frontiers. A German was not despised in England or the United States because Germany had a negligible army for some years; he is not more respected since Germany has rearmed and proved anew her military strength. A Swiss, a Dutchman, or a Scandinavian finds it as easy as an Englishman or

an American to make social connections anywhere. No one is interested in the "honor" of their respective countries. Until the actual declaration of war, the standing of a well-educated Japanese in the United States was not affected by the standing of his country as a fighting nation. Even after Japan was conceded to be a mighty force in world politics anti-Japanese immigration legislation still persisted in the United States. When Germany was said to have lost her honor through the peace treaty of Versailles, Germans did not flee from their country out of mortification. There has not been any discernible tendency on the part of the citizens of less conspicuous nations to become Germans or Italians just because Hitler and Mussolini have claimed that they redeemed the honor of their respective countries.

When is the honor of a nation felt to have been violated? The German Nazis, certainly sensitive on the subject of national honor, took no offense when, in 1935, the Swiss and the Dutch governments cautioned their manufacturers against exports to Germany because German promises of payment seemed worthless. The sentiment that national honor is at stake arises only when a nation feels that it is asked to do something or to acquiesce in something cowardly. Its courage must be clearly involved. In showing a willingness to fight, a nation proves that it is not cowardly and that it intends to punish the offender. Several writers have stressed this fact. In speaking of national honor, Thorstein Veblen remarked:

It will commonly happen that any material grievance must first be converted into terms of this spiritual capital, before it is effectually turned to account as a stimulus to warlike enterprise It is a highly valued asset, or at least a valued possession, but it is of a metaphysical, not of a physical nature, and it is not known to serve any material or otherwise useful end apart from affording a practical grievance consequent upon its infraction.⁴

A. A. Milne has this to say:

You will notice that whenever a Patriot (who may be loosely defined as a man who thinks that other people are not patriots) talks about England, he means always this third England, the Great Power. He is not thinking of the England of Shakespeare and Dickens, and calling his neighbors a traitor for preferring the pleasure of Tchekov and Dostoievsky. He is not thinking of English government, and extolling democracy over fascism. He is thinking of England as a nation in competition with other nations: of England, that is,

⁴*An Inquiry into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of its Perpetuation* (New York, 1917), pp. 27, 29.

as a Power. . . . So when the Patriot cries that England's prestige is in danger, he means that England's reputation as a Great Power is in danger; by which he means only this: that England's reputation for war capacity is in danger A nation's honor, then, is measured by a nation's willingness to use force to maintain its reputation as a user of force.⁵

National honor is a purely military matter in that it is brought to a nation's consciousness only through offences connected with military courage. This conclusion is supported by the following line of reasoning.

It is believed essentially dishonorable for a nation to submit a question of honor to the judgment of a third party. In such matters the only alternative to discussion is warfare. "National interests may sometimes be submitted to international agreement, but national honor never!"⁶ The code of the private duel prescribes that courage, as shown by a man's willingness to duel, restores honor. In matters of national honor not only must there be a fighting reaction, but an insult must have military implications.

Since honor is considered an instinctive feeling, long deliberation over the question as to whether the honor of the nation has been insulted or not is in itself as dishonorable as an appeal to a court. The decision of a nation to ask for restoration of its insulted honor is never the outcome of lengthy public discussion. It is characteristic that in Italian the word "*prudente*" means both clever and cautious. A nation sensitive concerning its honor wishes to be neither cautious nor clever. It prides itself upon quick action without regard to the cost, when its honor is at stake.

Additional proof of the assertion that national honor coincides with military esteem is to be found in those cases in which it has been considered dishonorable for a nation to ask for peace. To declare war may be morally objectionable and economically irresponsible, but it is seldom regarded as dishonorable. But when a nation does not attack a powerful neighbor until the latter has been rendered helpless by a third nation, the world draws the conclusion that cowardice rather than courage dictated the moment for the declaration of war. For example, Italy's entry into the war against France in June, 1940, was generally regarded as detracting from, rather than adding to, the honor of Italy.

⁵*Peace with Honor* (New York, 1934), pp. 34-37.

⁶Hayes, *op cit.*, p. 187.

When one nation is attacked by another and there is some chance, however small, that the attacked may defend itself successfully, the code of honor demands resistance. But when two forces are so unequally matched that a war can only mean a victory for the stronger power, the weaker nation is not always expected to resist. The tremendous development of armaments in the last twenty years has worked in favor of the more powerful nations—especially through the increased efficiency of the airplane. Gone is the time when a few Swiss cantons could defy the Hapsburg dynasty and the Dutch could revolt successfully against Spanish world power. At the turn of the twentieth century, it took the British several years to subdue the Boers. But in 1939, the Albanians, who had throughout the centuries often given serious trouble to their Turkish masters, were conquered by the Italians within less than a week. In May, 1940, the Dutch were overcome by the Germans in four days. Where resistance would have been justified in former times, it is often utterly hopeless today. In consequence, cases involving national honor have been diminishing. Hitler obtained Sudetenland and Memel without having to fire a shot. In April, 1940, the Danes did not put up even a symbolic resistance, and a little later Soviet Russia obtained Bessarabia from Rumania in the same bloodless way in which she had taken the small Baltic States (though not Finland). Under pressure of the Axis powers, Rumania ceded Transylvania to Hungary, and King Carol was forced to abdicate.

If it does not involve cowardice to yield to an opponent immeasurably stronger, it is not, then, cowardice to be lenient toward an opponent who is extremely weak. Thus, prior to 1914, Austria-Hungary used to boast that she had tolerated the inimical behavior of the small Serbian kingdom for many years, although she would not have done so in the case of a more powerful state. As the Austro-Hungarian army was unquestionably strong enough to defeat the Serbians, the Hapsburg monarchy could afford an attitude of being "too proud to fight." In August, 1914, Germany invaded Luxemburg, Belgium, and France. Luxemburg, with a population of 250,000 and a comic opera army, let the Germans pass, and no one blamed her for not fighting. When Belgium, which might have acted otherwise, chose to go to war, the admiration of the whole world was aroused. "Poor little Belgium" won more national honor than either its larger or its smaller neighbor.

When a war has been fought between several nations and one side has been defeated, the victor must decide whether he will rob the defeated of all military power and perhaps even of his existence as a sovereign state, or merely of its position as a world power. In the latter case, the chance of a new war, in which the role of victor and defeated may be reversed, is greater. There is also a greater chance that the defeated nation will view its future with renewed courage and honor. After Poland had been divided among three neighboring states in the eighteenth century, the Poles claimed the right to restore the Polish state and national independence, but they did not say that their honor was involved in remaining dependent and divided. Had there been a Polish state and had this state been forced by treaty to declare its sovereign allegiance each year to Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary by some symbolic act agreed upon, the Polish nation would have felt very strongly the loss of its honor. There would then have been a possibility, though a dangerous one, of defying the neighboring sovereignties and of discontinuing the act of allegiance.

Annexations seem to touch national honor less than unilateral restrictions of military power. Had the French annexed the German Rhineland in 1919, as their generals wished, there would have been even more ill-feeling between the two countries and even greater probability of another war; but the loss of the Rhineland would have come under the conception of honor as little as did the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine by France to Germany in 1871. The substitute used by the French—to demilitarize the Rhineland while it remained German, and to limit the German army to 100,000 men—was bound to convince the Germans that it was dishonorable for them to comply forever with such conditions.

Obviously, a definition of violations of national honor must be elastic. The matter is open to different interpretations. Not what a nation does but what its actions mean or are supposed to mean is the decisive factor. This, of course, is analogous to our social attitudes in daily life. A blow accidentally given, and perhaps followed by an apology, may be physically more painful than an intentional slap in the face; but the former means nothing, while the latter is an insult. Insults to national honor are, for the most part, not intended as such, and yet they are not fortuitous. There must,

therefore, exist within every nation responsible interpreters of national honor capable of deciding the meaning of what other nations intend.

Before considering the role of the interpreters of national honor, a few hypothetical situations in which national honor may or may not be involved may profitably be discussed. When the military strength of two nations is so balanced that prolonged resistance appears possible for the eventually weaker side, any demand for the surrender of territory is regarded as a case in which honor demands resistance. Nations have often gone to war for strips of territory which were quite useless to them and in some cases even a nuisance. But when the demand for the surrender of territory is not accompanied by threats, the situation may look different. The United States bought the Louisiana Territory from France, Florida from Spain, Alaska from Russia, and St. Thomas from Denmark. England voluntarily ceded the Ionian Islands to Greece. Sweden did not declare war on Norway when the Norwegians decided to refuse further obedience to the King of Sweden. When one nation desires territory owned by another, the question of honor may be involved; on the other hand, it may merely result in bargaining. The "interests" which are so often supposed to clash are less important than the sensibilities.

If nations were groups of persons with similar economic interests, or persons dominated by a bourgeoisie eager to pursue its class interests in foreign policy, economic questions would be more likely than anything else to draw nations into war, with national honor used as a pretext. As a matter of fact, economic setbacks suffered at the hands of foreign nations are less likely than other causes to bring about the sentiment of outraged national honor. To impose tariffs, to refuse to trade with other people, even to introduce autarchy, is the undisputed right of every nation. The repudiation of an externally incurred debt may have very serious consequences, but the creditors do not mention their honor in this connection.

Man knows within himself whether he is happy or unhappy, and no one needs to explain to him his likes and dislikes. It is quite different with national honor, however, where interpretations are innumerable, and we are not concerned as individuals but as members of the whole nation.

Who are the "keepers of the Code" (Veblen) who, by using or disregarding the phrase "national honor," can make or prevent war? In the more or less totalitarian states there is no discussion, and hence the government decides. The totalitarian government, whether expressed in a king or dictator, does not follow public opinion; it formulates public opinion. But where there is free discussion, as in democracies, anyone may raise his voice. In some countries, as in England, men coming from noble or well established families are highly trusted by the public. Generals are often important, especially after a successful war record. Journalists, parliamentarians, trade-union leaders, and clergymen may be more or less influential. But the government in power counts for more than all of these, even in a democracy, for the government alone can translate foreign policy into action.

When a government wants to avoid war or an imbroglio, it simply does not raise the issue of national honor, even in cases where it would seem to be unavoidable. The American government of 1937 was peace-minded and so were the people. In contrast with the Spanish-American War in 1898, touched off by the destruction of an American warship, the destruction of an American warship by the Japanese in 1937 led to nothing more than a protest and a demand for indemnity. The British, so sensitive to questions of honor in the days of Palmerston and Disraeli, merely protested the shooting of their ambassador in China. The slapping of a French consul by the Dey of Algier in 1827 ended the latter's sovereignty, but a similar affront to an American consul by a Japanese soldier in January, 1938, was forgotten a few days later after the Japanese government apologized. If a few really great leaders had stood up in France and England in the fall of 1938 and had argued that war would be better than the loss of national honor in abandoning Czechoslovakia, the people would possibly have followed them. But because the people were not told that national honor was of the highest national value, the majority accepted the Munich agreement with little opposition. In June, 1940, Paul Reynaud and his followers urged the French people to continue their fight against Germany alongside of Great Britain for the sake of their national honor, if for no other reason. But the Pétain Government declared the German armistice terms to be "honorable" and discontinued resistance.

From the above we may conclude that international events are traditionally associated with the concept of national honor. But no matter how important these associations may be, the work of the interpreters of honor is more significant. It is they who decide whether the courage of the nation has been questioned and should be demonstrated.

There was a time when the only honor to be defended by force of arms was the honor of the absolutist kings. They ruled their countries, were honored by their subjects, disposed of the public income, and felt themselves to be the descendants of conquerors and warriors. Their honor could be insulted, defended and restored, whereas anything like "national honor"—that is, the honor of the king's subjects—was beyond the conception of their times. The kings were their own interpreters in matters of honor. A feudal concept in the Middle Ages, honor was a possession of kings and knights; the rest of the people had no honor. But when the Third Estate became the nation, the honor of the kings and knights was appropriated by the nations. They thereby inherited a concept, laden with possibilities for war, far more remote from the interests of the average citizen than it had been from those of the kings and their selected feudal followers.⁷

It becomes clear, then, that national honor reflects national consciousness in general, but is in no sense a synonym for interest or happiness. As John Bright, British nineteenth century statesman, said: "Crowns, coronets, mitres, military display, the pomp of war, wide colonies and a large empire, are, in my view, all trifles light as air, and not worth considering, unless with them you can have a fair share of comfort, contentment and happiness among the great body of the people."⁸ This is contrary to interests of national honor. When the French King, Francis I, said, after having lost the battle of Pavia, "All is lost, except honor," he stated rightly that one can lose everything and keep one's honor, just as one can lose one's honor and

⁷"Among the reasons of state, peculiarly appropriate to feudal orders and monarchies, there early appeared a formula known as the 'honor of the prince,' which was easily transformed, with the growth of democracy, into the idea of 'national honor.'" Charles A. Beard, *The Idea of National Interest* (1934), p. 16.

⁸Quoted by W. L. Blease, *A Short History of English Liberalism* (1913), p. 193.

keep everything else. National honor may prefer a war, even one destined to fail, to a cheap capitulation without a struggle. Certainly it would have been better for the happiness of the German people had they lost instead of won many battles in the first World War. They were destined to lose that war and a short struggle would have saved many lives and much wealth. From the same consideration, it would have been better had the Poles not defended Warsaw in September, 1939, but rather had kept their capital intact. But the Germans are proud of their victories during four years of the First World War and the Poles are proud of their defense of Warsaw.

Most people are in some way dissatisfied with the political and economic conditions under which they live. Some desire more economic equality; others think there ought to be less. Large minorities, and sometimes even majorities, are dissatisfied with the laws concerning alcoholic liquor, trade unions, education, divorce, and taxes. In a democracy many arguments are needed to convert persons from one opinion to another. But in spite of dissatisfactions, the average man is ordinarily willing neither to change nor to risk his life for the sake of laws and institutions. He does not emigrate as a rule, and he does not attempt to bring about a revolution. He values his life and what comforts he has and carefully weighs his wishes against possible risks.

When one takes into consideration the difficulty of convincing people that they ought to pay higher taxes, it is nothing short of amazing how easily the same people are often satisfied with the arguments proving that a certain war is justified or, possibly, inevitable. Until 1914, the Austrians and Hungarians took it for granted that the Hapsburg monarchy must be a "Balkan power." A war which started because 180,000,000 Russians could not leave a few million distant Serbians "unprotected" was at first extremely popular in Russia. For Germany, the inviolability of Austria-Hungary was a "question of existence." Many Germans, including leading merchants and prominent professors of history and economics, were convinced during the last decades of the nineteenth and the first decade of the twentieth century that Germany would have to fight a just war for her "place in the sun," that is, colonies, though it was clear that Germany herself, like Switzerland, Sweden, and many other countries, had devel-

oped a great foreign trade and had become prosperous without colonies. After the first War World the slogan that Germany was in need of *Lebensraum*, a vague and unintelligible phrase, had the same emotional success.⁹

A war which is fought for Alsace-Lorraine or Danzig sacrifices the lives of more co-nationals than an eventual victory will add to the victorious nation. Furthermore, even if the war is won, more wealth is destroyed than is newly acquired.

Why, then, should nations be satisfied with absurd arguments and unintelligible slogans? Evidently because a heroic war, and particularly a heroic victory offers considerably more than the official war aims imply. After Hitler had started his dynamic foreign policy, scoring almost unbelievable successes without firing a shot, many observers believed that he would never risk a war, because it was evident that he had everything to lose and highly questionable whether whatever he gained would be worth a European conflict. This position overlooked the fact that Hitler stood to gain one thing valued by nationalists above everything else—recognition of his courage. Along with the visible spoils and against the drawbacks of possible defeat must be counted the respect of the world for the audacity of an aggressor. Once this is understood, the otherwise unintelligible foreign policy of certain aggressive nations and the attitude of almost all of them in respect to national honor is understandable. National honor is national consciousness condensed into a formula. The political or intellectual leaders of the nations interpret its meaning, and the masses are willing to be convinced that they are to fight and die for it.

⁹“Some irreverent scoffer in an after-dinner speech the other night was guilty of this ribald jest. Says Jones, ‘What is this I hear, Smith, about your not believing in the Monroe Doctrine?’ Smith retorts, ‘It’s a wicked lie. I never said I did not believe in it. I would lay down my life for it. What I did say was that I do not know what it means.’ ” Norman Angell, *The Public Mind* (New York, 1927), p. 82.

THE COMMON DENOMINATOR

An inquiry into the nature of national consciousness may be restated by a consideration of two questions. First, what do the members of nationally-minded nations feel and think? This has been answered in the chapters on "The Fighting Impulse" and "National Honor." Secondly, which people feel national consciousness and what is their common denominator? The answer to this question involves a discussion of the methods by which nations have been awakened and formed in the past.

"Patriotism," according to Veblen, "may be defined as a sense of partisan solidarity in respect of prestige. . . Patriotism is of a contentious complexion and finds its full expression in no other outlet than warlike enterprise; its highest and final appeal is for the death, damage, discomfort and destruction of the party of the second part. . . Patriotism is useful for breaking the peace, not for keeping it."¹ Thus, though patriotism is regarded universally as a virtue, it has practically no meaning in peacetime. Its ethical implications are associated entirely with war.

Questions of morality have little to do with nationality and are determined by other associations. A Hindu will submit to poverty and oppression, and hope for better circumstances in later reincarnations; an Occidental democrat or socialist will strive to better his situation immediately even to the point of revolution. For a Mohammedan, war is a sacred duty and a privilege; for a Quaker, it is a sin. Various religions and philosophies hold contrary attitudes toward slavery, marriage, money, alcoholic liquor, etc.² But what

¹*Op. cit.*, pp. 31, 33, 78.

²"If Buddhists became Christians or Christians became Buddhists, a corresponding moral change would soon make itself felt. The difference between Hindoo and Mohammedan morals closely follows the difference between their creeds. Whether Christianity is true or false, and whether European morality is good or bad, European morality is in fact founded upon religion, and the destruction of the one must of necessity involve the reconstruction of the other." James Fitzjames Stephen, *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity* (London, 1874), p. 77.

difference does it make in daily life whether a person is an American, a German, or an Italian? All over the world workmen are eager to get the highest possible wage for their work. Regardless of their nationality, employers calculate expenses against profits, physicians try to treat their patients properly, artists endeavor to create beauty, scholars seek for truth. Honesty, charity, faithfulness, and other virtues implied in the ten commandments are accepted as the standard of morality everywhere. In normal times the average American, Englishman, or Frenchman rarely finds himself confronted with moral problems which he thinks of in nationalist terms. But when war comes, each man thinks first of his nationality.

It is generally conceded that certain indications of the love a man feels for his country are found only in people who are born and reared on their native soil. The Rhinelander has an attachment to the Rhineland that no one else ordinarily feels; the foreign tourist admires the Alps without experiencing the sentimental attachment of a Swiss; lyric poetry and art forms centering around the family or the native village almost always originate with persons who have long been influenced by their artistic inspiration. But the will to power, the fighting impulse, the pleasure of "belonging," and the desire for political leadership within a certain group, do not presuppose an original affiliation with the nation for which a person chooses to work. Foreigners may do as good a job as the native born. A man may serve a country as a soldier or as a statesman without claiming it as his birthplace. It is, therefore, permissible to conclude that where foreigners play an important role as national leaders, the fighting impulse and its implications—not the love for home and homeland—have made this leadership possible.

Napoleon was emperor and dictator of the French people when national feeling already ran high. During fifteen years he asked them for unheard of sacrifices. Yet he was a Corsican and, therefore, more Italian than French. In his youth he had felt intense Corsican patriotism and hatred against the French, and he never learned to speak French like a Frenchman. Cavour, who played a decisive part in bringing about the national unification of Italy was more French than Italian, and spoke French or the Piedmontese provincial dialect almost exclusively. Gambetta, on the other hand, was of Italian descent. Kossuth, the national hero of the Hungarians, was a Slovak.

Many national leaders have fought against the countries from which their families originally sprung. In Hapsburg Austria the Czechs were led in their national struggle against the Germans by men named Reiger, Zeithammer, Krumbholz, Purghardt, Engel, Herold; and the Germans followed leaders named Chlumecky, Schmeyskal, Kozeppek.³ After the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany, the chairman of the Alsation opposition in the Reichstag was a deputy named Teutsch. Charles Stewart Parnell, champion of the Irish cause against England, was English by descent. Eamon de Valera, Prime Minister of Eire, was born in New York, the son of a Spanish father and an Irish mother. The family of the strongly nationalistic Hungarian Prime Minister, Gömbös, came from the German Rhineland. The leader of the Belgian Fascists, Degrelle, is the son of a Frenchman who settled in Belgium not long ago. Codreanu, one time leader of the Rumanian "Iron Guard," was not a Rumanian; his father was half Polish and half Hungarian; his mother was German. Hitler is not, as is sometimes reported, of partly Czech descent, but pure Austrian. The first man of international renown to recognize Hitler's "destiny" (and who predicted as early as 1923 that Hitler would become a leader of the German people equal to Bismarck) was Houston Stewart Chamberlain, a British admiral's son. After having received his education in France, Chamberlain developed into one of the foremost apostles of German nationalism. Among Hitler's most intimate advisers, a surprisingly large number were not born in Germany. Many Germans living outside of the Reich have shown sympathies with imperialistic and pan-German ideas, though Germany was not, or only partly, their *Heimat*. Hitler's most intimate friend, Rudolf Hess, was born in Egypt. Alfred Rosenberg, the author of *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*, best seller second only to *Mein Kampf*, comes from the Baltic provinces and is by origin at least as much Esthonian, Lettish, and French as German. Ricardo Darré, Hitler's Minister of Agriculture until 1942, was born in Argentina.

Present-day dictators have been seen fit, for various purposes, to interfere radically with the beliefs, customs, and traditions of their people. Kemal Pasha undoubtedly deserves to be called a pa-

³Friedrich Hertz, *Rasse und Kultur* (Leipzig, 1925), p. 408.

triot. Yet he revolutionized Turkish laws and ways of living which had hitherto been unchanged for centuries. He abolished polygamy, gave women equal status with men, replaced Arabic by Latin letters, and reformed the laws of Turkey by simply adopting the statute-books of various European countries. Kemal's policy resembles that of Peter the Great of Russia in its lack of consideration for national traditions. Yet, however good his motives, they did not include a desire to perpetuate the old beliefs, customs, and traditions of his countrymen.

Mussolini and Hitler are admittedly successful champions of national power. But their understanding of the national character of the Italians and Germans, respectively, has been limited by their ideologized military plans. Significantly, military training and life in barracks is more or less the same in all countries. A German and a French soldier lead similar lives in peace as well as in war. During a conflict, however much it may be fought for "national traditions and peculiarities," the participating nations lose their peculiarities for the duration. Preparations for war and actual warfare make serious inroads upon individual ways of living. Increased taxes take a substantial portion of all private incomes, curtailing the sphere within which individuals can live according to their own wishes and talents.

National consciousness is not intrinsically related to the spirit of war. The original Italian national movement, like the contemporary Indian national movement, was based upon a struggle for democracy; the alien opponents of these movements have stood in the way of democratic institutions as well as of national self-determination. It is the democratic, not the national, spirit that makes a Mazzini and a Gandhi believe in the abolition of war. When national self-determination is achieved and national consciousness is no longer dependent upon the democratic ideal, nationalism and pacifism tend to rise as competing forces.

Even nationally dynamic peoples are never, except when there is actually war, concerned primarily with national consciousness. The historians of the American, English, and Italian peoples must, perforce, neglect the average individual, because it is impossible to describe individual lives. Their subject is the nation and their approach encourages the impression that nations as such (whatever

that may mean) are the actors in history, rather than the millions of individuals of which the nations are composed. Historians have always described the decline of the old Roman Empire as a period of decadence in philosophy, art, civil loyalty, and military prowess. Thus the reader sees only comparatively few tired and decadent Romans and remains oblivious to what happened to the mass of the people. During a dozen generations many millions were born, grew up, and died. They played as children, made love as adolescents, became rich or poor, successful or unsuccessful, ambitious or resigned, healthy or sickly—just as men have been at all times.

A nation may be, according to Renan, a permanent plebiscite—but plebiscites are not held continuously. An enthusiast is not always enthusiastic, a religious person not always religious. Similarly, a nationalist is not possessed by the fighting impulse to the exclusion of all others. The most aggressive and courageous peoples do not go to war without at least the semblance of a moral pretext, though they are easily satisfied in this respect. They must have some inducement. As soon as this becomes manifest they suddenly become aware that actually they are not nearly as opposed to fighting as they had believed.

In recent times the impulse toward war has been receding and national consciousness diminishing. But wherever and whenever national consciousness constitutes a strong force, those individuals and nations who are possessed by it are thinking of the honor, the power, and the glory of their nation as compared with other nations. The psychology of national consciousness is not concerned with the daily thought and life of every individual but rather with certain dynamic explosions of the mass mind and how the ground was prepared for such explosions.

IMPERIALISM

At all times there have been people who believed that a certain social or political institution to which they were opposed for some reason was also the root of war and that wars would cease as soon as society had been reformed. Until the eighteenth century, religious skeptics maintained that wars were a consequence of religious fanaticism. In order to establish peace, it would, therefore, be necessary to get rid of the influence of the clergy. When democracy was fighting absolutism, most democrats believed that wars were the pastime of ambitious princes and would give way to universal peace with the introduction of universal democracy. When it became evident that democracy was no remedy for the spirit of conquest, the socialists proclaimed that wars were bound to exist as long as there was private property, competition, and a greedy bourgeoisie—in short, until socialism did away with war as well as other social evils.

The most tenable of these three theories of the causes of war and the means for its suppression (to which many more could be added), is the one holding that war is associated with absolutism. Monarchs, princes, and dictators have invariably profited by victories. Whether they were aiming at more prestige or more wealth or both, a successful war brought them what they desired. The victorious sovereign received evidences of respect from his old subjects and, in addition, from those whom he annexed to his realm. He was also admired by the world at large. The income which he obtained from newly conquered territory was at his disposal; there was no democratic control. Speaking of the kings of France, Taine stated: "Every time they made war during the hundred years from 1672 to 1774, the motive was vanity, family interest, personal interest, or condensation toward a woman."¹ The same can be said of most absolutist rulers, regardless of the time in which they lived.

¹*Les Origines de la France Contemporaine, L'Ancien Régime* (Paris, 27ième éd., 1909), I, p. 127.

The subjects of the European emperors, kings, princes, and aristocracies were various peoples who often spoke different languages, followed different religions, and believed in different traditions. The only link between them was their ruler, who was therefore justified in claiming with Louis XIV, "*L'État c'est moi.*" No one expected a ruler's foreign policy to take care of anything except his own interest and that of his family. When Louis XIV engaged in the war of the Spanish Succession, it was not extraordinary that he sacrificed the blood and the wealth of his people in order to place a Bourbon on the throne of Spain. His soldiers were mercenaries; many of them were Germans, Swiss, Scotch, or Flemish. On one occasion, when he was reviewing his regiments, he used the expression "the French Army" and then corrected himself, saying, "I mean the Army of France."² The mercenaries who composed every army had their professional honor as soldiers. But that they should feel that they were fighting for their country was quite out of the question. In pre-democratic times, not even those who were of the same nationality as their ruler gained any power or honor, however imaginary, by subduing other peoples. As to the economic prosperity of the country for which they gave their blood, the majority of the soldiers who fought in the armies of Frederick the Great and Maria Theresa were serfs. In the eighteenth century, custom barriers separating one province from another cut across France and other nations. Obviously, the idea that the annexation of additional territory might mean a larger area within which to migrate and to trade freely, with resultant general increase in prosperity, was not one of the motives of Continental European monarchical wars. The Prince of Hesse, who sold several regiments to the English to be used in America, has gone down in history as one of the greatest scoundrels of modern times. Yet what he did was hardly different from what all absolutistic rulers have done: he made his subjects fight for aims which were entirely alien to them, but which were quite reasonable from the point of view of their master.

When men attempt to predict the course of history, they generally base their assumptions on rigid logic, and try to figure out what human beings are likely to do in the future under certain presupposed conditions. A century and a half ago, few would have guessed

²Delaisi, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

that people organized on a democratic basis would do no better than to continue the foreign policies of their former rulers.

Herder, writing in the spirit of the eighteenth century, declared: "Cabinets may betray one another, political mechanisms may be driven against one another until one smashes the other. Not so do fatherlands advance against each other; they live peacefully side by side and help one another like families. Fatherland against fatherland in blood-strife is the worst barbarism in the human language."³ In this *Contrat Social*, Rousseau transferred the notion of "the sovereign" to the people at large. It did not enter his mind that the nations would choose to act toward other nations much as their former sovereigns had acted. Léon Duguit remarks:

Everyone knows the influence and prestige in France of the American Constitution. Full of admiration for its teaching, the Constituent Assembly was yet deeply impregnated with the monarchical conception. It was fortunately discovered that by a simple verbal change the monarchical theory of sovereignty could be easily reconciled with the teaching of the philosophers and the principles of the American constitution. All that was necessary was to substitute the nation for the king. The king was a person, a subject of right, the holder of sovereign power; like him, the nation will be a person, a subject of right, the holder of sovereign power.⁴

The same easy transformation was effected in the realm of foreign policy. The nations took over the role, the ideas, and the ambitions of the kings. This did not happen, of course, as a result of some paralogism of political scientists. It happened because war, power, and heroism were the ideals of the people. Consequently, they were prone to believe that what was good for monarchs was also good for free nations. Historians have as a rule interpreted the foreign policies of the various kings as being consciously or unconsciously in the interest of their nations. But we gain greater insight into history when we reverse the process and interpret the foreign policies of modern nations as being the continuation of the erstwhile royal desire for power and land. As Johanet has said:

Even if one studies only a little of the nationalitarian literature which is so abundant in Europe during the last century and a half, one is struck by its almost complete insincerity. All these people, whether they come from France, Germany, Italy, or from elsewhere, mask their (sometimes legitimate) appetites

³Macartney, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

⁴*Law in the Modern State* (New York, 1919), p. 11.

behind more or less clever theories. I do not know any nationalitarian work which does not attempt, mostly by tortuous ways, to demand an enlargement of territory. One can state this as an axiom corroborated by history: the national phenomena are phenomena of expansion in relation to the chosen center. All nations are eager to grow.⁵

This is, of course, true only of some nations. But those for which it holds are the nations Robertson had in mind when he said: "Patriotism, conventionally defined as love of country, now turns out rather obviously to stand for love of more country."⁶ If this is true, national consciousness is just an instance of imperialism.

There are scores of definitions of imperialism. Many of them are useless because they are confused with opinions which their respective authors hold upon the question of why imperialism exists. The following definition, however, is purely descriptive: imperialism is the tendency of a state to enlarge the area of its power.

The rulers of Babylon and Persia, Alexander the Great, the Romans, Charlemagne, the Spaniards of the sixteenth century, and Napoleon had imperialistic policies. In no case did the conception of a national state enter the picture; even Napoleon started with well-defended and already enlarged frontiers of France. An entirely non-expansionist policy, on the other hand, is to be found in Sweden, which seeks no new territory and has a population loyal to the country to which it belongs. But between non-national imperialism on the one hand and national contentment on the other there are a number of gradations. One type is found in nations that wish to liberate co-nationals. Italy successfully made war on Austria with this aim in 1859, 1866, and 1915-18; Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece declared war on Turkey with the same purpose in 1912; Rumania and Yugoslavia "liberated" people from Hungary whom they claimed to be their co-nationals; and Hitler demanded the Sudeten territory with the same argument. Some avoid calling these conquests imperialistic because they are in favor of national states and associate the word "imperialism" with the sentiment of disapproval. However, when sentiments and moral judgments are laid aside and imperialism is seen simply as the tendency of a state to enlarge the area of its power, there is no reason why wars of "liberation" should not be called imperialistic.

The line of demarcation between conquests for the purpose of

⁵*Op. cit.*, p. 109.

⁶*Op. cit.*, p. 138.

subjugating and of liberating is not always clear. What of populations content with their lot, whose "liberation" is claimed by another nation on the basis, for instance, of language? This happened with the Alsatians in 1871; though they spoke German, they felt a loyalty to France. The German historian, Heinrich von Treitschke, declared in this connection, that "we" know better what benefits these "unfortunate" people than they do themselves. Whether the Croats wished to be liberated by the Serbians is doubtful. Future historians will decide whether or not Hitler was engaged in "imperialism" when he annexed Austria.

Granted that imperialism means the addition of people and territory to a state in conformity with or against the wishes of the annexed, what of the forcible retention of people within the boundaries of a state when they wish to secede? From the moral point of view, the conquest of a population awaiting its conqueror is preferable to the forcible retention of people whose loyalty is not with their present masters. But on this important point, most democratic peoples usually violate their own principles. Not only Hitler's conquest but also his retention of Bohemia and Moravia are called imperialism. The same may be said of Great Britain in regard to India. But few people would cry "imperialism" if Switzerland forbade the canton of Ticino to join Italy, provided the majority of the inhabitants of the Ticino wished to do so, or if the United States interfered with the self-determination of any of the forty-eight states. Every American is free to emigrate to any other country and to become a citizen wherever he can be accepted. He is free to encourage other Americans to emigrate. He is not punishable if he proclaims that the United States might well take over the institutions of some other country, democratic or not. He is free to sell his landed property, should he own any, to foreigners. But no majority of Texans would be allowed to form a new Lone Star State, and the people of California, Florida, or Oregon would not be free to join Mexico or Canada except as individuals. The Civil War proved that.

Since the attitude of Hitler toward Bohemia, England toward India, and every modern democracy toward its own citizens have something, but not everything, in common with national conquests, the concept of imperialism may be enlarged to include both static and dynamic imperialism. The latter covers conquests, the former the refusal to let territories secede from the nation. Imperialism, in general, may therefore be defined as the tendency of a state to remain in-

tact, even against the will of sections of its subjects, or to enlarge the area of its power.

Static, more than dynamic, imperialism characterized the policy of Franz Joseph's Austria-Hungary. In the decades before the first World War, there was a continuous struggle to defend the realm against anti-patriotic nationalities. There were similar struggles in the old Ottoman Empire. Nationally unified countries do not have these difficulties. Yet it should be recalled that the French revolutionary *Convention Nationale* welcomed people to the privileges of French citizenship on December 15, 1792, and that it sponsored a decree emphasizing the principle that peoples have the right to self-determination. But on the following day a curious footnote was added by a decree to the effect that anyone who proposed or attempted separation from France was subject to capital punishment.⁷

The 1936 constitution of Soviet Russia, if taken at its face value, is the most democratic that has ever existed, for it declares: "Each Union republic retains its right freely to secede from the U.S.S.R."⁸ Unfortunately, there are a few drawbacks to this generosity. Only one political party is permitted to exist. Moreover, the central government has tight control over economic, fiscal, and monetary policies. Article 20 states: "In the event of a law of a Union republic differing from an All-Union law, the All-Union law prevails." Arnold Brecht stands on firm ground when he states: "The generous award of the right to secede which seems to challenge the timid federal structure of the United States, is illusory: how should it be exercised in a union in which any political organization other than the Communist Party is forbidden to come into existence, to form programs of secession and to nominate candidates?"⁹ It was not necessary to wait for Soviet Russia's march toward the West in 1939 to realize that socialism and imperialism are not incompatible.

National consciousness shows its inherent imperialistic character when a nation forbids unwilling citizens to secede (static imperialism) and when a nation aims at territorial conquest (dynamic imperialism). Static imperialism occurs under the following conditions: (1) The section wanting to shift its allegiance to another state, or wishing to become sovereign itself, may consist of people belonging to the same

⁷Michael Demiashkevich, *The National Mind* (New York, 1938), p. 270.

⁸"*Fundamental Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*," Cf. William E. Rappard and others: *Source Book on European Governments* (New York, 1937), Chapter 2, Article 7.

⁹"The New Russian Constitution," *Social Research*, IV, 1937.

nation. The American Civil War is a case in point. Some abortive proposals to detach Bavaria from the rest of Germany in the early years after the first World War—because of alleged “bolshevization” of Prussia—also belong in this category. (2) The people who wish to secede are considered members of the nation by the dominant group, but deny it themselves. The attitude of at least a part of the Alsations toward Germany from 1871 till 1918, and possibly the position of the Slovaks in Czechoslovakia are examples. (3) The dissenters are considered co-nationals neither by themselves nor by the ruling group, as in the case of former *Italia Irredenta* and many other national minorities. The Italians around Trento and Trieste were Italians in their own eyes and in the eyes of the Austrians. The Germans of the Sudetenland were Germans in their own eyes and those of the Czechs. But this did not mean that the Austrians and the Czechs were willing to allow their subjects to join other states.

Dynamic imperialism also occurs under several different conditions. (1) A nation may wish to “liberate” co-nationals waiting to “come home to the fatherland.” This was the attitude of Italy toward Trento and Trieste, and of Germany toward Sudetenland, Memel, and Danzig. It has been the attitude of the Hungarians toward their co-nationals in Yugoslavia and Rumania. The national states sheltering such minorities may refuse to let them go; the dynamic imperialism of Italy, Germany, and Hungary is met by the static imperialism of their opponents. (2) The co-nationals to be “liberated” are not always eager to return to the fatherland because they themselves have a different opinion of their nationality. It is unlikely that the Austrians wished to come under Hitler in 1938; the people of Eastern Poland, though mostly non-Poles, were not longing for “liberation” by Stalin in 1939. (3) A nation wishes to subjugate other peoples and annex their territories. This would not come under the heading of national consciousness at all, if conquests were not as a rule justified with arguments backed by national ideologies. Nothing of the kind was considered necessary by the conquerors of pre-national and pre-democratic days. The arguments used at present to prove that aggression is in reality defence are economic, historic, or cultural.

In short, imperialism need not be associated with the principle of nationality, but national consciousness is always to some extent imperialistic. Without a touch of imperialism, which may vary in degree, national consciousness would have a different meaning.

A SECULAR RELIGION

All religions promise to the faithful redemption from the evils of life. Some hold out better times for the future on earth. Christianity promises a life after death, Brahminism and Buddhism migration of the soul and possibly *nirvana*. In some religions (particularly the more primitive type, but also those of contemporary India), the faithful are expected to redeem themselves by certain rituals and by observing certain requirements; in others, they implore the divinity to grant salvation. Judaism, Christianity, and Islamism represent the latter type. Religions, as a rule, command individuals, but when religious enthusiasm overtakes the masses, they proceed to act in unison, as the history of the monotheistic beliefs shows.

The similarity between the behavior of men inflamed by religion on the one hand, and by national convictions on the other, has been noticed by a number of students of national consciousness. Carlton J. H. Hayes, in his excellent discussion of "nationalism as a religion,"¹ says:

Nationalism has its parades, processions and pilgrimages. It has, moreover, its distinctive holy days, and just as the Christian Church took over some festivals from Paganism, so the national state has borrowed freely from Christianity. In the United States, for example, the Fourth of July is a nationalist Christmas, Flag Day is substituted for Corpus Christi, and Decoration Day for the Commemoration of All Souls of the faithful departed, whilst in place of the saints' days of the Christian calendar appear the birthdays of national saints and heroes, such as Washington and Lincoln. Nationalism also has its temples, and he who would find the places and the buildings that are held most dear and most sacred by the vast majority of Americans, should seek not Christian cathedrals but Independence Hall in Philadelphia, Faneuil Hall in Boston, the shrine to General Lee in Lexington, and that to General Grant in New York, and the city of Wash-

¹*Essays on Nationalism*, Chapter IV, pp. 108, 109, 130.

ington with its stately Capitol, its White House, its great monuments to Lincoln and Washington, and its adjacent Arlington and Mount Vernon.

Moderns, especially Americans, are inclined to regard the mediæval veneration of images, icons and relics as savouring of "superstition," but let them replace a statue of St. George by a graven image of General George Washington, an icon of the Blessed Virgin Mary by a lithograph of the brave Molly Pitcher, and a relic of the Holy Cross by a tattered battle-flag, and they display a reverence which they deem beautiful and ennobling. It is our contention that in recent times nationalism has been substituted for other religion as the impelling source and object of that idealism which renders war popular. And such a substitution must be taken into account in any attempt to explain the modern intensification of war.²

The French Revolution attacked Christianity and every other supernatural belief: the priests were held guilty of many of the evils of the past; Christian teachings in the schools and the Christian festivals were abolished. However, the story of what happened to the Rights of Man is worth repeating because it shows how a religious attitude developed after the elimination of the traditional religious doctrines. Hayes quotes *Les Origines des Cultes Revolutionnaires*:

The written Constitution embodying the Declaration of the Rights of Man became holy writ. At the first session of the Legislative Assembly, in the autumn of 1791, "twelve old men went in procession to seek the Book of the Constitution. They came back, having at their head the archivist Camus, who, holding up the Book with his two hands and resting it on his breast, carried with slow and measured tread the new Blessed Sacrament of the French. All the deputies stood up and bared their heads. Camus, with meditative mien, kept his eyes lowered.

Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori, according to the Romans. Machiavelli lauded those who valued the greatness of their city above the salvation of their souls. When citizen-soldiers are called up in a modern war, they swear that they are willing to die in order that their country may live. The children of many countries are taught that they owe everything to their country. To insult the national flag or to remain seated when the national anthem is played sometimes amounts to a political crime. The national holidays are as sacred for the patriot as the Sabbath for the pious Jew and Sunday for the pious Christian.

All religions prescribe certain duties toward the deity and toward other men, and impose restrictions on normal impulses. In this

²*Op. cit.*, pp. 22, 102.

respect, all of them, primitive or highly developed, place restrictions upon natural egoism. The pursuit of one's own interest at the expense of others is considered sinful. Because religion commands men to live socially, some philosophers and sociologists hold that the chief characteristic of religion is its anti-egoistic social attitude. According to this theory, the function of religion is to make society possible. It may be said that national consciousness is similar to religion in that it also exalts the social group above the individual. The commands of both the nation and religion seem to be considered by their followers as morally justified. But where religion promises some kind of individual reward, the supreme sacrifice which the nation demands of its members may deprive them of life. They die without hope of personal reward in order that the nation may live.

But if both religions and national ethics appeal to egoism as well as the restraint of egoism, they do so in different ways. Religion promises a reward to the faithful who has done his duty: the duty comes first, the reward later. National ethics requires identification with the national group, which means that the individual sacrifices his own ego for that of the group. The nation wins honor and glory. According to Renan, "The soldier of Napoleon was well aware that he would always remain poor. But he felt that the epic on which he worked would be eternal, that he would live in the glory of France. . . It is impossible to make a soldier with the promise of a reward on earth. He must have immortality. If there is no paradise, there is glory, which is a kind of immortality."³

For Christianity, there is God and the individual soul; nations, classes, and other groups count for nothing. For nationalism, the nation is everything, and the individual has value only insofar as he takes part in the collective life of the group. This contradiction of goals accounts, more than anything else, for the conflict between the Catholic Church and the doctrine of National Socialism. The Christian is exhorted to meditate by himself and venerate God; the nationalist is exhorted to merge himself with his group and to go to war for his country. The supreme sacrifice can become the duty of the Christian too, but martyrdom is an exception. In nationalism, man does not fight for a belief, as in religious wars, but has made fighting itself his belief. Both Christianity and nationalism work

³Quoted by Georges Sorel, *Réflexions sur la violence* (Paris, 1910), p. 362.

with conceptions which are beyond experience and cannot be verified. In Christianity, life after death is only an assumption but it is based on a longing felt by most men. In nationalism, it is the other way round: that the nation survives the individual, admits of no doubt; but questionable, from every angle, is the alleged mystical "participation" of the individual in the life of the nation.

Experience and deduction can give only a fraction of the total truth, for emotions go hand in hand with vague conceptions, conjectures, myths. Intolerance and persecution are methods of silencing opinion on matters which lie in the realm of the uncertain. Theories in pure mathematics or in logic have produced neither inquisitors nor martyrs. Renan has pointed out that there may be a deep reason underlying the fact that Giordano Bruno died as a martyr to his pantheistic convictions, whereas Galileo renounced his astronomical conclusions. Of the two only Galileo could feel assured that his doctrine would prevail without the help of martyrdom. "At bottom," says Nietzsche, "man loses the belief in his own worth when no infinitely precious entity manifests itself through him—that is to say, he conceived such an All, *in order to be able to believe in his own worth.*"⁴

As long as the Catholic Church was all-powerful in spiritual matters, the philosophers and scientists protected themselves by asserting that their teachings were based upon the Bible. Today, when the whole world believes in science and progress, the founders of secular religions assert that they are teaching science. Marxian millenarianism comes forward as "scientific socialism" and the race theory of National Socialism pretends to be derived from biology and anthropology. However, it is not the scientific part of these doctrines which arouses enthusiasm (assuming they have scientific basis), but the very part which transcends experience and logic. The obscurity of great portions of the Marxian doctrine has not hindered but rather has furthered its success.

History has proved the impossibility of bringing about a feeling of piety and adoration for purely scientific truth. Auguste Comte developed his philosophical system around the "law of the three stages"—meaning that theology is followed by metaphysics, which in turn

⁴"The Will to Power," Vol. I. *The Complete Works* (London, 1924), XIV, p. 13.

gives way to science—and he invented an elaborate ceremonial for the society of the future where science and scientists would rule. His doctrine has been aptly called “Catholicism minus Christianity.” As might have been foreseen, his religion failed to have the slightest appeal, for where men completely comprehend, they are unwilling and even unable to feel piety. Wilhelm Ostwald, an eminent analytical chemist and originator of a philosophical system of monism, tried to make his contemporaries venerate the laws of nature, but he had as little success as Comte.

On the other hand, the French philosophers of the Age of Enlightenment, who were rationalists and worshippers of science, managed to arouse tremendous emotional enthusiasm for their doctrines. Without them there perhaps would not have been a French Revolution. But the two ideas which, according to Taine, mainly brought about their success were entirely metaphysical. They were that definite truth is at hand; and that this truth is universal and must be accepted by all human beings. “With these two beliefs, the philosophy of the eighteenth century resembles a religion, is similar to the Puritanism of the seventeenth and to the Mohammedanism of the seventh century.” Taine says in summary: “A doctrine becomes active only by becoming blind.”⁵

That part of the various doctrines which stirs the emotions may not impress the intelligence. Associations working in the subconscious tend to lose their efficacy when drawn into the light of day and subjected to analysis. Men can make a myth of the “state”; but let the state be defined and it will appear immediately that no one is willing to make sacrifices in its behalf. Renan has aptly said that “a *Zollverein* is not a fatherland.” At the time of the *Zollverein* and the unromantic and unpopular German Bund, Treitschke wrote: “The people have always spoken and sung of ‘*Kaiser und Reich*’; but never has a German heart beaten higher at the name of the German Bund.”⁶ It is evident that the subconscious associations evoked by “*Kaiser und Reich*” are the decisive factor in producing certain emotions. When the people of the Saar had to vote in 1935 on whether they wished to continue their *status quo* under the League of Nations or return to Germany, which then meant Hitler, they gave

⁵Taine, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 2, 12.

⁶*Deutsche Geschichte im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, I, p. 710.

a large majority to Germany in spite of strong misgivings regarding the Nazis. As the leaders of the opposition pointed out after the ballot had been taken, one reason for the popular stand was that the idea of the German fatherland had a strong sentimental appeal, whereas the *status quo* had none.

It is generally conceded that the traditional transcendent religions like Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islamism have lost considerable influence in the last centuries. Many millions of people still call themselves Christians, have their children baptized, contribute to churches, and attend divine service on Sundays, but in many cases it would be difficult to say whether their attitude comes more appropriately under the heading of religion or of customs and traditions. Two facts indicate a significant change: there are no longer wars of religion and conversions from one religion or denomination to another have become rare. Most present-day Catholics were born as Catholics, most Protestants were born as Protestants; but where religion is a living force, Catholics become converted to Protestantism, and *vice versa*. Only where religious feeling is weak does denominational affiliation become a matter of routine.

"Nothing is more dangerous than the void left by a lost religion," says Edgar A. Mowrer.⁷ The void left by Christianity made men say: "If I can no longer love the king, I can love mankind; if I can no longer love God, I can love the nation; if I can no longer love the country, I can love the proletariat."⁸ When the absolute kings passed from the scene, the nations took over their conceptions of conquest and honor. As the Christian churches lost their influence, new religions took their place. Of these, nationalism has become the most important.⁹

Every religious doctrine takes a position in regard to the three great realms of God, Nature, and Man. It must give an answer to the questions: Is there a God? What is nature? What is man?

⁷*Germany Puts the Clock Back* (New York, 1932), p. 48.

⁸Harold D. Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (1934), p. 156. The same thought was expressed by L. T. Hobhouse: "The best and the worst things that men do they do in the name of religion. Some have supposed that only supernatural religion could mislead. The history of our time shows that if men no longer believe in God they will make themselves gods of Power, of Evolution, of the Race, the Nation, or the State. In the name of such gods will they drench a continent with blood, and the youth will offer themselves up as willing martyrs." *The Metaphysical Theory of the State* (London, 1926), p. 134.

⁹Kimball Young, *Social Psychology* (1930), p. 306.

Philosophy centered around the concept of God in the Middle Ages, and around nature from the Renaissance up to the Age of Enlightenment. With the rise of the various philosophies of life in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, man began to share with nature a place in the central philosophical conception.

Nationalism is not concerned with God, but the concept of nature occurs frequently in its doctrines. National consciousness is proclaimed to be "natural" and from this fact it is inferred that it is our duty to feel national solidarity and to make sacrifices for our nation. Unrestricted egoism, class feeling, and cosmopolitanism are declared to be "unnatural" and symptoms of degeneration.

Although dependent on other human beings, we are more dependent on nature. Man must have a certain body temperature; he must breathe, and from time to time he must drink and eat. On the other hand, it is quite possible for his contacts with other men to be scarce; they may even cease altogether for some length of time without bringing about death. Alexander Selkirk, the English sailor who served as the prototype of Robinson Crusoe, lived on an island by himself for four years. It would have been impossible for him to live four minutes without breathing, four days without drinking, or four weeks without food.

We might expect nationalistic thought, which likes to refer to nature, to admonish its adherents to follow nature's laws. A nationalistic gospel of struggle and courage might be assumed to be concerned primarily with the struggle of man against nature. However, this is not the case. National thought and feeling center around man, and the relationship between man and man is practically its sole concern.

According to the Christian conception, all men are fundamentally equal because they are children of God. They have immortal souls, which animals lack, and duties toward God. They can be "saved." A few philosophers of antiquity formed a concept of humanity, but they had no influence beyond a small circle of scholars. It was Christianity which made the idea of humanity a part of Western thought; and even the most radical atheists, including the Bolsheviks, are in this respect heirs of the Christian doctrine, little as they themselves may be aware of it. When national consciousness began to become a force, the idea of humanity was by no means immediately chal-

lenged. The eighteenth century was so cosmopolitan that where patriotism was recognized as a virtue at all—which was exceptional—it was justified only as it served mankind. The same attitude prevailed during a great part of the nineteenth century. Sully-Prudhomme says in one of his sonnets: "I owe to my country a heart that transcends it. The more I feel French, the more do I feel human." According to Anastasius Grün, to be German means to welcome the whole of humanity with open arms and at the same time to feel in one's heart the unique love for the fatherland.¹⁰ Later, it became the prevalent idea that man has no other duty but to give his services to his nation, without thinking of humanity at large; humanity, it would seem, was served best by an intense patriotism. And finally, humanity was dropped altogether. What was originally conceived of as a means became an end in itself.

This is not unusual. The miser forgets that the purpose of money is exchange and regards it as a goal. Modern protectionism, as set forth by Friedrich List, originally maintained that tariffs are, for weaker nations, the means to economic progress but that the ultimate aim must be free-trade. Many nations followed List's advice and took the first step, only to forget the second. They introduced tariffs and their industries began to blossom. Thereafter, they never again gave a thought to free-trade. Nationalists no longer expect humanity to profit from national patriotism. The consequences were predicted by the Austrian poet, Franz Grillparzer, a century ago: "From humanity through nationality to bestiality."

If national thought is so completely focused upon the single nation why does it not aim at walling itself off from the rest of the world? Such was the ideal of Johann Gottlieb Fichte in his book, *The Self-Contained Economic State*, published in 1800. He wished to shut off his autarchic state from other states as far as possible. The government would eliminate the causes of international friction; foreign trade and the currency were to be regulated with this in mind. Only scientists would be allowed to travel in foreign countries; and science alone was to be common to the several peoples. The ideas expounded by Charles A. Beard in his book *The Open Door at Home*¹¹ follow a similar pattern. Beard proposed that the United States

¹⁰R. Michels, *Der Patriotismus*, pp. 27, 28.

¹¹New York, 1934.

should rely on her own economic resources as a means of avoiding international conflicts.

Now in order to understand the system of thought promulgated by modern nationalism, the following point should be clearly understood: Though some nations have occasionally attempted to bring about economic autarchy for military reasons, the pattern of all-round autarchy and cultural self-sufficiency which was in Fichte's mind is not the national ideal at all. In modern national consciousness, the world plays an essential part. It figures in the unconscious. It is only superficially that nationalism denies humanity. Looking deeper into the matter, one cannot fail to see that after having been expelled by the front-door humanity enters anew through the back.

There is no fighting without an enemy, no honor and glory without human beings able to honor and admire. Nationalism wants everything for its own nation, but it wants things which presuppose the existence of other human beings. Without them its aims have no meaning. Nations draw their consciousness from human society, not from nature alone, which is unable to defy, applaud, and admire.

Nations wish to be feared and admired. The means at their disposal are threats and war, and when war actually comes, the "in-groups *versus* out-group" feeling must be strong enough to give to the whole nation the necessary impulse to sacrifice. There must be hatred against the enemy. The masses may not know what they are fighting for, but they do know what they are fighting against. Hatred is a tremendous social force. Bolshevism, Fascism, and National Socialism all have won their followers by offering them an object of hatred. And all three dictatorial systems have found it necessary to embark on wars against other nations when the force of internal hatred had spent itself.

Dynastic wars were fought for egoistic though limited aims. The King of France seized, or yielded a province or a colony to the German Emperor or the King of England without endeavoring to annihilate the latter. The monarchs and aristocracies of pre-democratic times did not claim that they or their people were fighting for their very existence. No particular hatred was aroused against the enemy, except the hatred which was a consequence of the killing and looting. In spite of all their wars, the several kings who based their authority upon Divine Right felt that they were one big family towering far

above the common folk in all lands. Lord Acton asserts that Poland would never have been extinguished and divided in the eighteenth century had it been ruled by an hereditary dynasty akin to the other European dynasties. As it was, the Poles elected their kings.¹² But democratic wars mobilize the entire population and therefore must fill the masses with enthusiasm and hatred.¹³

When medieval man was in trouble, he found the cause in God; if he was strongly religious, he believed that his misfortunes were his own fault and a punishment for his sins. Modern man as a rule no longer blames God but rather "society" or some particular class or foreign nation. He restores his upset mental equilibrium by seeking and finding a villain. It eases his mind to know that evil-minded human beings, preferably "exploiters" and "haves" of some sort, are the cause of his misfortunes and that he can make them pay for his trouble and thereby have his revenge and his escape. Thus every nation, while interested only in itself, has the human beings outside its border perpetually in mind. Secular religion—in other words, nationalism—asks for sacrifices, but to offset them it promises the humiliation of other human beings and esteem from other nations. Varying degrees of intensity are of course shown in the inclinations of nations and groups to view the world only as the scene of human actions, victories, and defeats; to divide mankind into one's own group on the one side, and its enemies and potential admirers on the other.

As the history of philosophy shows, the human intellect when left to itself and severed from political emotions, always tends to view the social world as centered around both the individual and humanity as a whole. One's individual soul is the basic factor of everyone's experience; the concept of humanity emerges from the observation that man as a species is far more distinct from the animal world than men are different from each other. The Stoics, the Christian philosophers of the Middle Ages, and the rationalists of the last centuries were equally interested in the individual and in humanity, while relegating all groupings between these two poles to an inferior place. But in

¹²John E. E. D. Acton, *The History of Freedom and Other Essays* (London, 1922).

¹³*Cf.* Guglielmo Ferrero, *Peace and War* (London, 1933).

recent times many intellectuals have stressed the division of the human race into nations and sovereign states. This shift in attitude is a result of their religious needs combined with the fighting impulse rather than of purely intellectual perception. When industrial workmen feel the void left by a lost religion, they, for the most part, become socialists. Intellectuals are probably more likely to become nationalists. Obviously, the divergence in the attitudes of the two classes is rooted in the differences in their economic and social positions.

In an industrial society based upon a highly developed division of labor, where the number of employers is small and the number of employed is large, many people feel that their fate depends upon the decisions of a few. Farmers, as a rule, feel themselves dependent on nature for the harvest is to a great extent a matter of chance. But when the farmer's produce brings poor prices or he is ridden by debt, he is apt to blame the government, the traders, or the speculators. But as long as he thrives, the farmer's philosophy is not concerned primarily with man. Capitalists—however small their enterprises—enjoy working "for themselves" rather than "for another," and hence have the same tendency as farmers. But industrial workmen, clerks, and all persons occasionally unemployed feel that they depend on the small group that hires and fires. They overrate the power of this group, and as a class they are amenable to doctrines which preach political and social changes and hatred toward those elements which allegedly attempt, out of selfish interests, to frustrate either national glory and prosperity or universal salvation. The result is nationalism, or the doctrine of class-war or a similar system of thought.

Americans are slightly less prone than Europeans to narrow down their picture of the universe to hostile human groups. Though American nationalism is strong in war time and has been aroused occasionally in peacetime to intense passion by deliberate propaganda, the idea of aggressive nationality is not prevalent as a rule in the minds of the American people; nor has the doctrine of class war had much of an appeal for American labor. For this there are a number of reasons, of which one is pertinent to the present discussion. In American tradition man's fight against nature holds a larger place than his fight against man. At least one of the national holidays, Thanksgiving Day, recalls the triumph over an unfriendly climate and the natural scarcity of food. When Americans speak of the "frontier" they do not think of the Canadian or Mexican border but of that part of their country which at one time had not been settled.

In no European country does the idea of the frontier have this association. The American pioneers conquered nature. The Indians, of course, had to be pushed out first, but their defeat was a foregone conclusion. Individual struggle and competition are the American heritage and tradition. Therefore, it is possible in the United States even today for strong mass movements to get under way without a villain to unite their followers in common hatred. Prohibition was popular in its hey-day not primarily because it was directed against the profiteers in the liquor business. The various old-age retirement schemes, however deficient from the angle of economics, do not set the older people against the younger because the latter are "exploiting" them.

Marxian socialism is a secular religion similar to nationalism. There is the same mass enthusiasm, spirit of sacrifice, and belief in a brighter future when the "enemy" has been disposed of. The foe is the bourgeoisie, which thrives by appropriating what the proletarians produce. The niggardliness of nature is discounted and the possibilities of unlimited progress in taming the forces of nature are taken for granted. As no "natural" distinction is assumed to exist between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, socialism finds its aim in economic equalization. The fight is theoretically not against other men but against an institution represented by a class. But actually the hatred of the masses is of the same type as in nationalism. In socialism, the goal came first; thereafter a movement was started to attain it. In nationalism, the movement came first and the goal was vague and undefined. But the two religions have gradually become more like each other. In socialism, the school of Sorel has taught that fighting and myth are more important than a well-defined scheme of planned economy; and in nationalism, scores of intellectuals have been busy working out ideas of a future world-order based on national consciousness, particularly that pertaining to their own nation. Of the two competing religions, nationalism has been the more successful. The chief reason for this is that nations really exist, whereas the international revolutionary proletariat is a fiction.¹⁴

¹⁴"The proletarian revolution, in which Marx and Lenin believed, seems to be incompatible with the real labour movement as it is. Certain elements of Marx's and Lenin's revolutionary predictions have proved only too true Only one thing is certainly not true: the idea that, at the height of such a crisis, the proletariat will rise and, throwing all the propertied classes into the dust, will take the lead of society, abolish private property in the means of production and create a régime where there are no more classes." F. Borkenau, *The Communist International* (London, 1938), pp. 420, 421.

National consciousness is intimately associated with excelling fighting, and defeating, because it is centered neither in theology nor nature but solely in mankind. The exclusive concentration on human beings leaves the way open to several attitudes. Humanity may be thought of as a unified whole (the Christian doctrine) or as divided into nations, each one walling itself off from all the others. In both cases, a peaceful world may ensue. But when honor and glory, even the *raison d'être* of the nation are found in its superiority to other nations and in their admiration, the consequence is bound to be a dynamic struggle. This can never be resolved and may well lead to that sort of explosion which has been experienced in our time, and which Hermann Rauschning has so aptly named the "Revolution of Nihilism."

CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

When people live under a traditional or a free government and have no particular grievances, they will as a rule resent foreign aggression and defend the *status quo*. This they may do without feeling any national consciousness. The same is true when people follow their government, even in an act of open warlike aggression, simply because they are not aware of any other alternative. National consciousness means that a substantial part of a group is willing to make sacrifices in order to retain or join or establish a certain state for the sake of its sovereignty among other nations.

This phenomenon is far too complex and widespread to be disposed of by a few abusive phrases. National consciousness is not the expression of the economic interests of a small group of individuals, nor is it the arbitrary invention of intellectuals who have managed to spread their ideas by propaganda. On the other hand, so many striking coincidences have played a part in molding the nations that it is untenable to see them as merely "natural" entities. The solution to this apparent contradiction must be found in making a distinction between national consciousness in general and its manifestations in particular. There has been inevitability in the rise of the former and coincidence in the formation of the latter.

The meanings of "inevitability" and "coincidence" are controversial within philosophical terminology, and it is beyond the scope of the present book to explore them. To state that something has happened by coincidence does not mean that it has happened without sufficient cause, for every event has its cause. It means that, from the point of view of the observer, something else might have happened, and that it is possible to figure out what might have taken place. When the result of a vote on a certain proposition is 51 per cent aye and 49 per cent nay, we have good reason to believe that if some

voters had not stayed at home, the outcome might have been reversed. When a person misses a train and thereby escapes a railway accident, we say he had good luck; he might as well have had bad luck. A few historical examples will suffice to show the relative sense in which the terms inevitability and coincidence are used.

There was no inevitability in the outcome of the battle of the Marne in September, 1914. If the German High Command had had a little more confidence, or if Marshal Joffre had had poorer nerves, the Germans might well have won. Julius Caesar, Abraham Lincoln, and other eminent men might never have been born or might have died in childhood. Hitler would possibly never have been heard of if the directors of the Viennese Academy of Art had awarded him a scholarship when he applied for one. These may be said to be examples of coincidence. But the discovery of America was inevitable. It would have taken place even if there had been no Columbus. The end of republican institutions in Rome and the abolition of slavery in the United States would have come about in the long run, though possibly somewhat later.

Among the many factors which have contributed to the building of national consciousness and of the various nations, the following may be considered inevitable: The love of home and homeland: this powerful force contributes to national consciousness mainly through the logically untenable but psychologically understandable confusion between the identity of the small locality and the few people best known and the larger impersonal nation. Segregation: the satisfaction felt in "belonging" to a social group which is distinct from other social groups; the fighting impulse; and the respect felt for courage. Man's religious endowment: what Schopenhauer calls his "metaphysical need." The void left by a lost religion calls for another religion to fill the gap. The secularization of human thought in modern times through skepticism and enlightenment. It is superfluous to add that scores of other historical events, among them the industrial revolution and the progress of democracy, were needed to bring about modern national consciousness at a certain time among certain peoples. The following factors may be considered more or less coincidental: The delimitation of the national groups: who feels and stands with whom again whom; and the strength of national consciousness. The latter varies even with the same people, increasing

or decreasing; it overcomes peoples who have never experienced it and can lose its force with others who have been violent in the intensity of their nationalism.

The philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries regards man mainly as a being endowed with intelligence, *homo sapiens*, but the philosophy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries stresses such irrational factors as will, life, instinct, impulse, and the longing for power. In this, there is agreement among such widely diverse thinkers as Schelling, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Darwin, Marx, James, Freud, and Bergson.

Certainly in national consciousness primal life forces and will dominate over deliberate, detached, objective reasoning. "Observation proves that where there is free choice and the material conditions are normal, interest subordinates itself to sentiment. It is with nationality as with love: sentiment comes first, and only subsequently does one attempt to explain it by reasoning."¹ But though sentiment comes first, man wishes to know why he makes one decision and not another; and although the reasons which he assumes are guiding him are often nothing but the products of his emotions, yet he would not act without them. We have seen that, in spite of the fighting impulse, a war is not popular without the conviction that it is "necessary" or "just." It would be a fine thing if we were able to say just how much impulse and how much intellect are needed in every concrete case. Unfortunately this is not possible.

Intelligence and thought enter into the formation of national consciousness at two points. First, a number of intellectuals "awaken" slumbering national feeling and draw the line separating those who are taught that solidarity is "natural" from those who are to be ostracized as "aliens." Second, the nations produce ideologies, fictitious notions, visionary speculations, concerning their origins, their mission, the ethical significance and the economic advantages of their national consciousness and policies.

Propaganda and education have played a great part in bringing national consciousness to its present level. Hayes thinks that "the success of the idea of supreme loyalty to nationality and the national state is attributable to a number of highly favorable circumstances,

¹Arnold Van Gennep, *Traité Comparatif des Nationalités* (Paris, 1922), I, p. 12.

but quite specifically to the zeal with which nationalism has been propagated first among intellectuals and then among the masses. Events of the eighteenth century predisposed some countries to nationalism. Propaganda during the nineteenth century rendered nationalism a universal phenomenon."² But we must be careful not to overestimate the force of propaganda. The tremendous resources of propaganda and the educational facilities of the several Christian churches have proved inadequate to prevent a decline in response to the Christian faith; and if international Communism has failed to make progress, it is certainly not due to lack of propaganda, but rather because propaganda is not equally effective for all doctrines. No commodity can be made popular with the public through propaganda alone, and no mythology catches the imagination of the masses if it fails to satisfy certain wants.

Geography provides the dividing line between nations when certain psychological attitudes and limitations dispose men to infer consequences from geographical situations. Oppression leads to national feeling when the latter is defined and propagated by an élite under certain circumstances. Religion may foster division between nations. Even in our time religion is the essential ingredient of national consciousness in the Near East and in a part of the Balkans. The Turks have always regarded the Mohammedan inhabitants of their country as compatriots. Their crack soldiers in the old days, the Janizaries, were men of non-Turkish origin who had been taken from their parents during childhood and had been brought up as Mohammedan warriors. When the Turks and the Greeks arranged an exchange of population in the early 1920's, after Kemal had expelled the Greek army from Asia Minor, Greek Catholics and Protestants were allowed to remain in Turkey. As they did not belong to the Greek church, they were not considered to be Greeks, in spite of their language. Though most nations hold that solidarity of language is a "natural" phenomenon and that religion carries no national significance, the Turks and some other peoples feel that language is of minor importance, and that religion is the decisive factor. This justifies the view that what counts is to stand with someone against someone; the actual characteristics of the respective partners are of secondary importance.

²*Op. cit.*, p. 61.

The nations of Latin America have been very nationalistic and jealous of their frontiers—though, with the exception of Brazil, their peoples speak Spanish, are Catholic, and represent a mixture of the white with several colored races. With them the dividing lines are those of the old, more or less arbitrary, administrative districts of the Spaniards. During the insurrection against Spain, the dwellers in each Viceroyalty or Captaincy General fought for themselves, according to James Bryce. Whereupon, “that which had been an administrative division passed into a Republic.” There are very insignificant differences between the people of Columbia, Venezuela, and Ecuador, and those of Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Yet they have often warred against each other.

In general, however, language is the foremost factor in dividing nations. In some cases, as with England and France, it was the state which first unified national languages. When the time of national consciousness arrived, the boundaries of the states coincided with language boundaries, and the existing circumstances appeared to be “natural.” In other cases, language and political frontiers did not coincide. Here the “national awakening” of the various language groups was started by the intellectuals; they proclaimed who should stand with whom against whom. Where languages and states do not conform, there is either one state with several languages, or one language spoken in several states. Of the former pattern, the outstanding example is Switzerland. For languages spoken by several nations, the examples are more numerous. Portuguese is spoken in Portugal and Brazil; English in Great Britain, the United States, and the Dominions (which may eventually be sovereign nations); and Spanish is the language of Spain and of more than a dozen American nations. It is more difficult to unite several language groups than to split one language group; from this it might be inferred that men have in general a stronger tendency toward segregation than toward unification.

But all modern nations are the product of some mingling of peoples originally separated. The fact that they have one national consciousness proves that unification has been successful in greater or less degree. The Scotch have not lost their regional Scottish patriotism, but they have no desire to break away from England. Yet they are Celts and have kept more of their original language in their High-

lands than have the Irish, who, though also Celts, at one time spoke almost nothing but English and have never wavered in their opposition to England. In Austria and Hungary, the various peoples did not merge into one nation; but in Switzerland, the intimate association of several language groups works very satisfactorily. The people of the United States feel as one nation; yet as late as 1835, Alexis de Toequeville believed that the Federation would break up and that the States would develop as separate nations. For anyone who wishes to understand the reasons for the formation of the nations, there remain incomprehensible, irrational and imponderable factors.

Events in this field are unpredictable. It is assumed that in the future, as in the past, governments will be able to win new loyalties and to destroy old ones. Whether Austrians will be Austrians or Germans and Australians will be only Australians or Britishers as well; whether the various Latin American loyalties will remain as divided as at present; how the Serbians and Croats will feel toward each other—all depend partly on the purposeful acts of men, present and future, and partly on unforeseen historical circumstances. But one thing seems certain: the molding of new loyalties has become more difficult than it was before the era of national consciousness. The Gauls were glad to accept the Roman language, as it represented a high culture and they had no culture of their own to match it. The conquering Franks, after taking France, accepted the Roman language for the same reason. But today, even relatively backward nations feel themselves equal or superior to all others, and stick to their own languages. When France took over the Alsations at the time of the French monarchy, they did so with ease as there was neither German nor French national consciousness, except in an embryonic state. But when Germany annexed Alsace in 1871 an endless unrest ensued in spite of the German language of the Alsations.

Karl Marx and his followers called the "ideological superstructure" those ideas which man unconsciously originates in order to justify his actions to himself and others. Marxism teaches that economic motives are the reality in social life and that all the rest is more or less illusion, that human actions are properly understood only when reduced to economic motives. In this doctrine, Helvetius and his school in France and, through some misunderstanding, the English classical economists were his predecessors. Marx's own contribution

consists in the concept that social groups (called classes) and not individuals struggle for existence and wealth. Partly because it fits in with the natural inclination of most men and partly because Marx and his school have asserted it, there is in our time a strong tendency to explain human actions by asking: Where is the profit? The opposite procedure—to state that some sort of idealism, useful or harmful, is at the root of certain human beliefs and attitudes (including certain ideas on how to become wealthy)—is generally looked down upon and ridiculed. Yet this procedure goes far in explaining the myths of the nations.

Our search for reasons for our actions and our hope that we will find reasons which flatter or at least do not violate our moral sentiments and intelligence, result in a continuous process of rationalization. The Greeks believed that they had slaves because nature had predestined some people to slavery. Women have been denied equal rights with men by arguments of much the same kind. Traditional prejudices of every sort have been explained by hereditary instincts. The man or woman who falls in love believes that the beloved has unparalleled qualities. The person who is unable to achieve his goal compensates for his feeling of inferiority by making himself believe that it is virtuous to renounce; and he may build up a whole system of morality based on resentment against the more successful. The greatest discoveries in the field of self-illusion are, by the way, not due to Marxism but to psychoanalysis. There are a number of widely accepted national ideologies, in reality, rationalizations. The first is that nations, *i.e.*, nationally-minded individuals, are convinced that of all conceivable human groups and associations, the nation is the most "natural." It is difficult to imagine why this should be so, for other types of association have always been possible.

Harold D. Lasswell has formulated this very neatly:

The number of words which can be used to distinguish one person from another is unlimited. All the curly-haired people might be united in curly-haired consciousness versus all the straight-haired people; all the dry-skinned people might be united against the oily-skinned people; but words about propinquity and tradition and economic standing have thus far outcompeted physical words in the rivalry for human loyalty . . . Dr. Carl Jung has done much to create an "introvert" and "extrovert" consciousness in mankind, yet the introverts and extroverts are not yet demanding self-determination.³

³*World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York, 1935), pp. 32, 33.

Class consciousness, international consciousness, religious solidarities, and many other group feelings are thought of as artificial phenomena and possibly treason. Every individual Frenchman or German may be in many respects deficient, yet the French or the German nations are regarded as superior. "Mankind in all ages has had a strong propensity to conclude that wherever there is a name there must be a distinguishable separate entity corresponding to the name."⁴ The nation is supposed to exist by itself and, as men are willing to fight for their nationality, it is assumed that for such depth of feeling there must be an equivalent cause. The national group must evidently represent either the will of nature or a particular moral and cultural idea. In reality, men are willing to die for their country, but they do not live for it.

The second rationalization is that the love of home and homeland is a reality. Granted that this love is an extremely strong sentiment with many men, it is an illusion that home and country, neighbors and co-nationals, are synonymous. The consequence of this erroneous belief is that men merge the nation with the home in their thoughts and reinforce their inclination toward segregation and the fighting impulse with the whole weight of sentimental associations arising from youthful recollections and tradition. The affection for a certain place and for certain persons is transferred to a more or less artificial, man-made, distinct fighting group, headed by administrative institutions. The nation profits from values not indigenous to it.

The claims made by nations with respect to their own comparative merits constitute the third rationalization. Few illusions are more extraordinary, but in a psychological sense this one is not altogether surprising. It was once aptly described as "Pooled Self-Esteem."⁵ Numerous primitive tribes and the intellectual and ruling elite of more highly developed peoples before the age of national consciousness held similar views—as, for example, the Jews, the Chinese, and the Japa-

⁴John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic*; Book V, Chapter 3.

⁵If I have an exorbitant opinion of myself, it is continually criticized and thwarted by external criticism; . . . It becomes impossible for me to believe that I am a wonder in the face of surrounding incredulity . . . What, therefore, we need, and what we get, is something which at the same time distinguishes us from a great part of the human race, and yet is shared by nearly all those with whom we come in contact. That we find in our country; and in our country we do most successfully and unconsciously pool our self-esteem." A. Clutton-Brock, "Pooled Self-Esteem," *The Atlantic Monthly* (Vol. 128; December, 1921).

nese.⁶ A number of national mythologies regarding common and noble descent have been mentioned in an earlier chapter. One more may be added here: Milton declared that the English are the chosen people in succession to the Jews; and the Anglo-Israel-Identity Society, formed in the second half of the nineteenth century, claimed that the English people were identical with the lost tribes of Israel and therefore destined by the Old Testament to a unique historical role.

Myths of merit and destiny are common. Michelet addresses France: "France, you are the word of the world! When you cease to speak, justice vanishes from the whole surface of the earth."⁷ Lord Curzon said: "The British Empire is, under Providence, the greatest instrument for good that the world has ever seen."⁸ German claims of like nature are legion. Johann Gottlieb Fichte addressed the German nation thus: "If you should perish with your peculiar qualities, the whole human race loses its prospect of being saved from the terrible evils from which it suffers. There is no alternative: if you become engulfed, all mankind becomes engulfed with you, and there is no hope left for restoration in the future."⁹ American claims of merit and distinction have been made with such phrases as "geographical predestination," "extension of the area of freedom," "the mission of regeneration," "inevitable destiny," and "manifest destiny."¹⁰

Suspicion of foreign nations is inherent in national consciousness. As a result, events of no significance, if they involve several nations, may have tremendous consequences. Many thousands of lives are lost every year in each country through automobile and other accidents; the fact carries no political significance. But when a solitary aviator loses his direction in peace time and flies over foreign territory, or a shot is accidentally fired across a frontier, the consequences may be serious. Football, so unpolitical ordinarily, became a political issue during the Olympic games of 1936 when there were demonstrations in Lima, Peru, because a victory of the Peruvian over the Austrian team at Berlin was subsequently questioned. The whole world outlook of the nations, particularly small ones, is a product of their sensitiveness.

⁶Westermarck, *op. cit.*, gives numerous examples.

⁷Michelet, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

⁸*Problems of the Far East* (London, 1894).

⁹*Reden an die deutsche Nation*.

¹⁰Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny, A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History* (Baltimore, 1935).

Notice the following record by Hayes of grievances of the Alsatians against the French after France had reannexed them:

In Alsace-Lorraine a notary public had the right to open an office at will, while in France he had to await an official appointment. Again, a druggist in Alsace Lorraine had to obtain a license from the Government, while in France he had only to consult his own pleasure. In Alsace Lorraine professors of medicine might choose freely their own internes; in France, a strict examination regulated the choice. In France there was a state monopoly of tobacco with inferior products; in Alsace-Lorraine, where no such monopoly existed, the citizens were accustomed to good cigars. These differences and hundreds of others complicated the re assimilation of Alsace Lorraine by the French national State.¹¹

All these differences are, of course, less significant than the changes which the laws and institutions of the same country undergo within a decade in peaceful let alone in troubled times. That they could be reported as problems involving the relations between the Alsatians, who were partly French, and the French, is significant in itself. The importance attributed to small differences is often nothing short of ~~ridiculous~~.

Professors, journalists, and other intellectuals are fond of visiting foreign countries for the sake of giving lectures on their own countries, and thereby bringing about better "understanding" among the nations. This is a pleasant and harmless pastime but it can accomplish little in bringing the nations nearer to each other. Nations do not mistrust each other because of a lack of mutual knowledge; segregation and opposition give them pleasure, and they have certain resultant opinions concerning foreign institutions.

The assumption that the nation is superior to numberless other actual and potential groups in its ability to provide economic advantages for its members is the final rationalization. As shown above, the nation is certainly not an economic grouping of the joint-stock company type, a trade-union, or a trust. Insofar as it is an economic group at all, it belongs to the sociological pattern of the brigand gang: both take away the property of other people by force.

There remains then the question of what precisely it can achieve in the economic field. Though nations fight primarily for honor and glory, they are also convinced that victory pays and this conviction

¹¹Carlton J. H. Hayes, *France: A Nation of Patriots* (New York, 1930), p. 255.

strengthens their warlike inclinations. There is the belief that the so-called problem of access to the raw-materials and the question of overpopulation can be solved by annexations in general, and the acquisition of colonies in particular. Much has been written on this subject since Norman Angell, in his highly successful book, *The Great Illusion*, first published in 1909, asserted that conquests do not pay. The latest author to side with Angell is Grover Clark.¹²

There is no simple answer to the question whether the annexations achieved through victory pay a profit above the expenses of the war. The balance-sheets will be different for the small and almost bloodless war of the United States against Mexico, which yielded Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California to the victor; for the South African Boer War which cost Great Britain £250,000,000 before the Boers were defeated; and for a World War begun by Hitler for the sake of *Lebensraum*, even should he manage to defeat all his foes.

Given social groups such as modern nations—composed of people of many professions, suspicious of other groups, and with a ~~high respect~~ for warlike bravery—certain economic assumptions are almost certain to follow.¹³ The first is that the economic interests of all members of a nation are identical; that all win and lose at the same time; and that internal strife, particularly “class war,” is unnatural and brings poverty to all. Common interests are most evident when they conflict with those of other nations. All the land on the surface of the earth and all its actual and potential wealth “belong” to some nation. As long as they belong to others, so runs the argument, they cannot belong to us. Modern nationalism thinks in the first place of the land to be taken, and not so much of its inhabitants, who in former centuries, if defeated, were used or sold as slaves. For the military mind, conquered square miles prove victory and power. Seen from the economic angle, every portion of the globe is a source of potential wealth. Whenever a country acquires a colony—for example, when Italy obtained Ethiopia—the hopes of economic gain are boundless. Yet no one believes that possessions in the Arctic mean anything, at

¹²*A Place in the Sun* (New York, 1936). *The Balance Sheets of Imperialism* (New York, 1936).

¹³The following argument may be too condensed to be entirely conclusive. But it suffices if it shows that the economic theories of the nationalists are extremely questionable. In this case the cocksureness and intolerance with which they are held prove their emotional origin.

least at present. When Hitler tells President Roosevelt that the New Deal economic policy has failed to live up to the standard set by National Socialism—otherwise the United States, with fewer inhabitants per square mile than Germany, would know no unemployment—the argument is so crude that it scarcely needs refutation.

In every country the idea arises in times of depression that with men unable to find work and areas of uncultivated land, nothing is needed but to settle the unemployed on the land. They can then presumably take care of themselves. The same panacea of colonies as a drain for overpopulation is urged, but unfortunately it is an illusion. Even men trained in agricultural work will starve if they have nothing but their bare hands when taking possession of a piece of land. They must have food to live on while crops mature, implements, possibly access to a market through roads, and so on. In a word, the land is of no use to them if they have no capital; without capital they might better continue to live on relief. But if the government or private associations find the capital needed for the new settlers, the question remains whether that capital and the work of the hitherto unemployed cannot be made more productive by placing them in some nonagricultural employment, for which new land is not needed. As a matter of fact, this is very likely to be the case. When all over the world people increasingly desert agriculture and move into the towns, there must be a reason for it.

The nationalist will perhaps argue that it is the land combined with labor and capital which produces riches, and that the value of annexations and colonies must be sought in this direction. The question then arises: Whose labor? The unemployed and poorly paid of the victorious nation will say "ours," and nobody can blame them if they want remunerative jobs. But it is by no means certain that, after the defeated have been ejected from their country or allowed to starve there, the work of the newcomers will necessarily be more productive than theirs was. Furthermore, losses arise through the shifting of the population, new adaptations, and the forsaking of homes and technical equipment in the old country. It is economically advisable rather to make use of the labor of the conquered people, and in fact this has been the almost universal procedure.

There are two ways of disposing of the produce of the conquered: either to leave it entirely to the producers or to appropriate a part for

the dominant nation. The entire output cannot, of course, be appropriated, for then the conquered people would starve, and that would end the matter. If the inhabitants of the annexed territory are treated as equals by the victors, as in the case with the Boers in the South African Union and the people of Eupen and Malmédy in Belgium, and if they are not subjected to discrimination and burdensome taxation, there is obviously no profit from the annexation. In the event that they are taxed more highly than the members of the dominant nation or exploited in some other way, there is always a limit to what can safely be taken; they must be able to keep up their capital stock, replace machinery, houses, and so on. This reduces the economic revenue considerably, and whether it is worth-while to appropriate the balance is doubtful.

If national economic motives were fundamental or anything but an afterthought, we would find a great number of business people, economists, and government officials occupied in peacetime with calculations of the direct and indirect costs of war, the value of every other country or colony if annexed, the additional taxes, the risk of revolutionary upheavals. These people would busily attempt to draw a balance-sheet and to figure which war might pay and which circumstances might be regarded as sufficiently favorable to warrant the risk. There would be no vague allusions to "overpopulation," "*Lebensraum*," or "a place in the sun." The procedure would resemble the drawing up of a budget. But, in reality, emotion comes first; the belief that annexations are profitable is merely a superstructure. Nations do not, as is often held, seek profit while preaching the doctrines of Christ; rather they speak of profit but actually think of honor and glory. It is true that some capitalists may profit by war and annexation. But why do the masses, when nationally-minded, believe the capitalists who pretend it is all a matter of honor and security? If it were true that the munitions-makers and profiteers instigate modern wars, this would actually prove very little; how could they arouse enthusiasm for a cause which would be positively detrimental to the balance of the nation, were it not that the latter were eager to be convinced? Direct subsidies are much cheaper for a nation than a "capitalistic" war. Everyone agrees that if American investors were to ask their government to indemnify them for losses suffered in Latin America or Europe, or to hand over the equivalent of the profits they

think they might make if certain foreign countries were ruled by the United States, their government would most assuredly not grant their request. But millions of people believe that the same capitalists actually involved their country in the Spanish as well as the First World War, and that they profited by so doing. Thereby those who believe this acknowledge that the man in the street can more easily be persuaded to go to war than to pay additional taxes.¹⁴

There is, as we have seen, no great possibility for an individual German to become wealthier by the incorporation of Czechoslovakia and Poland into Germany. Not per capita wealth, but the aggregate national wealth is increased through annexation—and in a war, aggregate wealth counts. The greater the taxable wealth behind an army, and the more soldiers a nation can get from a large population, the greater are its chances of winning. We may, therefore, infer that annexations are valuable because they facilitate further annexations; they are both the aim and the means of advancing imperialism. The system revolves upon itself.

To summarize: the dramatic intervals in which nationalism is felt and followed as a religion are the ones which historians in general record as "history." But in a peaceful world, the ideology of nationalism is an illusion, based on rationalizations.

¹⁴See Walter Sulzbach, *Capitalistic Warmongers—A Modern Superstition* (Chicago, 1942).

THE FUTURE

The future of national consciousness is indissolubly connected with the future of war. If the fighting impulse should vanish or become directed toward different objectives, or should use peaceful methods, national consciousness would wither away. What, then, are the chances that intelligence and knowledge can be made to prevail over emotion and illusory romanticism? Can the experiences of mankind be brought to bear effectively on peaceful international relations? —

The effect of modern war upon the economic and cultural life of the people directly concerned and of the world at large during war and for many years thereafter are fully recognized. But the aims for which nations go to war are not so clearly understood. It is generally taken for granted that the problems leading to war are necessarily very serious since war itself is serious. The thesis of the present study is that this is a paralogism. There are no problems between Germany and France which are not matched by similar ones between Prussia and Saxony, Massachusetts and Maine, Los Angeles and San Francisco, and even between two blocks of houses in any city. There is no conflict of interests between nations. There is a conflict of wills. According to Kant, space, time, casualty, etc., are *a priori* knowledge with man; we understand the world by making use of these categories in organizing the sensations which come to us. However this may be, there is such a thing as a social *a priori*: we see mankind in a certain way and under certain aspects, and thereby produce problems and conflicts which we ourselves have originated.

This being so, the opinion that the conflicts between the nations can only be solved either by peaceful understanding or through war and that the world must choose between the two must be re-examined. There is a third choice: it may be that our social *a priori* can be

changed and that we will then feel indifferent toward problems now considered of the utmost importance. This would certainly be true if men should lose their national consciousness. The character of international relations would necessarily change simultaneously. For such a revolution, the precedent of religious consciousness may be cited. There was a time when men considered it impossible that Catholics and Protestants could live peacefully side by side. But later men became indifferent toward the question of religious denominations and consequently the problems which had sprung from religious consciousness, though never solved, simply disappeared.

The question is: What can be done to bring about a social *a priori* different from national consciousness? Is it a matter of enlightenment and education? Or are the irrational forces in which nationalism is rooted so strong that reflection and persuasion are powerless against them?

The Age of Enlightenment was convinced that men did the wrong thing because their education had been defective. Man was supposed to be open to conviction. The task was simply to achieve the proper environment and introduce an adequate system of education. This optimism has faded. The experience of the last century and a half has proved that where emotion and interests conflict with reasoning, the former may often have the better of it. All the arguments in favor of free trade have been known since the days of Adam Smith and Ricardo. Yet tariffs and export subsidies have come to prevail everywhere. Everything that can be said against militarism and the acquisition of colonies by force was said long ago, without making the slightest impression on the confirmed militarist and imperialist. He answers the argument that the nations can get on by peaceful understanding by quoting Moltke's words that eternal peace is a dream but not a beautiful one, and by contending that humanity will degenerate in a world without war. When these assertions have been properly refuted, he points out that the world's riches must first be redistributed before there can be any talk of disarmament; and if he is forced to admit that the economic value of colonies and other territorial annexations is immensely overrated, he falls back on his original thesis and insists that war is a law of nature. It is the same with all political and economic opinions rooted in emotions and interests. When one argument has been disposed of, there is immediately an-

other to take its place. From this Marx drew the conclusion that only the economic interests matter, while Pareto made a distinction between the emotions and interests (*residui*), which are decisive, and the ideas and arguments (*derivati*), which move in a world of sham and make-believe.

But the pendulum, which had swung too far in the direction of the reasoning man, has now swung too far in the opposite direction. Both Marx and Pareto were convinced that their own arguments carried persuasive force; otherwise they would not have written their books. One example of the force of reasoning is the enormous damage suffered by the Christian churches at the hands of rationalism, the critique of the Bible, materialism, and Darwinism. Political propaganda everywhere appeals to interests and emotions; but at the same time it tries to convince with arguments.

Turning now to the influence of knowledge and reasoning upon the question of war and peace, the outlook seems discouraging when considered *prima facie*. The interests in favor of war—in spite of the myth about the munitions-makers—do not amount to much, but the emotions are so strong that they have been able to prevail in some countries even against the terrible experiences of the years 1914-18. In 1919, the whole world pinned its hope on the League of Nations, and yet there has been no real peace in all the years since then. Is there, then, a chance that reasoning will stand a better chance in the future?

Arguments alone are seldom decisive. The ultimate effect is produced by the arguments plus all the circumstances prevailing at the time. In order to evaluate the outlook for the future, the following questions should be asked and answered: Where does the present general trend appear to lead? What can be done to help the cause of peace?

There may be a trend toward some state of society and opinions at one time and a different trend at another time. Predictions based on the tendency prevailing at a certain moment may, therefore, prove to be entirely wrong. Universal atheism, universal free competition and free trade, democracy everywhere, and socialism in every country have all been confidently expected at some time. Basing his conclusions on the tendencies he believed to be prevailing in 1857, an historian of great intellectual calibre, Henry Thomas Buckle, made a tragically incorrect prediction about the future of war.

That this barbarous pursuit [the practice of war] is, in the progress of society, steadily declining, must be evident, even to the most hasty reader of European history. If we compare one country with another, we shall find that for a very long period wars have been becoming less frequent; and now so clearly is the movement marked, that, until the late commencement of hostilities, we had remained at peace for nearly forty years: a circumstance unparalleled, not only in our own country, but also in the annals of every other country which has been important enough to play a leading part in the affairs of the world. [For this great achievement, Buckle gives the credit to the progress of knowledge.] Supposing the remaining circumstances to be the same, it must happen, that as the intellectual acquisitions of a people increase, their love of war will diminish.¹

Warned by the example of Buckle to be cautious with our conclusions, let us examine first the tendencies which militate in favor of war and national consciousness, and then those which militate against them. Present economic trends are in the direction of giving ever more influence to governments at the expense of individuals. This tendency results from the influence of certain social and socialistic ideas; it has gained strength since the 1870's in times of peace as well as war. In the opinion of the present writer, democracy and private property are intimately related, and democracy collapses when private property is curtailed beyond a certain limit.² In addition, every great war, even one fought for the preservation of democracy and liberty, has certain consequences which are detrimental to free institutions and a peaceful world order. Consequently, socialism—whether mild or full-fledged—and war both bring about circumstances favorable to dictatorship, and dictatorship in turn favors national consciousness.

Current economic trends are influenced by a number of extraordinary and almost revolutionary experiments which have been made in many countries since the First World War. More experiments are being proposed, but the one experiment which would probably imply no risk—the return to *laissez-faire*, unrestricted right of property, free-trade, and free migration—is not even advocated now except by a few isolated scholars who have no following. The tendency is altogether away from *laissez-faire*.

The economic policies of the majority of the countries aim at pre-

¹*History of Civilization in England* (New ed., London, 1882), Vol. I, pp. 190-192.

²*Cf.* Walter Sulzbach, "Tolerance and the Economic System," *Ethics*, Vol. L, No. 3, 1940.

serving private property and free individual competition in principle; at the same time, their governments regulate—to a greater or less degree—prices, wages, employment, the rate of interest, dividends, hours of work, imports and exports, and the investment of capital, and control banks, factories, means of transportation, and public utilities. As a consequence, a host of people have a very personal economic interest in the question of who shall rule the country, whether it is to be their own friends and protectors or the friends and subsidizers of other groups. Political parties tend to stand more and more for definite economic groups and interests. Democracy works where and as long as people are convinced that the interests common to them outweigh those on which they are divided, and as long as there is an ample sphere for private life independent of the political party in power. By continually curtailing this sphere of private liberty and by changing the character of the political party struggle into an economic struggle, governmental control undermines the proper functioning of democratic institutions.

If mutual hatred and greed are not kept within limits, the only alternative is chaos or dictatorship. What has happened in Italy, Germany, and several other European countries resulted from numerous forces other than the economic circumstances indicated above, but the latter played a significant role. The intimate connection between private property and individual competition, on the one hand, and the functioning of democratic institutions, on the other, has not been sufficiently noticed because the leading democratic countries have not yet carried economic control to the ultimate limit. Though, as everyone knows, democracy no longer functions as smoothly as it did prior to 1914, it has been able to withstand communistic and fascist propaganda in every country where there has been an honorable and fairly long democratic tradition. The democratic system, it is true, recently collapsed in France under the impact of defeat; but that is a story in itself.

Obviously, the position of the government becomes stronger and the position of the individual citizen weaker under socialism. According to orthodox Marxian theory, the true socialist community will be internationally organized and the individual sovereign states will be abolished. There is to date no world government, but socialism has actually been tried in one country on a broad scale. The experiment

in Soviet Russia has taught the world much—for instance, that there is no such thing as a classless society, for the more effectively the classes of the capitalists and the proletarians are liquidated under a planned economy, the greater becomes the gap between the power of the ruling class and the lack of power of the ruled. As the lust for power is a normal human impulse, the rulers enjoy their positions and do not think of relinquishing them voluntarily.

We find, then, that modern economic tendencies, when limited to control, are—to put it cautiously—not favorable to the smooth working of democracy, and that full-fledged socialism and dictatorship are intimately related. Before we investigate the relationship between absolutist government and national consciousness, we must consider the tendencies arising from actual warfare such as the present world conflict.

It is certainly no coincidence that up to 1917, when Russia fell into chaos as a result of war, defeat, and revolution, the Bolsheviks were a little known and unimportant group, and that no one predicted anything like Fascism and National Socialism in highly civilized countries. Even the word "Fascism" in its present-day meaning did not exist in the political vocabulary. Mussolini, Hitler and the conditions under which they came to power would have been impossible without the First World War and its aftermath.

John Stuart Mill points out that the economic havoc caused by wars is overcome with surprising speed³. The houses, factories, and roads which have been destroyed or damaged are repaired, and after a short time life goes on as if nothing had happened. This holds true not only in respect to the wars of which Mill had knowledge—among which were the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon—but also in respect to later wars. But unfortunately the damage to the physical equipment of the countries involved is not the main economic set-back. The experience of the two decades since the First World War has shown that the disorganization of capital investments and international trade, the breakdown of currencies, the impoverishment of certain classes but not of others, the struggle between capital and labor, the increase in social hatred, and universal insecurity are far more significant. Physical equipment is a matter of the capital

³*Principles of Political Economy*, I, Chap. 5.

existing at a certain moment, but the other factors mentioned above affect production and income and may curtail the people's economic well-being for many years.

Certain events following the First World War are likely to be repeated after every similar catastrophe. The international gold standard, with the help of which international trade had functioned until 1914, broke down. Even before the opening of the Second World War in 1939, its reconstruction seemed very remote. Tariff walls were raised higher and higher. Confiscation of foreign capital, introduced by the belligerent powers, became universal in the form of the repudiation of foreign debts. The masses, who had suffered so terribly in the years 1914-18 and had been promised a better-social order as a reward for their sacrifices, demanded the fulfilment of this promise and became more easily converted to radical doctrines than ever before. There arose among the defeated nations a class of unemployed and desperate former soldiers who continued to see the world as a place of legitimate slaughter and violence, and therefore constituted a first-rate danger to the social order of the countries concerned. Never did intelligence speak more strongly for the removal of violence from international relations; but the emotions which had been stirred up by war did not die immediately when peace came. It was not evident to everyone that violence and killing, which had been virtues for four years, had suddenly again become crimes. The economic conditions of the victors, the defeated, and the neutrals had been more or less on the same level until 1914. Thereafter, they became widely divergent.

International trade can function only where there are proper currencies and where tariffs and export subsidies are kept within reasonable limits. Democracy functions only where there is respect for the law, abhorrence of internal violence, an unswerving determination to keep the rules and to obey the legitimate government, and a willingness on the part of the ruling party to relinquish power when the opposing party is in the majority. As these conditions were not realized in most countries when the First World War was over, democracy was no longer able to continue its march, which had been a victorious one since the American and the French Revolutions. Dictatorships arose and in the international field, the League of Nations broke down.

Every absolute government is interested in blaming its own shortcomings on others and in making its own people see the supposed rea-

sonableness of obedience to the laws of the land. It will try to give them a feeling of superiority over other people, thereby compensating them for the total lack of influence, dignity, and liberty in the life of the individual. The enemy, on whom poverty and distress are blamed, need not in the beginning be outside the national frontiers. Originally the bourgeoisie served as the scapegoat in Russia; the war-profiteers and the communists in Italy; the Jews and the communists in Nazi Germany. But when some time has elapsed and the internal foe has been disposed of and the tirades against him have become wearisome, external foes are put in the foreground. This evolution took some time in Soviet Russia, but was clearly visible even before the Bolsheviks became obviously imperialistic. The end result is the same, whether a people is urged to feel nationally conscious because upon it falls the honor and the duty to redeem the world from capitalism, or whether rampant nationalism arises without the latter argument. The Italian and German brands of dictatorship were strongly nationalist from the beginning. They gained their following with an anti-Bolshevik slogan, and set one secular religion against another. Nationalism alone appealed, and they made ample use of it.

The social universe contains systems of interactions which have a tendency to regain their equilibrium when upset. Of these, the most significant is the price system. Where there is demand for a commodity, it fetches a good price and the producers make extra profits; thereupon competition sets in, the price goes down, and profits return to their normal level. A superabundance of a commodity results in a low price; there is then no profit in producing it, output is curtailed, competition decreases, and in the end its price goes up again and profits return.

There are other systems of social interactions which not only lack this tendency toward an equilibrium, but tend toward a stabilization of disequilibrium, once it has come about. The relationship between the Jews and anti-Semitism may serve as an example. The disagreeable qualities of some Jews bring about and intensify anti-Semitism, which in turn intensifies the peculiar qualities of the Jews and is a further bar to their adjustment and assimilation. Hence the Jewish question persists.

To which of the two patterns do war and peace belong? There can be no doubt that during the greatest part of human history every

war has been the father of the next war. But it is fortunately by no means certain that the same rule will be valid in the future.

Foremost among the tendencies favoring peace and working against national consciousness is the increasing strength of pacifism. As no one can know for certain how the people feel in the dictatorial countries where they are not allowed expression, the contention that hatred of war is increasing must be based on what is happening in the democracies. The democracies are at present, and have been for some time, intrinsically pacifist; the national consciousness of their citizens is fading under the conviction that war is senseless and ought to be abolished. But prior to the rise of democracy, only the ruling classes showed any interest in public affairs. The masses were indifferent and silent. According to James Bryce:

For nearly fifteen centuries, from the days of Augustus till the Turks captured Constantinople, there was never among the Romans in the Eastern Empire, civilized as they were, any more than there had been in the West till the imperial power ceased at Rome in the fifth century, a serious attempt either to restore free government, or even to devise a regular constitutional method for choosing the autocratic head of the state.

Few things in history are more remarkable than the total eclipse of all political thought and total abandonment of all efforts to improve political conditions in a highly educated and intelligent population such as were the inhabitants of the Western half of the Empire till the establishment there of barbarian kingdoms in the fifth and sixth centuries, and such as were the Helleno-Romans round the Aegean Sea till many centuries later Men were tired of politics. . . . The few active minds cared for other things, or perhaps despaired. The masses were indifferent, and would not have listened. When a rising occurred it was because men desired good government, not self-government.⁴

With the rise of democracy and with the spread of liberty—which was by no means absent in some non-democratic states, as, for instance, the German Reich of the Hohenzollerns—the political attitude of the people became ascertainable.

Prior to the American and French revolutions, at a time when absolute monarchs and aristocracies still ruled every European country and the “philosophers” had to turn to antiquity for examples of democratic institutions, a number of politically-minded authors held an opinion on patriotism which is worth quoting. It emphasizes a truth which is not limited to particular historical circumstances. La

⁴James Bryce, *Modern Democracies* (New York, 1921), Vol. I, p. 27.

Bruyère wrote, toward the end of the seventeenth century: "There is no fatherland under despotism. Other things take its place: interest, glory, the service of the prince." Voltaire stated in 1752: "The citizen of a republic is always more attached to his country than the subject of a prince, because one loves one's own possession more than the possession of one's master." All the philosophers of the Age of Enlightenment were in accord that there is no fatherland where there is no liberty. They praised the English Puritans who went to America and the French Protestants who went to Prussia, England, and Holland, and thereby chose, as their voluntarily adopted fatherlands, countries where they felt that they could be free.⁵

When the ideals of democracy took hold of one people after another, the problem arose concerning the best constitution; another problem was how to delimit the several national groups which were to have democratic institutions. We have observed how the dividing lines between nations originated and how the nations continued the foreign policies of the princes in order to satisfy the human fighting impulse. Democracy did not mean pacifism. The leading democratic countries have gone to war many times as aggressors, particularly when it was a question of colonial expansion. But recently a fact of outstanding importance has emerged: the democratic nations are relinquishing imperialism, and in some cases are even willing to give up territory they already possess.

Great Britain has given complete self-government, not only to its dominions overseas, but also to Ireland, and is emancipating one colony after the other. India is definitely on the way to dominion status. The same tendency has been evident in the colonial policy of France. The United States liberated Cuba but did not annex it, and it was eager (up to its entrance into the war) to get rid of its responsibilities in the Philippines. The idea that all the existing colonies should be taken out of the hands of the powers which are today their masters in order to turn them over to a future League of Nations is very popular even in England, where the proposal to return Germany's lost colonies was widely acclaimed before the rise of Hitler. As far as the policy of the democracies is concerned, the traditional ideas about colonies are fading, and the colonial system is in full dissolution.

⁵A. Aulard, *Le Patriotisme Français de la Renaissance à la Revolution* (Paris, 1921, pp. 26, 44, 30.

There are also significant signs that national consciousness itself, when left alone and not artificially stirred, is moving in the same direction. Before the present war, and even in some countries after it had started, the people in the democracies have shown a surprising indifference toward the conservation of their national states, their honor, power, and glory. The will to make sacrifices for national ideals has evidently weakened.

What happened in England and France in 1938 was quite symptomatic. France was bound by treaty to stand with Czechoslovakia, and England had indicated that she would probably do the same. In giving way to Hitler at Munich, both countries acknowledged themselves beaten before they had fought, and thus sacrificed their national honor. This was the first time a sacrifice of such magnitude had been made in modern history. No misinterpretation was possible. Had there been strong nationalistic leaders in either country, or in both, things would possibly have been different. But the masses, left to themselves, showed themselves overwhelmingly in favor of peace at almost any price. When Chamberlain and Daladier returned from Munich, they were cheered. Of all the implications of the Munich capitulation, this was perhaps the most important. Its meaning was that in England and France the average man had decided that there were values higher than war-like courage and prestige. It is, of course, true that both countries went to war a year later. But this they did only because there was practically no other choice.

Men generally believe what they wish to be true. Future historians will continually be amazed by the blindness with which countries like Belgium, Holland, and particularly France and England failed to arm adequately when faced with the growing menace of Hitlerism. They will ponder the question of why the democracies did not stop German armament at a time when it would have been possible almost without firing a shot. The main reason for the apathy of the Democratic nations is to be found in the fact that they had become so peace-loving and so little disposed to sacrifice the pleasures of civil life for the sake of making their national sovereignties unassailable, that they choose to believe that Hitler's future behavior would be different from his record in the past.

In France particularly, the love of home and the attachment to the local "*petite patrie*" have undergone no change. But the deter-

mination to consider the frontiers of France sacred and inviolable, so strong with almost every Frenchman in 1870-71 and 1914-18, must have become weaker in the two decades after the first World War. Many Frenchmen were willing even to discuss Alsace-Lorraine with Germany, if only peace could be secured; others were so absorbed in party strife and hatred that they coined the slogan: "Rather Hitler than Léon Blum." The British people put up a magnificent fight after their cherished self-deception had been destroyed by Hitler. But it may well be that even the British position no longer fundamentally tends toward British nationality. Winston Churchill was willing to merge Great Britain and France into one single state, and very many Englishmen would welcome a fusion of the British Empire with the United States. That is a long way from the feeling of the nations at the turn of the century!

The United States, having entered World War I after the right of neutrals to sail their ships had been violated, enacted a neutrality law by which it forbade its ships access to areas dangerous to shipping in the event of new hostilities. Quite clearly it was hoped that this legislation would make another embroilment in foreign conflicts impossible. But gradually the attitude of the majority of the American people underwent a change. Significantly enough, the change was brought about almost entirely by rational reflections on the dangers threatening an isolated America in the event of an Axis victory. Emotions played a minor part. How otherwise can it be explained that while the older people favored all-out aid to Britain, the majority of the younger generation stood for isolationism—a reversal of the normal reaction in similar emergencies.⁶ It is also characteristic of the pacifism of the nation during the last decades that many Americans have felt that the First World War was an enterprise into which they had been unsuspectingly tricked for the sake of British and French imperialism. When there is strong national feeling, the people view their military history very differently.

It is quite possible that when the present war is over, the smaller nations will be more willing than before to give up voluntarily a part of their national independence. When people come to the conviction that certain things, however high their value, can no longer be feasibly

⁶Of course, when Japan attacked the United States, national unity, as was to be expected, was achieved immediately.

defended and saved, they may acquiescently accept a new order. In the light of their recent experiences, the small nations may desire to voluntarily forego a part or the whole of their national sovereignty for the sake of security.

When a religion loses its force, it is either replaced by another transcending or secular religion or it is succeeded by all-round individualism. At present, no new religion is taking the place of national consciousness. In conformity with developments in ancient times and at the end of the Middle Ages, religion is now giving way to individualism. This does not mean that we are heading toward the state of society anticipated by Herbert Spencer. At a time when the masses look to the state for the improvement of their well-being, this would be the last thing to expect. What we are witnessing is the normal disintegration of formerly accepted values. As Bertrand Russell puts it:

In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the wars between Catholics and Protestants filled Europe and all large-scale propaganda was in favor of one or other of the two creeds. Yet ultimate victory went to neither party, but to those who thought the issues between them unimportant If the world, in the near future, becomes divided between Communists and Fascists, the final victory will go to neither, but to those who shrug their shoulders and say, like *Candide*, "*Cela est bien dit, mais il faut cultiver notre jardin.*" The ultimate limit to the power of creeds is set by boredom, weariness, and love of ease.⁷

The relinquishment of the principle of national honor by some small states, and by the large democracies under certain circumstances, is to a large extent the consequence of the evolution of armaments and war techniques in recent times. War has been mechanized; and the more this has been the case, the less room remains for personal heroism. That nation has the best chance of winning which is most thoroughly industrialized and which is best able and willing to spend large sums for armaments. The Ethiopians and Albanians were just as brave as the Italians; the Poles were just as brave as the Germans. But they had no chance against superior machines. In the words of Winston Churchill: "War, which used to be cruel and magnificent, has become cruel and squalid."

The naval blockade has become an ever more efficient weapon, because the civilized nations have evolved an economic system based on

⁷*Power; A New Social Analysis* (New York, 1938), p. 156.

international trade and dependent upon imports from foreign countries. An efficient blockade may decide a war, as it did in 1914-18 and possibly will do in the present conflict; but a blockade is not romantic. Most significant of all is the airplane which draws the civilian into the war zone. He is no longer able to enjoy the excitement of war as a well-protected witness. It is true that enemies with equal power in the air have the possibility of revenge for every damage suffered. But the less civilized combatant has the advantage. The destruction of the famous French and English cathedrals cannot be compensated for in the minds of the English people by the possible destruction of the cathedral of Cologne, but for men like Hitler and Goering the latter means nothing at all. With the airplane as a weapon, a nation may victoriously defend its frontiers, possibly conquer foreign territory, and win the war, but in so doing its own country may be wrecked from the air.

Romanticism can live longer than the reality it glorifies, as has been evident in the case of war. But when the gap between the two grows wider and wider, romanticism will have to give way in the end. In war, this phase has possibly been reached. When the First World War began in 1914, the war was popular in all countries involved. When the Second World War began in 1939, it was popular nowhere, not even in Germany.

Balancing the several conflicting tendencies against each other, we come to the following conclusion: International attitudes and relations, as they had developed between 1919 and 1939, could not possibly persist. The several nations paid nothing more than lip-service to the international order represented by the League of Nations. The most they were willing to do in order to make this international order effectual was the introduction of "sanctions" against the violator of peace. Even this was not done thoroughly; and the majority of the members of the League, not to mention those nations which were not members, went this far with reluctance. While the majority of the peoples of the earth were in favor of a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of all international conflicts, they were not willing to grasp the means implementing this result. They did not attach sufficient importance to the outlawing of war. Their interest was limited to measures short of war. But at the same time, while boasting that they

would always fight for their own national interest and honor, in a world full of aggression the democratic nations were partly unable and partly not really determined to do so. Where there was democracy, the will to fight had abated; where this will was strong, democracy had vanished.

At present the dictatorships have gained ground everywhere. But this tendency may soon be reversed. And though the dictators have effectively glorified national consciousness, their successes do not necessarily mean a strengthening of this impulse. Like every other great social movement—especially Christianity and democracy—national consciousness has risen and grown under a measure of liberty and free discussion in competition with other ideas. Whatever enthusiastic followers these movements have had they have stood by their idea because they had chosen it voluntarily and believed it represented truth. They might have made a different choice. It is with this background of freedom that ideas become living forces. Under a dictatorship, men are forced to confess a certain faith, and can no longer listen to divergent views; though the vigor with which they pronounce their commanded conviction may become greater, the faith itself loses its power and becomes a matter of routine. Spontaneity vanishes and the confessions of the faithful, repeated over and over again, cease to evoke any genuine sentiment. All this happened to Christianity at the end of the Middle Ages, after the Church had monopolized all thinking and teaching; and only when the Reformation had challenged the Church of Rome did Catholicism awaken from its stupor and once more become a living creed. Should national consciousness be glorified in the future only under dictatorial governments, it will lose the spiritual impulse to which it owes its original greatness. While flourishing externally, it will die internally.

But the present war may possibly call a halt to the decay of national consciousness in those democracies which survive. The fate of France will be taken to heart and hammered into the minds of the younger generation. And the new glory won in the present war will be turned to the best account. It must be remembered, on the other hand, that nations which have fought for democracy are not always in a position to preserve democracy in their own countries after the devastations of war. The financial and social conditions of England, after a war which began when the effects of the years 1914-18 had

still not been overcome, may render the working of her democratic system of government well-nigh impossible, at least for some time. The fate of France is even more obscure.

To summarize: Current economic tendencies and the probable short-run consequences of the present war favor dictatorship and an increase of nationalism; but where the truth is brought to bear against errors and a fallacious romanticism, truth will as a rule prevail. The forces working against war are so strong that one is justified in feeling relatively optimistic. Obviously there is greater hope for a peaceful world if the fascist powers are defeated.

We come now to a consideration of the second question formulated above. What can be done to help the cause of peace? The assumption is made that the democracies, emerging victoriously from their struggle against fascism, will be favored in their task of reconstruction by predominantly pacifist trends. The proposals in behalf of peace fall into two groups; first, the organization of international collaboration; and second, education and propaganda.

The League of Nations did not fail because of technical deficiencies of the League covenant. It failed because the nations which were members of the League acknowledged the supreme value of national consciousness and rejected a curtailment of national sovereignties. Thus they attempted to use an international organization for national aims.

As long as nations and their governments continue to think in terms of territory, honor and power, problems which would otherwise simply not exist will predominate, and the best that can be hoped for is mutual tolerance, with occasional arbitration of differences. The various governments will be eager to give away the minimum and secure the maximum; and when this does not succeed there will be national indignation. One side will always be pressing for a new arrangement or will threaten revenge.

If the participants in a league of nations consider the specifically national values as the highest values, international collaboration against aggressive and treaty-breaking states will not work, regardless of any clever scheme invented for an international parliament and the distribution of voting power among the several states. What happened when the League imposed sanctions against Italy in 1935-36 and expelled Russia in 1939 will probably happen again in the future. Every

member will ask: Which nation is the most interested, which the least; who runs the greatest political and commercial risk, who runs the least? No international organization for the preservation and enforcement of peace will function along these lines. But if national consciousness should recede into the background, and the consciousness of values common to all mankind should gain in strength, a new League of Nations may very well succeed. No greater task faces the victorious powers once Germany and Japan are defeated.

The framers of the future peace treaty will be confronted with the principle of nationality as were their predecessors in 1919. It is a safe guess that their point of departure will be the right of all the people to national self-determination. They will be well aware that the peace treaties of 1919 were based on this principle, and actually gave national self-determination to millions of people who had not had it previously; but that nevertheless in regard to the elimination of armaments and future wars, the treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon, and so on, have proved to be conspicuous failures. And they may accept the great legend of 1919-1939 that ~~if~~ only Germany had kept her colonies, had not been ordered to disarm and pay reparations, if Italy had received more territory in Africa, if Hungary had not been forced to cede a great part of her area to her neighbors, the hope for a better world order entertained in 1919 might have come true.

But if this happens they will be laboring under a thoroughly superficial political theory and a doctrine pregnant with dangers for the future. For the failures of 1919 resulted from a false interpretation of the essence of national consciousness. When the statesmen once more sit down round the conference table, this time to clear up the wreckage wrought by the Second World War, nothing will be more important than that they shall understand the true meaning of the principle of nationality better than did their predecessors at Versailles.⁸

What did the principle of nationality mean to the framers of the peace treaties that ended the 1914-18 war? Imbued with the teach-

⁸Incidentally, the defeat of the Axis powers and Japan is not the only condition for tolerable international relations in the future. It must also come about that Great Britain and the United States will have the power to restrain the Russians, Poles, and Czechs from seizing as much German territory as they can and treating the Germans as they have been treated by them.

ings of the Age of Enlightenment, and conscious of the more recent theories of "progress," they founded their decisions on the conviction that man is fundamentally social, peaceful, and good. Let the war-mongering rulers of the various aggressive monarchies be removed, give to all the people national self-determination and democratic institutions in general—thus they believed—and those who have been formerly oppressed will become advocates of mutual tolerance, while the former oppressors will learn to disdain wars and to appreciate the benefits of a peaceful economy and international goodwill. To be sure, men like Clemenceau did not put much confidence in the Germans, at least not in the short run. But he, too, believed in the principle of nationality as the proper basis for the organization of the world. Little progress has been made since 1919. We still find the vast majority of the political and intellectual leaders of the democracies laboring under an entirely mistaken concept of the essence of national consciousness. They still associate it with liberty instead of with power, and still believe that "national self-determination" concerns only those who enjoy it, and is no concern of their neighbors. But, as the tragic events of the present war have shown, the lives of millions of human beings are involved when "national self-determination" leads to the glorification of power—and to war.

The enthusiastic believers in the principle of national self-determination with their demands that every nation should "work out its own destiny" should not attempt again to frame a new world order without clearly understanding the meaning of "national destiny." A nation's "destiny" is not concerned with its culture but with its foreign policy, where the prize is the distribution of power. Even at Versailles, where the League of Nations was set up, the several governments should have had more insight into the meaning of national consciousness. The mere idea that the League should be entitled and empowered to take away territory from one member state and give it to another was universally scorned; thus it was acknowledged that no nation could be asked to acquiesce in growing smaller; and (by inference) that it is to the advantage of a nation to add to its territory. While dynamic imperialism was understood and condemned, static imperialism was not understood; and national consciousness, instead of being interpreted in the terms of imperialism, was mistaken for the love of home and homeland.

At the future peace conference there may possibly be some who believe that the case for peace will be strengthened if minorities are exchanged and thereby made harmless. This has been done before, between Turkey and Greece, and between Greece and Bulgaria. The result seems to have been satisfactory, though toward the end of 1941 the Bulgarians evidently have started a new movement to expel Greek inhabitants from territory "originally" Bulgarian. Were the principle of nationality static, the exchange of minorities might well be a solution for frontier troubles. But minorities are not always oppressed. Where they are, their position is quite often the consequence of their own political ambitions to join another state where they may be of the dominant group. This ambition, in turn, is more often than not the consequence of the imperialism of the neighboring nation. When a nation is imperialistic, it produces its own arguments. Eugene Staley has shown in a remarkable book⁹ that foreign investments have rarely led to wars, but that the leaders of ambitious nations have often used private investments as pretexts for political and territorial demands. It is the same with national minorities. Whether the existence of minorities involves problems is frequently decided, not by the minorities concerned or the people among whom they live, but by persons and groups not directly involved.

Too much attention may be paid to minority exchanges by the believers in nationality as a static principle, with the resultant neglect of another problem of great significance. When the boundaries of the several states are drawn in conformity with language and other national lines, a number of states emerge that are unable to defend themselves when attacked by stronger neighbors. In a world in which future wars are a possibility, these states are not only themselves permanently imperiled but their weak position constitutes a danger to other peaceful nations. In such a world, the principle of the balance of power is logical and sound. But the principle of nationality, pure and simple, is no solution at all.

The peace treaties of 1919 and 1920 put their main emphasis on the principle of nationality, and the newly founded League of Nations was subordinated to it. If the peace treaties of the Second World War are to be better than their predecessors, they must re-

⁹*War and the Private Investor: A Study in the Relations of International Politics and International Private Investment* (New York, 1935).

verse this relationship and subordinate the principle of nationality. No objection can be raised against frontier lines drawn as far as practicable in conformity with language lines or other national concepts and demands. But first there must be a strong new League of Nations with the power to interfere with national sovereignties and restrict them in the interest of the world at large. To bring about such an organization will be the foremost task of the future peace settlement, a task which far transcends all other international problems awaiting solution. Let us hope that when the time comes to remold our world wrecked by two world wars, the people at large and their leaders will have given enough thought to the principle of nationality to rid themselves of misplaced sentimental associations.

The provisions of the covenant of the future league and the surrender of a part of the sovereignty of every state to a central world executive will in themselves mean little unless national consciousness is deemphasized.

It should be noted that though the League of Nations did not achieve what it set out to accomplish, its failure was not a factor in the present catastrophe. Things happened more or less as if the League of Nations at Geneva did not exist. Those who venture into a second league experiment should be armed with more insight as well as more power than was possessed in 1919. They have much to win and absolutely nothing to lose.

What can education and propaganda do to prevent war in the future? The American philosopher, William James, has probably given the best answer. According to James, what is needed is a "moral equivalent for war," a "substitute for war's disciplinary function." As pointed out by Horace M. Kallen: "Peace should be more than the mere absence of war it appears to be; it should be a *substitute* for war, liberating the same impulse, evoking the same virtues, developing the same strengths, without exacting the price of war in personal freedom and general wealth; without, that is, coercing cooperation for ends of destruction."¹¹ The fighting impulse, then, would be conserved; there would still be idealism and sacrifice; but the aims as well as the means of what had hitherto been war would become different. We quote Bovet:

¹⁰*The Moral Equivalent of War* (New York, 1910), pp. 13, 15.

¹¹*Of War and Peace*, p. 385.

In discussing the sublimation of the instinct in the individual, we distinguish three characteristic stages: first, the crude instinct realising itself in physical behaviour; then an intermediate stage, in which physical behaviour, though still in evidence, is enhalved by the ideal at the service of which it is put; finally, complete sublimation, the primitive behaviour having disappeared, and the psychic forces within it being now utilized for the good of society. In the history of political states this evolution of pugnacity has so far hardly passed beyond the second stage.

We are no longer at the first stage A large number of political states are in the second. They fight as hard as of yore, but they commit brutal acts only in the service of an idea—the fatherland, liberty, right as against might, “the war to end war”. . . .

The third phase, in which the whole of instinctive pugnacity would be transformed into a grand collective effort on behalf of humanity, has not yet been reached by any political state.¹²

In the world of the future—should wars and their evils be eliminated—what outlet will men have for their fighting impulse, who or what will be the foe? It would no doubt be to the greatest advantage of mankind if enthusiasm could be aroused for a sustained effort toward overcoming and taming nature. “Man against microbe” is one of the slogans that has been recommended. The only statement that can be made with certainty in this connection is that the proposition has as yet never aroused mass enthusiasm. Men know and acknowledge that the progress of mankind has come through fighting nature, but this fails to excite and inflame them. A description of the exertions and sacrifices which have been necessary to achieve technical progress and overcome epidemic diseases does not as yet stir the same emotions as does the epic of the battle of Marathon or Waterloo. Predictions concerning future human attitudes are always risky. All we can do is to state the task and add a note of skepticism.

The prime task is the negative one of getting rid of the traditional war-spirit. For this, it is necessary first, to sublimate the fighting impulse; and second, to refute and ridicule national ideologies. Intellectual reasoning alone will not accomplish the task. But if the desirability of heroism is recognized, ridiculing the heroic concept held by the nationalists may bear fruits. To a certain type of romanticism, Cervantes’ *Don Quixote* once gave the death blow. The same procedure may succeed again.

¹²*Op. cit.*, pp. 158-159.

The romantic hot-head, with his assortment of well-tried metaphors, can survive any number of pacifist appeals and warnings, but laughter kills him at once. . . . The only thing to do is to make the gentleman who is roaring about mailed fists, shining armour, hearts of oak, look the fool he is, and to demonstrate clearly that the war to which he is heading us would not be a fine adventure but a stupendous piece of slapstick, a farce as big as a continent. . . . If someone offered me fifty thousand pounds . . . to make a pacifist film, I should not hesitate to make it a comic satirical one, in which whole armies were unmercifully guyed.¹³

Should it be possible to bring about a lasting fighting spirit against stupidity and romantic pompousness, this would serve the cause of peace better than the Marxist indignation and proclamations against the "bourgeoisie," the "exploiters," and the "capitalistic war-mongers." In the meantime, nothing must be left undone in analyzing and destroying the prevailing concepts of race, national character, and national interests; this is important despite the fact that these concepts are secondary phenomena and will vanish automatically with the passing of the spirit and appeal of war which have brought them about.

The day will certainly come when national consciousness will have meaning for the historians alone. It has not existed during the greatest part of history and it will not exist forever. The question at present is simply how long it is still destined to determine the fate of mankind, and what can be done to bring about its speedy end. When this end comes, nothing will be lost and much will be gained. The love of home and homeland will not be affected at all. But the several states, representing the administrative organizations under which men must necessarily continue to live, will be able to cover a larger area than heretofore, particularly in Europe. Their number will shrink when frontiers are no longer determined by the principle of nationality. Once the love of home and homeland has been separated from the impulse toward segregating and fighting and the spirit of imperialism has died, mankind will at last be set free for the problems and tasks which are really important.

¹³Priestly, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

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